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Abstract
This paper examines national Internet control from a policy regime perspective. The 
mechanisms through which governments attempt to control the Internet may be devel-
oped and implemented by different institutions and agencies, or fall outside of a formal 
regulatory structure entirely. As such, the totality of the institutions and practices of na-
tional Internet control is better conceptualized not as a regulatory regime, but as a control 
regime. After a survey of the critical policy and control dimensions, a six-part typology of 
control regimes is proposed. The purpose of this study and typology is exploratory. With 
comparative research about Internet control regimes at a relatively early stage, this paper 
aims to enable the formation of concepts and hypotheses about the interrelationship, or 
co-presence, of key distinguishing variables in different Internet control regimes. 
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Chapter One
Internet Policy Primer
Introduction 
All of the major works on state control of the Internet—including Lessig's Code 
and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999), Kalathil and Boas' Open Networks, Closed Re-
gimes (2003), Goldsmith & Wu's Who Controls the Internet (2006), and Deibert's Access 
series (2008; 2010; 2011)—open with a now-familiar narrative: In the early 1990s, the 
expansion of the Internet was widely perceived as a threat to the nation-state status quo. 
The full potential and commercial applicability of the technology was still unknown, of 
course, but prominent policy makers and tech pundits agreed that this network-of-net-
works would soon facilitate the circumvention of traditional barriers of distance and bor-
ders, while the technology’s decentralized architecture—a labyrinthine web of channels 
and routers—would place the medium outside the reach of any one state’s direct control.1 
Skeptical readers might question the pervasiveness of this ostensibly “convention-
al” wisdom. Did a majority—or even a slight plurality—of pundits and policy makers in 
the 1990s really believe that the Internet could function outside of the regulatory reach 
of national governments? Or have rhetorical framing devices and cherry-picked quotes 
simply been reproduced enough times to lend credence to a faulty premise?2 
Upon closer examination, aspects of this narrative do seem misleading given the 
diversity of arguments and policy positions in circulation. Still, variations of the “ungov-
ernable” claim were quite common and clearly permeated the policy dialogue.3 Prominent 
1 The term Internet first appeared in 1974 in reference to a technology that connected numerous networks 
using an Internet protocol communication suite. Protocol here refers to the process through which comput-
ers transfer bits of information over networked wires, and Internet Protocol (IP) and Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) were the first networking protocols defined in this standard. By the early 1990s, the term 
Internet became shorthand for all computer networking activities (Schulte, 2013, p. 3).
2 In the wake of the Arab Spring, for instance, Malcolm Gladwell (2010, Oct. 4; 2011, Feb. 2) and other 
prominent authors published articles swatting down maximalist claims about Twitter toppling dictators. But 
the pollyanna arguments Gladwell and others engaged with were largely unattributed, and its doubtful that 
many observers really believed that Twitter caused the Arab Spring or similar uprisings. See Rosen (2011) 
for other examples.
3 See Johnson and Post (1995) and Shields (1996).
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international relations theorists, economists, and cyber-enthusiasts agreed that the Internet 
would amplify the disruptive effects of globalization on international regulatory regimes.4 
Some Silicon Valley ideologues went a step further, arguing that the Internet was the 
vanguard technology of a coming wave of social and economic change that would crash 
against the borders of national governments and smash the chains that tethered humanity 
to territorial rule.5 
"The Internet cannot be regulated," MIT Media Lab founder Nicholas Negroponte 
famously pronounced. "It's not that the laws aren't relevant, it's that the nation-state is not 
relevant. Cyberlaw is, by nature, global and we're not very good at global law" (Higgins 
& Azhar, 1996, Feb. 5, p. 9).6
Negroponte could not have been more mistaken. Drezner (2008), Goldsmith and 
Wu (2006), and other authors have detailed the extent to which great power states (and 
the private interests they represent) are the primary actors in the global governance of 
the Internet—although the terms “global governance” and “global law” are themselves 
misleading as they underemphasize the extent to which national law and less formalized 
control mechanisms linked to national governments are the most fundamental controls on 
Internet access, activity, and functionality. 
While Negroponte’s statement and similar claims were obviously incorrect, it 
is true that the era of self-regulated, “open Internet” did persist from the technology’s 
development in the 1960s until the dot-com tech boom in the late 1990s (Palfrey, 2010).7 
But policy makers’ hands-off approach during this period ultimately reflected a lack of 
4 The Economist's Frances Cairncross articulated the globalization argument in her book The Death of 
Distance (2000): “Government jurisdictions are geographic. The Internet knows few boundaries. The clash 
between the two will reduce what individual countries can do. Government sovereignty, already eroded by 
forces such as trade liberalization, will diminish further” (p. 177, quoted in Drezner, 2007, p. 93).
5 See Barbrook and Cameron (1996) for a summary and critique of this perspective, which the authors 
famously refer to as the "Californian ideology."
6 Negroponte’s Being Digital (1996) is one of the ur-texts of cyberutopianism. 
7 Nearly every aspect of the Internet’s development occurred under the auspices of the US government and 
state-funded universities. But US authorities were largely passive custodians for several decades as the 
Internet expanded from a series of connected intranets to a commercialized “information superhighway” 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Eko, 2012). 
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interest rather than a lack of means. By the end of the decade, states around the globe had 
begun asserting control of the technology by enacting laws aimed at regulating the seg-
ments of the Internet within their domestic borders, or at least staking a claim that these 
critical parts of the network were within the ambit of their legal jurisdiction. National 
governments—democratic and authoritarian—worked in coordination with private tech 
companies to erect a variety of information and e-commerce controls, and the view that 
cyberspace was beyond the reach of real-space regulation faded (Palfrey, 2010; Lessig, 
2006). 
No incident better symbolized this shift than Bill Clinton’s visit to an Internet café 
in Shanghai in 1998. After speaking with the young and enthusiastic clientele, the Presi-
dent joked to reporters that China’s efforts to “crack down” on the Internet would be like 
“trying to nail Jell-O to the wall”—a prediction that proved widely off-the-mark (Gold-
smith & Wu, 2006, p. 90). Only months after Clinton’s off-the-cuff remarks, the Chinese 
government criminally prosecuted three prominent democracy activists for their online 
efforts to organize an opposition political party—the “China Democracy Party,” which 
one of the activists had tried to register officially in the wake of Clinton’s visit (Rosen-
thal, 1998, Dec. 19, p. 5). That same year, the government initiated the so-called Great 
Firewall project, a global Internet filtering system developed over the next five years for 
a staggering estimated cost of  $160 million (The Economist, 2013a, April 6; Hagestad II, 
2012, p. 253).
The mechanisms governments employed to regulate and control the Internet 
reflected diverse policy goals and varying levels of enforcement capability. This chapter 
describes the emergence and function of Internet regulatory regimes, which are general-
ly—but not exclusively—focused on the economic aspects of the Internet at the national 
level.8 Internet regulation at the international level also covers economic and develop-
8 The term regulation generally describes an array of public policies explicitly designed to govern econom-
ic activity and its consequences at the level of the industry, firm, or individual unit of activity (Eisner, 2000, 
pp. 5-6).
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mental issues, as well as more functional aspects of the technology. The chapter then ex-
amines Internet control regimes, a term Zheng (2008) uses in reference to the government 
agencies and policy mechanisms that function to control Internet access and activity for 
political and social reasons, and Yang (2009) uses more broadly in reference to the total-
ity of the institutions and practices of Internet control, including the regulatory regime 
framework. After explaining why the latter use of the term is more appropriate for com-
parative analysis, the final section of this chapter identifies the paper’s central research 
question and argument, and outlines the structure of the following chapters. 
Internet Regulatory Regimes 
In the social sciences, the term regime generally refers to governmental systems 
and the institutional frameworks that establish their legal and administrative parameters 
(Eko, 2012, p. 34).  While the term is occasionally applied to an entire governing system,9 
it is more accurate—and more practical—to use the term with reference to a specific 
policy area. Policy regimes are anchored within a specific institutional structure encom-
passing both formal rules and decision-making procedures and informal rules of action 
based on shared principles, norms, and beliefs. The policy regime analytical framework 
developed as a variation of regime theory geared towards policy formulation and imple-
mentation at the national level (Wilson, 2000). This framework is especially useful for 
analyzing Internet policy, as it allows us to identify explicit links between policy makers, 
policy, and mechanisms of control.
Internet policy is often presented as a regulatory regime. Internet regulatory 
regimes at both the national and international level are focused on the economic implica-
tions and applications of the Internet and related Information and Communication Tech-
nology (ICT),10 although the regulatory framework also captures intervention on behalf of 
9 As political columnist William Safire (2007) famously summarized, "a regime is a government you don't 
like" (p. 298).
10 The term Information and Communications Technology (ICT) refers to all technologies and devices used 
in managing and processing information systems. ICT is a critical social and economic concept, as it is con-
sidered one of the three major technological breakthroughs—alongside steam power and electricity—of the 
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the “public interest”—a concept subject to varying interpretations. The emergence of the 
Internet as a commercial platform disrupted existing regulatory models and mandates that 
had traditionally distinguished media policy from telecommunications policy. The former 
developed as a means to shape the conduct and content of the mass media (namely, the 
press and broadcasting outlets) as media of public communication. Telecommunications 
policy, in contrast, was perceived as a more technical policy field concerning the inter-
state communication between individuals by technological means—i.e. radio, telephone, 
wire, cable, and satellite (Psychogiopoulou & Anagnostou, 2012; Freedman, 2008).
The browsable format of the Internet that has existed for slightly more than two 
decades muddles this distinction by placing press and broadcast content on a telecommu-
nications platform alongside a variety of independent and user-generated content, and its 
integration across economic sectors invites further policy interventions from a variety of 
political, economic, social, and cultural actors and interests (Psychogiopoulou & Anag-
nostou, 2012; Freedman, 2008).11 Furthermore, the digital data flowing across the Internet 
is no longer just web text and relatively small packet exchanges; it now includes massive 
Big Data bundles of financial transaction data and mobile communications.12 An oft-cited 
McKinsey Global Institute report notes that Big Data has become integrated into nearly 
every industry and business function, and is now as important a factor of production as 
labor and capital (Manyika, Chui, Brown, Bughin, Dobbs, Roxburgh, & Byers, 2011).13  
modern era (Edquist & Henrekson, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, its important to understand that 
ICT’s most important contemporary function is serving as the physical conduit of digital data. Although at 
one time ICT was weighed equally between analogue and digital technology, today nearly all information is 
transmitted digitally. This digital revolution began with the adoption and proliferation of digital computers 
and digital record keeping, and effectively amplified the transformative power of the ICT revolution (Küng, 
Picard, & Towse, 2008, p. 3).
11 The application most commonly associated with the Internet is the World Wide Web, a site-linking hy-
pertext system developed in 1991.  But the World Wide Web should not be considered synonymous with 
the Internet—it is simply one application that operates using the network. Other Internet-enabled software 
includes email, file transfer protocol, and a variety of peer-to-peer file sharing programs (Solum, 2009, pp. 
48-49).
12 The MGI report defines Big Data as datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software 
tools to capture, store, manage, and analyze (Manyika & Chui, 2011, p. 1).
13 MGI estimates that, by 2009, nearly all sectors in the US economy had at least an average of 200 tera-
bytes of stored data per company with more than 1,000 employees. 200 terabytes is more than twice the 
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Internet regulatory policy is thus reflective of the technology’s dual functional role as 
content platform and digital data distribution system.
The three commonly identified models of national Internet regulation are not 
dissimilar from other public policy regulatory approaches: a "command-and-control" or 
state model, in which public authorities make the rules, enforce them, and punish those 
who breach them; a self-regulation model, in which private sector actors largely make 
the rules and implement them collectively without any public intervention; and a co-reg-
ulation model, in which policy drafting, implementation, and enforcement are spread 
between a number of public and private actors, but initiated and overseen by the state 
(Kleinsteuber, 2004; Frydman, Hennebel, & Lewkowicz, 2012). Although this framework 
presents a useful starting point for Internet policy regime analysis, it is at once too broad 
in application, as the United States, European Union member states, and various devel-
opmental countries utilize regulatory approaches that can be characterized as co-regula-
tory, and too narrow in conceptual scope, as laws and regulations are only as effective as 
a government’s capability to enforce them. For the purposes of comparative analysis, a 
country’s regulatory approach is better conceptualized as a policy backdrop against which 
diverse control mechanisms operate rather than a policy blueprint that dictates the mecha-
nisms application. 
The effectiveness of any of these regulatory models varies from country-to-coun-
try and from activity-to-activity. National regulation of the Internet generally works well 
when the regulated activity is well defined in existing law and all of the parties to the 
regulated activity are identifiable and located within the physical territory of the na-
tion-state. Published content on the web, for example, is subject to laws on defamation. 
Internet fraud is subject to criminal sanction. And peer-to-peer file sharing of copyrighted 
material subjects users to civil or criminal liability. With regard to these examples and 
more complicated e-commerce issues, the role of national law is critical even if its pres-
size of US retailer Wal-Mart's data warehouse in 1999 (Manyika & Chui &, 2011).
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ence is often taken for granted. But national regulation of the Internet is inherently costly 
and ineffective when the object of regulation is either content that originates outside of 
national boundaries or the architecture of the Internet itself. These two regulatory issues 
are sometimes related, as regulation of architecture may be a means to more effective 
regulation of content (Solum, 2009, pp. 68-69, 75). 
Internet regulation at the international level—often referred to as Internet gov-
ernance—has proven just as complicated and problematic as national regulation, due in 
large part to states’ differing levels of economic and telecommunications infrastructure 
development, and widely varying perspectives on which contentious speech and content 
issues merit government intervention on behalf of public interest claims. What interna-
tional regulation exists consists of an assortment of UN resolutions, conventions, and 
treaties to which most of the countries of the world agree, either as individual nations 
or within the framework of regional economic or political groupings. International reg-
ulation of the Internet primarily covers electronic commerce and electronic signatures, 
intellectual property, and child pornography (Eko, 2001; Eko, 2008). 
This rather narrow range of issues underscores the primacy of national law in 
Internet policy development with one important exception: the Domain Name System 
(DNS), which translates easily memorized domain names (e.g. nytimes.com, wikipedia.
org, pdx.edu) to route-specific numerical IP addresses. By providing a global distributed 
keyword-based redirection service, the DNS is a critical component of the functionality 
of the Internet. But even this supposedly global system is decidedly national: "root au-
thority" for DNS administration rests with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), a California-based nonprofit organization under contract to the 
US Commerce Department and overseen by the United States government. Other glob-
al governance bodies, including the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
and the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), are also involved in functional 
Internet issues, but their role is more marginal.
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Internet Control Regimes 
While most national Internet policy can be characterized as regulatory in that it 
addresses e-commerce, technological development and harmonization, and public inter-
est issues through familiar policy making procedures, other important aspects of Internet 
control operate outside of a formal regulatory framework. Case studies of Internet policy 
under authoritarian regimes are clearly capturing control mechanisms that occur at arm’s 
length from the government to assure plausible deniability. Such mechanisms include 
harassment and violence against online reporters and activists, sophisticated online pro-
paganda efforts on behalf of political parties and actors, and coordinated denial of service 
attacks against particular websites and servers. 
Other non-regulatory mechanisms reflect the intervention of different govern-
ment agencies into the Internet policy process. Extensive surveillance programs have 
been created under the purview of law enforcement and state security agencies in both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes that allow government actors extensive access into 
users’ digital communications. While some of these surveillance activities are integrated 
into regulatory policy (such as mandates that Internet service providers retain browsing 
records), other aspects of surveillance are covert (such as signals intelligence operations) 
and effectively ancillary to formal regulatory efforts.  For the purposes of Internet policy 
analysis, what matters is the degree to which surveillance programs grant the government 
“control” over the technology, not whether the policy objectives of the programs are 
perceived as positive (monitoring of a human trafficking ring) or negative (interception of 
messages between environmental activists). 
Eriksson and Giacomello (2009) note that the concept of control is not only asso-
ciated with general notions such as “governance,” “influence,” and “authority,” but is also 
“distinctively linked to the law and technology, including the methods and means of gov-
erning the performance of any apparatus, machine, or system” (p. 206, footnote 2). This 
usage of control in the term’s operative sense captures all of the mechanisms of technical 
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control. But some analyses of Internet control focus more narrowly on government and 
private actor intervention into the social and political dimensions of the technology. Con-
trol in this context does not exclude more nuts-and-bolts regulatory issues, but the focus 
is more on the policy aims of different actors vis-à-vis the particular Internet activity or 
development issue being targeted. Yang (2009) and Eko (2012), for example, contex-
tualize Internet control policy as an aspect of governmentality—the cultural and social 
context out of which modes of governance arise and by which they are sustained. Many 
regulatory policies do fall within this conception—especially those reflecting public inter-
est claims or state security goals—but control in this context also captures informal and 
extralegal mechanisms operating outside of normal regulatory parameters.14   
Warf (2013) notes that because the state is not a “monolithic entity but composed 
of diverse agencies, sometimes working at cross-purposes,” it is more instructive to think 
of Internet control efforts in terms of “multiple, sometimes contradictory authorities that 
invoke diverse strategies of suppression of various groups and individuals for a broad 
array of reasons and motivations” (p. 47). Although not all control efforts should be 
characterized as suppressive, the recognition that multiple agencies and stakeholders are 
involved in the policy making process is important. Zheng’s 2007 book Technological 
Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China details how the inherent contra-
dictions in the Chinese government’s approach to the Internet have produced two distinct 
Internet policy regimes: an Internet regulatory regime and an Internet control regime. The 
regulatory regime represents policies developed by the Ministry of Information Indus-
try and the China Internet Network Information Center to facilitate the development of 
the Internet while managing its growth and profitability. The control regime represents 
policies developed by the Central Propaganda Department and State Council Information 
Office to limit content access and squelch political discourse (Zheng, 2008, pp. 49-50). 
14  “Control” in this usage has a distinctly negative connotation—much more so than “regulation,” a concept 
generally supported by the public and associated with positive policy outcomes.
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The tension between these two regimes produces conflicts of interest among 
different state agencies, and inefficiencies in enforcing hard and soft forms of control. 
For the moment, the control regime maintains the upper hand through its strategic use 
of coercive measures. Recent evidence, however, suggests that control regime efforts 
may be slowing Internet traffic and hindering the use of cloud-computing services. This 
architectural flaw will eventually reduce China’s global competitiveness in e-commerce, 
which could cause a shift in the dynamic between the regulatory and control regimes 
(The Economist, 2013b, April 6; Mozur & Tejada, 2013, Feb. 13).15 
Zheng’s work is narrowly focused on China, but the policy dichotomy he identi-
fies is not unique to the country, or even to a particular governing regime type. Whether 
the case is the United Arab Emirates or the United States, there is ample evidence that 
the diverse mechanisms of control employed by different government agencies represent 
divergent and even conflicting policy objectives. In Europe, for example, the EU Data 
Protection Directive imposes strict data privacy requirements on software and Internet 
companies, while the EU Data Retention Directive obliges all Internet service providers 
to retain users’ browsing data for future access by law enforcement. 
The diversity of Internet policy objectives necessitates a broad Internet policy 
regime analytical framework. It is important to recognize that even when regulation and 
control efforts reflect divergent policy goals, they rely upon many of the same mecha-
nisms for execution and enforcement. Filtering technology that blocks access to websites 
hosting child pornography—a form of content illegal in nearly every jurisdiction—may 
also be used to block human rights websites, and surveillance systems established by 
state security agencies to intercept messages between terrorist cells may also capture 
communications between civil society groups. The regulatory regime / control regime 
division is further muddled by the subjective normative context of public interest Inter-
net policy. What appears to be an egregious and illegitimate form of content “control” in 
15 The latter observation is my own. 
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one country or region may be a perfectly acceptable form of regulation in another.  In the 
United States the conception of the Internet as a marketplace of ideas suggests a standard 
that—except in very limited circumstances—the government may not regulate online 
“speech” on the basis of its subject matter or viewpoint. In Europe, however, online 
speech restrictions are much more common and generally supported by the public. France 
and Germany both restrict online content labeled as “hate speech.”
While Zheng (2007) identifies a clear division between the regulatory and control 
regimes in China, Yang (2009) defines the country’s Internet control regime as the “total-
ity of the institutions and practices of Internet control” (p. 47). While the author’s usage 
of “control” in this particular analysis is intended to reflect governmentality, the passage 
effectively captures the broader notion of control identified by Eriksson and Giacomello 
(2009), and tracks closely with Wand’s (2012) concept of Digital State Capacity (DSC), 
which refers to the ability of the state to manage and control digital information within its 
jurisdiction.
Employing a broad Internet control regime definition that includes all relevant 
control mechanisms—including those within the regulatory framework—is the best way 
to fully capture a government’s ability to manage, regulate, and otherwise manipulate the 
technology towards particular policy goals. National-level Internet control regimes, then, 
comprise the totality of national institutions and practices of Internet control, including 
the regulatory policies and mechanisms which promote e-commerce development and 
allow for government intervention in widely agreed upon law enforcement and public 
interest areas (e.g. child pornography, counterterrorism, and identity theft), as well as the 
policies and mechanisms which allow for contested and possibly extralegal intervention 
into online social and political activities. 
Using this broad control definition allows for a more effective comparative ap-
proach. The annual country-level “Internet Freedom” reports from Reporters Without 
Borders, the OpenNet Initiative, the Open Society Foundation, and Freedom House all 
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differ in their respective methodological and descriptive approaches, and the book length 
policy literature also lacks a consistent analytical framework. Case studies of Internet 
policy under authoritarian governing regimes tend to focus on examples of content filter-
ing and repressive actions against activists. Case studies of Internet policy in the United 
States and Europe tend to focus more on copyright protection and development issues—
although that focus has shifted of late following revelations about the surveillance ca-
pacity of the National Security Agency. Many accounts across regime type tend to lump 
mechanisms that control access to the Internet in with mechanisms that control activity 
on the Internet, including filtering, surveillance, and enforcement at the source. By fo-
cusing on all relevant aspects of control, we can more accurately categorize mechanisms 
common to both authoritarian and democratic governing regimes, while positioning them 
within a standardized analytical framework.
Research Question and Argument 
The research question for this paper is as follows: What are the different Internet 
control regimes at the national level and how are they different? Several corollary ques-
tions then emerge: (a) What does “control” of the Internet constitute and what are the 
technical mechanisms through which it can be achieved; (b) What are the variations in the 
strategic and administrative aspects of Internet control; (c) Why do different governments 
adopt particular control regimes; and (d) What are the results, limitations, and unintended 
consequences of control efforts?
I argue that the wide range of Internet control regimes can best be classified using 
a six-part typology based on dimensions derived from standard comparative public policy 
analysis broadly, and from Internet policy and policy regime literature more specifically. 
I identify several key distinguishing variables, including governing regime-type, institu-
tional arrangement, and institutional capacity. 
13
Study Outline 
 This paper proceeds as follows: Chapter Two details existing approaches to com-
parative Internet policy analysis, explains why a typological approach is best for identi-
fying and distinguishing Internet control regimes, and outlines the typology dimensions, 
which are derived from public policy literature. Chapter Three lays out the six typology 
categories: Cuban model, Chinese model, Russian model, Developmental model, United 
States model, and European model. Finally, Chapter Four provides an overview of the 
research, explains its significance, and identifies opportunities for future research. 
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Chapter Two
Methodology for Analysis
Review of Existing Analysis
The bulk of Internet policy analysis takes a comparative approach that examines 
particular censorship and control techniques on a country-by-country basis. Although 
these profiles are often compiled in larger reports that identify emergent trends, they do 
not specify or group countries by Internet policy type, as that concept remains largely un-
defined in these works. Rather, countries are organized along an axial “more-or-less free” 
scale based on basic and observable standards of free expression and evidence of filtering 
and censorship. Reporters Without Borders, the OpenNet Initiative, the Open Society 
Foundation, and Freedom House all put out annual country and region reports related to 
“Internet freedom” that outline and document censorship policies and practices. These 
reports all slightly differ in methodological and descriptive approaches. The OpenNet Ini-
tiative reports are perhaps the most detailed, especially on issues of ICT architecture and 
specific censorship techniques—e.g. filtering and IP redirects. Freedom House’s Freedom 
on the Net reports are the best known and most cited, and the methodology employed is 
quite similar to that used for the organization’s annual Freedom of the World report.1
The Freedom of the Net report examines the level of Internet freedom through a 
set of questions and accompanying subpoints, which are organized into three groupings: 
obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. Through a careful 
reading of country profiles and scoring one can ascertain that countries receiving similar 
total scores may be using substantially different control techniques. For example, Myan-
mar (total score of 75 out of 100) has an extremely low rate of Internet penetration (1 
percent) owing to an underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure. The military 
regime is thus able to control the Internet largely through limiting access (obstacles to 
1 Freedom of the World assigns countries political rights and civil liberties scores rather than regime-type 
designations (beyond the ordinal Free / Partly Free / Not Free labels).
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access score of 20 out of 25). Saudi Arabia (total score 70 out of 100) has relatively high 
levels of Internet penetration (54 percent), especially in urban areas. The government 
thus controls Internet content primarily through a sophisticated filtering system (limits on 
content score of 24 out of 40) and harsh laws on libel and defamation (violation of user 
rights score of 32 out of 40).
Some authors have attempted to categorize the mechanisms governments use to 
control digital content, and then identify states most associated with particular censorship 
and surveillance trends. Deibert (2010), for instance, identifies and defines three genera-
tions of controls, with each progression representing both shifting policy goals and tech-
nological advances. First-generation controls focused on denying access to particular In-
ternet data through the use of filtering technology that blocks access to servers, domains, 
keywords, and IP addresses. This stage was led by states such as China and Saudi Arabia, 
but specific filtering practices and policies varied widely, even within the same regions. 
The second-generation controls aimed to create legal and normative environments and 
technical capabilities that would enable state actors to deny access to information re-
sources as and when needed, while reducing the possibility of blowback or discovery. 
China was again a leading actor in this phase, but some of the covert technical mecha-
nisms that characterize the second-generation controls were especially pronounced in 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and other former Soviet republics in the run ups to elections and 
during demonstrations. The third-generation of controls represent a shift from reactive to 
proactive policy, and involves the construction of state actor capabilities for competing 
in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. The leader here is not 
China but Russia, where filtering is largely non-existent but sophisticated information 
shaping strategies expand the state’s ability to manipulate and control cyberspace.
Another recent approach could be labeled schematic. Zittrain (2003), for example, 
considers the Internet as a delivery chain, with control mechanisms and policies designed 
specifically for different points along the route, and Ziccardi (2012) considers Internet fil-
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tering policies at different nodes along the Internet’s physical architecture. The schematic 
approach is especially useful for looking at censorship approaches within a hardware and 
tech capacity context. However, it has some clear drawbacks for policy analysis.  The two 
polar ends of the digital content distribution chain—producer and recipient—are general-
ly addressed by the same grouping of control policies, while a single, broad policy such 
as surveillance may be applicable at different stages along the chain.  
Third and finally, there is a regulatory approach that focuses on how and to what 
extent Internet controls are located within a larger regulatory environment. This approach 
is especially important as it integrates policy paradigms and policy maker motivations, 
and outlines the role of regulators—the public or private bodies capable of influencing 
the behaviors of actors. Frydman, Hennebel, and Lewkowicz (2012) detail the com-
mand-and-control and self-regulation models, and build upon Zittrain’s (2003) frame-
work to identify co-regulatory mechanisms—the legal devices designed by both public 
and private players to put pressure on the points of control to achieve some regulatory 
result.
Typological approach
The wide range of Internet control regimes can best be classified using a typolog-
ical approach. A typology is a useful technique for (a) classifying complex phenomena 
without oversimplifying, (b) clarifying similarities and differences among cases to facili-
tate comparison, and (c) incorporating interactive effects. Typologies generally (d) pro-
vide a comprehensive inventory of all possible kinds of cases, and (e) draw attention to 
“empty cells” or kinds of cases that have not occurred and perhaps cannot do so, although 
as I discuss ahead, neither of these functions may be present in particular typologies (Bai-
ley, 1994).
Typologies should be understood as organized systems of types. Scholars some-
times refer to their analytic typology categories as “ideal types” to signify that these cat-
egories are broad abstractions that may not consistently serve to classify empirical cases. 
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The ideal type concept is closely associated with Weber—although Bailey (1994) notes 
the sociologist’s usage of the term is often misunderstood and thus misapplied. Examples 
of ideal type typology categories are found in the writings of Schmitter (1974), Lueb-
bert (1991), and Hall and Soskice (2001). In all of these studies, the authors proceed to 
classify empirical cases within their identified abstract categories.2 Collier, LaPorte, and 
Seawright  (2008, pp. 161-162) suggest that international relations scholars often frame 
their typological cases as ideal types in recognition that cases—often states or govern-
ing regimes—grouped together under any one category usually cannot be understood as 
being perfectly equal. Rather, the “claim is that they do indeed fit in a particular category, 
and not in another. The resolution here may be a simple recognition that categorization 
entails a process of abstraction” (p. 162).
The proposed typology outlined in this paper is not intended to exhaustively cap-
ture and exclusively categorize every country’s respective Internet control regime con-
figuration. Rather, the goal is to identify the most common and most prominent control 
regime types. The typology identifies groupings of countries exhibiting densely linked 
shared characteristics and presents them as “models”—effectively ideal types. Several of 
the models use a label derived from an exemplary empirical case (Cuban model, Chinese 
model, Russian model, United States model), while two others use less country-specific 
labels (developmental model and European model) to indicate that no one country ex-
hibits clarity across all relevant dimensions. These category types would thus appear to 
straddle the line between criterion types and constructed types. The former possess all of 
the relevant features or dimensions of the type and exhibit extreme clarity on all features. 
The latter is generally not an extreme or accentuated form of the type, but rather a more 
common or central empirical form analogous to a measure of central tendency (Bailey, 
2  In Luebbert’s (1991) analysis of political-economic regimes in interwar Europe, for instance, the author 
states although it is “seldom difficult to locate interwar European societies [among his identified regime 
types],” “the extent to which the societies corresponded to the idealized model of the regime varied” (p. 3).
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1994, pp. 19-23).3 However, the exemplary cases in the country-label category types do 
not necessarily display “extreme clarity” on all features, although they do exhibit pro-
nounced accentuation on the distinguishing dimensions. More importantly, they are also 
“models”—or prototypes—in the sense that other countries within the respective group-
ing mimic or adopt their control (and development) techniques. The constructed type 
label is thus more accurate. The United States model would appear to be an exception, as 
the category type applies to only one country. However, as I explain, the unique charac-
teristics of the US model may eventually be embraced by other countries, and the label 
could eventually capture a grouping of countries. 
The dimensions for my typology are drawn from policy regime literature (espe-
cially Wilson (2000)) and from relevant Internet policy analysis (especially Eriksson & 
Giacomello (2009), Wand (2012), and Deibert (2008; 2010; 2011)). Categories were se-
lected after careful reading of country profiles from Freedom House, the OpenNet Initia-
tive, and other organizations and publications. The typology draws from and refines Eko’s 
(2001; 2008) Internet regulatory typology—discussed ahead in greater detail—which is 
largely based on a single (albeit multifaceted) dimension of governmentality. 
Descriptive vs. Explanatory. Typologies generally take one of two forms: de-
scriptive or explanatory. Descriptive typologies identify the attributes that comprise a 
particular type and serve to distinguish one type from another. Gerring (2011) identifies 
3 All empirical cases are expected to deviate to some extend from the constructed type.
Table 2.1: Typology of Democratic Regimes (Liphart 1977, p. 107, taken from Caramani, 
2008, p. 89.)
Elite Behavior Structure of Society 
Homogoneous Plural
Coalescent Depoliticized democracy Consociational democracy
Adversarial Centripetal democracy Centrifugal democracy
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several varieties of the descriptive approach. Simple typologies focus on a single di-
mension that distinguishes variations of a larger concept. For example, polities may be 
classified in Aristotelian fashion as monarchies (rule of one), oligarchies (rule of few), 
and democracies (rule of many). In a matrix typology, the typology categories are the 
product of an intersection of categorical variables. Lijphart’s (1977) fourfold typology 
of democratic regimes (Table 2.1) is a good example of this approach. Other descriptive 
typology varieties include temporal, taxanomy, configurational, and sequential. Although 
descriptive typologies serve primarily to describe and categorize types, they may also be 
associated with the formulation and testing of explanatory claims. The contrasting types 
contained in a descriptive typology, for instance, may be the outcome to be explained in a 
given study (Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright, 2008, p. 153).
Descriptive Classificatory Explanatory
Analytical Move(s) Define compound 
concepts (types) to as 
descriptive characteri-
zations. 
Assign cases to types. Make predictions based 
on combinations of 
different values of a 
theory’s variables. Place 
data in relevant cells for 
congruence testing and 
comparisons to deter-
mine whether data is 
consistent with theory.
Question(s) Answered What constitutes this 
type?
What is this a case of? If my theory is correct, 
what do I expect to see? 
Do I see it?
Example What is a parliamentary 
democracy as opposed 
to a presidential democ-
racy?
Are Britain and Ger-
many parliamentary or 
presidential democra-
cies?
According to the norma-
tive variant of the demo-
cratic peace theory, what 
foreign policy behavior 
is predicted from a dyad 
of two mature parlia-
mentary democracies? 
Do the bilateral foreign 
policies of Britain and 
Germany agree with that 
prediction?  
Table 2.2: Goal of Typology (Elman, 2004, p. 97)
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Elman (2005) notes that in an explanatory typology, the descriptive function is 
modified by its theoretical purposes as constituent attributes comprising each type are 
extracted from the variables of a preexisting theory (Table 2.2). The dimensions of the 
property space (its rows and columns) reflect alternative values of the theory’s indepen-
dent variables, so each cell is associated with predicted values of the theory’s intervening 
or dependent variables. This effectively changes the descriptive question being answered 
from “What constitutes this type?” to “If my theory is correct, what do I expect to see?” 
(pp. 296-298). As an example, Elman uses the explanatory typology implicit in Mear-
sheimer’s (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. As displayed in Table 2.3, the 
types of state in Mearsheimer’s implied typology are represented in the rows, and the 
columns show whether the state is acting in its own or another region. The content of the 
cells are the states’ predicted intra- and extra-regional behavior (Elman, 2005, p. 309).4 
My proposed typology is decidedly descriptive in that it identifies the compounds 
of conceptual attributes (the policy regime dimensions) that comprise particular types 
4 Elman (2005) goes on to extend the typology to reach a more complete property space listing, and to 
demonstrate that Mearsheimer under-specifies the range of structural conditions that great powers can 
confront.
Table 2.3: Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (from Elman, 2005, p. 309).
Exemplar In-regional behavior Extra-regional behav-
ior
Continental great 
powers
Germany Attempt regional 
hegemony while bal-
ancing against other 
states.
Unclear. Case stud-
ies suggest balance 
against any would-be 
regional hegemons.
Island great powers Great Britain Balance against any 
would-be regional 
hegemons.
Unclear. Case stud-
ies suggest balance 
against any would-be 
regional hegemons.
Regional hegemons United States Balance against other 
states to maintain 
regional hegemony.
Balance against any 
would-be regional 
hegemons. 
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(Internet control policy regime models). However, because the Institutional arrangement 
dimension of the typology captures the control mechanisms through which particular con-
trol regimes are able to exert control, it effectively answers an important “how” question, 
and thus contains an explanatory element that forms a link between a purely bottom-line 
descriptive account and a causal mechanism-based explanatory narrative. In addition, 
because the policy regime analytical framework pulls from both international relations 
theory and public policy analysis, the boundaries and definitions for particular dimen-
sions are fuzzy.5 As such, many of the typology’s cells (property spaces) are best labeled 
as thick descriptions. 
With comparative research about Internet control regimes at a relatively early 
stage, this typology is intended to enable the formation of concepts and hypotheses about 
the interrelationship, or co-presence, of key distinguishing variables in different Internet 
control regimes.               
Analysis of Similar Typologies. By employing a multidimensional policy re-
gimes framework, I have attempted to expand and improve upon previous media and 
Internet regulatory typologies—namely Peterson, Schramm, and Siebert’s (1956) seminal 
Four Theories of the Press (henceforth FTP) and Eko’s (2001; 2008) more recent typolo-
gy of Internet regulatory regimes.  FTP presented a tidy explanatory typology, spelled out 
in book’s subtitle: “The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Com-
munist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do.” The basic question addressed in 
the book was why do the mass media appear in widely different forms and serve different 
purposes in different countries? The authors identify several explanatory factors, includ-
ing the level of economic and technological resources in a country, the degree of urban-
ization, and social-cultural disposition. But a “more basic reason”—and the book’s cen-
tral organizing claim—is that “the press always takes on the form and coloration of the 
5 Wilson (2000, p. 272) concedes that it is not always clear where state regimes, policy regimes, and sub-pol-
icy regimes begin and end.
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social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the system of 
social control whereby the relations of individuals are adjusted” (pp. 1-2).
Four Theories of the Press (1956) offered a simple, persuasive schema that 
matched the main categories of Cold War-era political systems and was intelligible within 
the broader division into First, Second, and Third worlds. Its limitations became appar-
ent, however, as the Cold War concluded, globalization increased, and the clear lines 
between political systems began to blur. Even as new variants—including “development” 
and “democratic-participant” (McQuail, 1983)—were added to keep pace with political 
transformations, the idea that the political and social roots of the printed press should 
still serve as frame of reference for all mass communication analysis within particular 
national borders seemed increasingly unpersuasive. Most contemporary references to the 
work’s influence also note its numerous deficiencies. Hardy (2012, p. 12) identifies many 
of the common critiques of FTP, including its ethnocentric perspective, its inconsistent 
structure, and its problematic assumptions. Hardy argues persuasively that the key fail-
ing of the book’s approach is that the authors did not empirically analyze relationships 
between actual media structures and social systems. Rather, the focus is on the rationals 
or theories by which those abstract systems legitimate themselves (Table 2.4). In spite of 
its global claim, the book provides scant empirical comparative analysis. Only the United 
States, Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union (Russia) are examined in any de-
tail, while other Western countries, such as Canada and Australia, are barely mentioned.  
While my ideal type categories do focus on exemplary examples, in most cases a large 
grouping of similar countries is identified.
Drawing inspiration from Peterson, Schramm, and Siebert’s (1956) work, Eko 
developed a typology of Internet regulatory regimes based on international, regional, and 
national, political, economic, cultural, moral, and social realities. Eko, a communications 
professor at the University of Iowa, is the only author to date to present such a typolo-
gy, which he first outlined in a 2001 article in Communication Law & Policy, and later 
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Table 2.4: Four Rationals For the Press (from Peterson, Schramm, & Siebert, 1956, p. 7)
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expanded in a 2008 encyclopedia entry in The International Encyclopedia of Communi-
cation.  The author identifies neo-mercantalist, culturist, Euro-communitarian, gateway, 
Confucianist, Arab-Islamist, and developmentalist national and regional Internet regu-
latory regimes, as well as an international Internet regulation model comprising binding 
multilateral conventions, resolutions, and declarations. Eko’s 2012 book New media, old 
regimes: Case studies in comparative communication law and policy also references the 
typology, and specifies that the seven categories reflect different “governmentalities”—a 
concept developed by Michel Foucault to refer to the organized practices (mentalities, 
rationalities, and techniques) through which governments attempt to create the subjects 
(the governed), and the social, economic, and political structures in and through which 
particular policies can best be implemented. 
While Eko’s (2012) approach is a very useful starting point, it has one critical 
shortcoming: Although governmentality is a multifaceted concept, governmentality-based 
comparative analysis tends to focus on a single characteristic of a country or society that 
reflects and exemplifies deeper structural conditions. Each of Eko’s category type la-
bels signifies such a pronounced attribute: the neo-mercantalist model captures Internet 
regulatory regimes characterized by libertarian economic principles, the culturist model 
captures Internet regulatory regimes characterized by protection of national culture and 
language, the development model captures Internet regulatory regimes characterized by 
the use of the Internet for economic and political development, etc. But governmentality 
as a single variable does not adequately (in some cases) or consistently (in others) serve 
to categorize cases. Eko presents France as the exemplary culturist case, yet the country 
would also seem to fit within the Euro-communitarian model. Saudi Arabia, likewise, 
could arguably be categorized under either the gateway model or Arab-Islamist model. A  
multi-dimensional typology that accounts for all relevant policy attributes and uses con-
structed type category labels is a better way of categorizing Internet policy regime cases. 
My typology uses Eko’s work as starting point, but disaggregates the governmentality 
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variable into its component parts, which are then sorted into the relevant policy regime 
dimensions.  
Typology dimensions
The dimensions for my proposed typology are drawn from policy regime litera-
ture—particularly the model advanced by Wilson (2000), which consists of four dimen-
sions: power, policy paradigm, institutional arrangement, and the policy itself. I have 
altered the dimension categories somewhat to best reflect the subject, and added several 
additional categories to fully capture all of the relevant variables. 
Ideas. At a second order level, ideas may refer to systems of ideas or ideologies 
which link together a wide range of phenomena, and which connect to and influence 
policy proposals. But in practical policy analysis, ideas generally refer to the relatively 
discrete policy packages of measures which may be selected and implemented as actual 
policy (John, 1999, pp. 42). The policy process is permeated by competing ideas about 
the “good life” and the best policy goals and tactics to achieve it. Policy-making partic-
ipants advocate their respective policy ideas and engage with one another to try to win 
their case (John, 1998, pp.144-145).
 Wilson’s (2000) policy regime model captures this practical definition of ideas 
under the concept of “policy paradigm.” A policy paradigm refers to an intellectual con-
struct containing a set of ideas shared by the policy actors, including critical assumptions 
about the policy problem’s cause (and those responsible for causing it), its seriousness, 
its pervasiveness, and the appropriate governmental response. The policy paradigm thus 
shapes not only the ways problems are defined, but the types of solutions offered, the 
kinds of policies proposed, and the “identity” of the policy actors (Wilson, 2000; Capano, 
1999).6 Policy paradigms and the ideas and assumptions undergirding them are construct-
ed by (a) the academic discourse of researchers and intellectuals; (b) professionals and 
practitioners directly engaged with the issue; (c) interest group leaders and organizations 
6 Capano’s (1999) discussion of policy paradigms draws from Hall (1993) and Jenson (1989).
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advancing a particular policy agenda; and (d) the interaction of policy makers with the 
individuals and organizations identified above. Paradigms are disseminated through the 
media, political speeches, policy debates within government, and even day-to-day com-
munication in homes, schools, and places of work (Wilson, 2000).
When a policy paradigm is shared by all of the relevant members of the policy 
sector, it can understood to be hegemonic. However, when policy actors embrace differ-
ent policy paradigms, there is a conflict that must be resolved in a favor of a dominant 
paradigm—although that label suggests an alternative paradigm still exists or will emerge 
in the future (Braun & Busch, 1999). A dominant policy paradigm tends to stabilize a pol-
icy regime over the long term in several ways. First, it structures perception of the policy 
in ways that obstruct the emergence of alternative policy definitions and policy solutions. 
Second, it promotes the belief that existing arrangements are rational and natural and 
alternatives are irrational or impossible. Finally, it legitimizes the regime and contributes 
to its long-term stability (Wilson, 2000, p. 259).
 A survey of relevant literature suggests that there are four critical components to 
Internet policy paradigms: governing regime type (political context), regulation model 
(regulatory context), ICT development goals (economic context), and the values and cri-
teria by which policy goals are defined and recognized (normative context).
 Governing regime type. Milner (2006) posits that the uneven diffusion of the 
Internet across the globe has been driven by neither technological nor purely economic 
factors alone—rather, it is “political factors, especially domestic institutions” that matter 
for the adoption of new technologies because they “affect the manner and the degree to 
which winners and losers from the technology can translate their preferences into influ-
ence” (p. 178). The author hypothesizes that authoritarian leaders perceive the disadvan-
tages of the Internet as outweighing its advantages, and are thus less likely than demo-
cratic leaders to promote Internet development. Using indicators of diffusion (such as 
users or hosts per capita) as proxies for government policy toward the Internet, Milner’s 
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analysis indicates that a country’s regime type matters greatly, even when controlling for 
other economic, technological, political, and sociological factors. 
Milner’s work (2006) and other early analysis of Internet diffusion suggested that 
the only effective way to completely control the Internet was to limit its growth or even 
keep it out of a country entirely. However, a strategy of limiting Internet infrastructure is 
not sustainable, as it also limits the state’s ability to harness the technology’s economic 
benefits. The Dictator’s Dilemma theory—a variation of Huntington’s famous King’s 
Dilemma—suggests that authoritarian states will either adopt technologies thought to 
threaten political control, or face economic stagnation and other pressing legitimacy is-
sues (Kedzie, 1997). The recent trend is both academic and media accounts is to highlight 
authoritarian regimes’ ability to maintain technical and surveillance advantages over their 
own Internet architecture, and to use legal, normative, and market constraints to limit 
political challenges. Analysis of Singapore, China, and the United Arab Emirates suggests 
that governments can successfully bifurcate “economics” from “politics”  (Wand, 2012; 
Boas, 2006).
It is also necessary to emphasize that there is a tremendous amount of policy 
variation within any given regime label. Even the world’s democracies understand the 
same technologies in very different ways. They may have similar policy goals—e.g. more 
efficient government, improved access to information—but will implement tech initia-
tives and regulations in substantially different fashions (Rogerson & Milton, 2010). For 
instance, Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify three very different media models within 
Western democracies: the Mediterranean or ‘Polarized Pluralist” model; the North / 
Central European or “Democratic Corporatist” model; and the North Atlantic or “Liberal” 
model. As these titles suggest, each model emerged in and is representative of different 
countries and regions, but each model is also centrally defined by political system charac-
teristics. 
Authoritarian regimes exhibit similar policy diversity, although there are a few 
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key common denominators. Kalathil and Boas’ (2003) seminal work Open Networks, 
Closed Regimes surveyed how eight authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries—Chi-
na, Cuba, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and 
Egypt—employed and regulated the Internet, and found different results, as the regimes 
did not attempt to suppress information flows over the Internet in the same fashion. Re-
cent country profiles reports from Freedom House and the OpenNet Initiative reveal the 
same sorts of variation. There was, however, evidence of censorship in all of their case 
studies, suggesting a common strategy if not tactic. 
Furthermore, the Pearson correlation coefficient for Freedom House’s 2013 
Freedom in the World score and the 2013 Freedom on the Net score for the 60 countries 
receiving both is 0.85. This is a strong positive correlation, which means that high Free-
dom in the World variable scores go with high Freedom on the Net variable scores (and 
vice versa).7 [See Appendix 1]. 
Regulatory paradigm.  Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
sectors, including the Internet, have always existed within a regulated environment, 
although the extent and applicability of this regulation has expanded considerably over 
the past two decades.  It should be emphasized that it is not only the degree of state 
intervention, but also its objectives and instruments that determine the classification of 
a country within the Internet control typology. A full accounting of control mechanisms 
will be provided later in the paper, but three Internet regulation paradigms can be identi-
fied here that provide a policy backdrop against which more targeted regulatory actions 
can be said to occur. The three paradigms are: self-regulation, government regulation 
(“command-and-control”), and co-regulation (Cave, Simmons, & Marsden, 2008; d’Ude-
kem-Gevers & Poullet, 2001). 
 Self-regulation occurs when regulatory authority—the power to create and en-
force rules—is formally delegated to a private entity, although punishment for non-com-
7 The P-Value is < 0.00001. The result is significant at p < 0.05.
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pliance may still be enforced by and through the state.8 Modern self-regulation began in 
the United States with industry associations that defined their own codes of conduct, and 
limited membership to those willing to obey these rules. Self-regulation is often per-
ceived as the preferred mode of regulation for the Internet because the technology is new 
and still evolving.  Both public and private actors recognize that legislation passed into 
law reflecting existing market dynamics and user behavior may soon be outdated and in-
effectual. Thus legislation is expected to trail, not anticipate, new technology. Self-regula-
tion performed internally within the tech industry allows a greater degree of flexibility in 
rules and practices, especially with regards to new fields of development. The US system 
of Internet regulation has often been described as self-regulatory (Peng, 2005; Kleinsteu-
ber, 2004, pp. 62-64).
Under a command-and-control regulatory model, government authorities or a 
specialized government agency make the rules, enforce them, and punish those who 
breach them. Under such an arrangement, government regulators fix standards on cer-
tain activities (the command) and establish mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement 
(the control). Command-and-control establishes recognized and observed operational 
parameters and compliance obligations, and thus creates a relatively stable platform 
for regulatory participants. Its legitimacy is particularly strong in times of crisis where 
8 Self-regulation may also be found where there is no state regulation, although this is less common. 
Command-and-control Public authorities make the rules, enforce 
them, and punish those who breach them.
Self-regulation Private tech sector actors largely make the 
rules and implement them collectively 
without any public intervention. 
Co-regulation Policy drafting, implementation and en-
forcement is spread between a number of 
public and private actors, but initiated and 
overseen by the state. 
Table 2.5: Regulatory Paradigms 
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sentiment demands more intensive and legalistic rules. However, critics often note that 
command-and-control regulations are inefficient, inflexible, and discourage innovation, 
and that such an approach is not well matched to the technological realities of the Internet 
(O’Sullivan & Flannery, 2011; Frydman, Hennebel, & Lewkowicz, 2012).
 Co-regulation encompasses a range of different regulatory phenomena, all in-
volving complex interaction between general legislation and a self-regulatory body 
(Marsden, 2011b).9 Co-regulation generally provides “backdrop powers” for governments 
to intervene in the event that markets fail or constitutional rights such as freedom of 
expression are endangered. It also constitutes multiple stakeholders, including consumers 
and citizens, and this inclusiveness results in greater legitimacy claims. Co-regulation is 
often identified with “new governance” trends in environmental and financial regulation 
during the late 1990s, yet it also reflects the emergence of ICT policy during that period. 
Marsden (2011a) argues that co-regulation is “becoming the defining feature of Internet 
regulation in Europe,” and may “prove the most appropriate model to respond to other 
dynamic technologically led and globalized fields of regulatory activity” (p. 242).
ICT development goals. In an examination of media policy paradigms in the 
United States and Western Europe, Val Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) find that the most 
influential causes of change are probably the ambitions of media corporations and gov-
ernments alike to benefit from the economic opportunities offered by Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT), and the Internet more narrowly.10 The authors argue 
that the emerging policy paradigm for media and ICT is primarily driven by economic 
9 Frydman, Hennebel, and Lewkowicz (2012, pp. 133-134) argue that the meaning of co-regulation is 
twofold: as a concept of legal theory, it may refer to a legal model in which norm-drafting, implementation, 
and enforcement are not under the sole authority of the state, but rather spread among a number of players, 
both public and private; in a more practical sense, co-regulation refers to a form of governance based on the 
voluntary delegation or transfer to private actors of the burden of all or part of the drafting, implementation, 
and enforcement of norms. 
10 As noted in footnote 10, the term Information and Communications Technology (ICT) refers to all tech-
nologies and devices used in managing and processing information systems. For the purposes of this paper, 
its important to understand that ICT’s most important contemporary function is serving as the physical 
conduit of digital data.
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and technological logic, although it retains certain normative elements from the previous 
regimes. 
It is widely recognized that ICT can act as a catalyst for development and enable 
change across all economic sectors, especially in combination with other growth-pro-
moting policies (Economou, 2008, March 27-28). Countries at different levels of devel-
opment have tried to harness ICT in three fundamental ways that correspond to different 
roles ICT may play in the economy (Table 2.6). First, countries have developed and 
promoted their national ICT infrastructure and industry (both hardware and software) 
to attract both market seeking and efficiency seeking foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Market seeking FDI is especially attractive in developing countries favoring import 
substitution strategies. Efficiency seeking FDI is essentially a form of vertical integration 
aimed at reducing costs by moving or replicating different stages in the production to 
more cost-efficient or market-proximate areas of operation. Both approaches may involve 
the establishment of manufacturing and assembly facilities either with a local partner or a 
wholly owned subsidiary (Hanna, 2003).
 Second, countries have utilized ICT as a general purpose, value-added technol-
ogy that can increase the productivity and competitiveness of the local economy—par-
ticularly among ICT-intensive industries and services. The impact of investment in ICT 
Foreign Direct Investment ICT infrastructure may serve as an induce-
ment for FDI. Market-seeking FDI is par-
ticularly attractive in developing countries 
favoring import substitution strategies.
Value-added Technology ICT can increase the productivity and 
competitivess of the local economy—par-
ticularly among tech-intensive industries 
and services.
Social Development ICT may be used to achieve social and 
community development goals related to 
civic organization, education, and in-
creased economic agency.
Table 2.6: ICT Development Goals
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infrastructure may span beyond targeted industries into all types of information-based and 
business-support services. There is a growing awareness among both advanced and poor 
countries that this is where most of the economy-wide benefits are likely to be (Hanna, 
2003). 
Third and finally, countries may use ICT development as a part of larger policy 
strategy for social and community development. For developing countries, these policy 
goals may be pursued in coordination with nongovernmental organizations and other civil 
society actors working to increase education opportunities and economic agency. ICT 
has powered global civil society movements for causes such as debt relief, banning land 
mines, and providing HIV drugs in poor countries, and allowed local economic networks 
to better integrate into global markets and supply chains (Hanna, 2003).
Norms. Norms are best thought of as the values and criteria by which policy goals 
are defined or recognized by policy makers. While norms are a component of the Internet 
control typology, they are not its most salient feature. Content filtering and other censor-
ship mechanisms in Myanmar and Cuba, for instance, reflect different social and political 
values, but both countries have a similar institutional arrangement through which censor-
ship occurs. 
Governments that seek to implement Internet control mechanisms—particularly 
filtering—typically invoke the “protection of public morality” as a justification, although 
terrorism has emerged as a favorite rationale of late. Authoritarian regimes often cite 
intentionally vague notions of national security and social stability. The specific type of 
content blocked or otherwise censored varies considerably from region-to-region and 
regime-to-regime. Middle Eastern governments are the most likely to block material 
deemed heretical or sacrilegious; Western countries are more active in protection of 
intellectual property, including restrictions on illegally downloadable movies and music; 
while France and Germany block sites for virulent hate speech. The OpenNet Initiative 
divides regime filtering efforts into four categories: political, social, conflict / security, 
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and Internet tools (Warf, 2013, p. 46; Bidgoli, 2006, pp. 353-354).
The institutions used to enforce Internet control policies are typically outgrowths 
of older media regulatory regimes, and policy language specifying the kind of prohibited 
Internet content is often drawn directly from existing legislation and decrees addressing 
prohibited newspaper, radio, and broadcast media content. As such, it may be assumed 
that when governing regimes shift—especially from authoritarian to democratic—there 
will be equally dramatic shifts in media and Internet policy. In Spain, for instance, a 
new media structure emerged after Franco’s authoritarian rule that was characterized by 
extraordinarily high levels of pluralism and liberty—all principles solidly rooted in the 
democratic constitution of 1978 (Gunther, Montero, & Wert, 2000). 
However, the example of Spain is something of an anomaly.  Case studies of me-
dia policy in post-Communist Eastern Europe suggest that media regulatory institutions 
may retain authoritarian characteristics even after a democratic transition (Jakubowicz & 
Sükösd, 2008). In part, this is because laws and politics governing the media are deeply 
socially embedded, and can be thought to represent cultural as well as institutional forces 
(Verhulst & Monroe, 2013). Media regimes in new democracies are often transforma-
tions of existing institutions that carry with them the norms and power relations of the 
old regime (Voltmer, 2012, p. 235). This perpetuation of institutional practices can easily 
filter down to Internet policy. In Tunisia, for example, a number of restrictive Internet 
laws from the Ben Ali-era remain on the books, and there have been efforts to reinstate 
the Tunisian Internet Agency’s filtering system to block pornography and other morally 
offensive content. Furthermore, the sentencing of two young bloggers to seven years in 
prison for charges relating to their posting of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad on 
Facebook has prompted serious concerns among free expression advocates (Freedom 
House, 2012).
Internet penetration.  Internet use levels are strongly correlated with income 
(World Bank, 2012, p. 17). Generally speaking, countries with lower per capita income 
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have lower Internet access or usage levels. These nations, of course, also lack many other 
elements of infrastructure. Hargittai’s (1999) work is one the earliest work detailing this 
relationship. The author compared Internet connectivity (measured as penetration) levels 
in eighteen Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
countries. Hargittai found that economic wealth (measured by gross domestic product, 
or GDP, per capita) and telecommunications policy were the most salient predictors of a 
nation’s Internet connectivity. Two years later, Norris (2001) undertook a cross-national 
comparison of 179 countries, examining the relationship between a variety of social, eco-
nomic, and political factors and the number of people online in each nation. Norris found 
that economic development and investment in research and development were the over-
riding factors in the level of Internet adoption. Neither education nor the level of democ-
ratization were significantly linked to citizen usage (West, 2005, pp. 141-142). 
Levels of Internet penetration have risen substantially since those two works in 
both developed and developing countries. But the digital divide remains substantial. Ac-
cording to World Bank development indicators (2012) for 2010, there were an average of 
74.7 Internet users per 100 people in high-income economies, 34 users per 100 people in 
upper middle-income economies, and only 5.4 people per 100 in low-income economies. 
Warf (2013, p. 22) emphasizes that access to the Internet is “deeply conditioned by where 
one is,” which is in turn a reflection of existing topographies of wealth, class, gender, 
ethnicity, and power. As discussed ahead, Internet penetration rates shape the contours of 
Internet control policy. 
Some of the most cited assessments of telecommunications and ICT development 
within particular regions and countries come from market research and consultancy firms, 
such as BuddeComm, Taylor Nelson Sofres, and the Global Web Index. Projections and 
snapshot figures from these firms can be found in peer reviewed journals, IGO reports, 
and major newspapers. While these groups do not always outline their methodology, 
their success depends upon a reputation for accuracy, and their research—both free and 
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paywalled—on Internet and mobile penetration, e-commerce, and social media usage is 
appropriate for comparative studies.
The International Telecommunication Union, a specialized agency of the United 
Nations, also provides telecommunications and ICT data for 200 economies, including 
infrastructure, access, and usage information. The cited figures and statistics are generally 
provided by national government agencies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
(2011a; 2011b) uses a similar set of indicators, including: 
● Internet users per 100 inhabitants 
● Internet subscriptions in total 
● Broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 
● Availability of digital subscriber lines 
● Households with access to a home computer
● Households with access to broadband
● Mobile users per 100 inhabitants 
● Wireless‐broadband subscriptions 
Quantitative analyses of ICT-related research questions tend to use Internet users 
per 100 inhabitants as an independent variable, or Internet and mobile users per 100 
inhabitants as these variables together act as a measure of the level of digital commu-
nications (see Wand, 2012; Fielder, 2012; Best & Wade, 2009). Broadband Internet is 
significant because of its substantially increased connection speeds (compared to dial-up), 
which allow for a greater variability of Internet use—such as an increase in allowable 
file viewing size—and a fixed line (“always on”) connection that does not tie up a house-
hold’s main phone line. Dial-up modem connections have a maximum speed of 56,000 
bytes per second, while a DSL broadband connection can translate data at 5 million bytes 
per second (CERIAS, 2013). From 2005 to 2010, the percentage of people in industri-
alized countries accessing the Internet via broadband DSL or cable connections rose 
substantially. In this same period, the number of mobile phone users reached 3 billion, 
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meaning that nearly one out of every two people on the planet owned a mobile phone. In 
2013, the number of mobile subscriptions was expected to pass 7 billion, meaning that 
the vast majority of the global population now owns a mobile device (Etoh & Powell, 
2005; Sauter, 2012, pp. 4-5). 
The inclusion of mobile phone statistics is especially important because of the 
global expansion of 3G—and now 4G—networks. 3G, or third generation, mobile net-
work technology represented a substantial functional leap from 2G in that it allowed 
for full Internet service connection. A concurrent development during this time was the 
smartphone, which combined the abilities of a palmtop computer with a mobile phone, 
leading to widespread demand for 3G service. After Apple entered the mobile domain 
with their iPhone in 2007 and Google followed with the Android a year later, techno-
logical innovation on mobile devices decoupled from the telecoms industry and moved 
toward IT-based software companies. A 2010 ITU report speculated that at current growth 
rates, web access by mobile devices and laptops is likely to exceed web access from 
desktop computers by 2015 (Etoh & Powell, 2005; Sauter, 2012, p. 5; ITU, 2010). 
Institutional arrangement. Wilson (2000) includes “institutional arrangement” 
as part of his policy regime model. Institutional arrangement refers to a policy’s orga-
nization within government, the policy-making arrangements through which policy is 
developed, and the implementation structure through which it is applied. Wand’s (2012) 
digital state capacity model can be considered an institutional approach to Internet policy 
analysis. Digital state capacity is a multifaceted concept that can be divided into (a) po-
tential ability, which rests on underlying institutional factors; and (b) application, which 
is premised on policy objectives and driving ideology (pp. 45-47). In this Internet control 
regime typology, application is largely captured by the paradigm component within the 
Ideas dimension. 
For the purposes of Internet control, the most relevant part of the institutional 
arrangement is the implementation structure through which policy is applied. The Internet 
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control regime’s policy-making arrangements and organization within government are 
both irrelevant if the implementation structure is not effective. To best capture this struc-
ture, I use a framework developed by Eriksson and Giacomello (2009). The authors argue 
that government control of the Internet occurs across three dimensions: (1) access to the 
Internet, (2) functionality of the Internet, and (3) activity on the Internet. These dimen-
sions do overlap to some extent, but the framework still illuminates policy options and 
constraints vis-à-vis each dimension. 
Effective control across all three dimensions—especially activity—is contingent 
upon the potential ability aspect of Wand‘s (2012) digital state capacity concept, which 
I refer to here simply as “institutional capacity.” Per Wand, there are four critical aspects 
of potential ability: financial, as Internet control bureaucracies are expensive to build and 
maintain; technical, as monitoring and filtering tools require development and customi-
zation; human resources, in both quantity (numbers of personnel assigned to surveillance 
and censorship) and bureaucratic quality, and finally institutional corporate cohesion, .i.e. 
the willingness of individuals within institutions to comply with edicts from regime lead-
ers and enforce institutional goals. This last aspect is addressed within the Ideas typology 
dimension, and I only reference it tangentially here. As the state is rarely the sole actor 
applying Internet control mechanisms, institutional capacity may also extend to oversight 
of private and corporate actors, especially tech companies that function as information 
intermediaries. 
What follows is a brief summary of Eriksson and Giacomello’s (2009) three di-
mensions, with special emphasis given to control mechanisms associated with activity on 
the Internet, since they are the most commonly deployed mechanisms across regime type 
and arguably the most important. 
Access. Internet access shapes the contours of Internet control policy. Access 
refers to the ability of citizens to connect and use the Internet. Eriksson and Giacomello 
(2009) argue that controlling access involves (1a) controlling the means of access (com-
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puters and Internet service providers), and (1b) controlling the Internet’s physical archi-
tecture (cable networks, routers, satellites, etc.). Both state and nonstate actors may exact 
varying degrees of control on one or both of these areas. 
Means and levels of access vary considerably across regime types and develop-
mental status. Ward (2013, p. 48-49) notes that in impoverished states in which penetra-
tion rates are low and users rely heavily on Internet cafés, control mechanisms are easy 
to implement and resistance is futile. As personal computer prices fall, Internet access 
expands, and users grow more technologically adept, the initial control mechanisms be-
come less effective and the Internet user populations becomes more difficult to manage. 
In addition, rising incomes, literacy rates, and technical skills often produce modernizing 
elites who actively resist censorship through organized means. Authoritarian regimes rec-
ognize this phenomenon, and thus try to keep access levels within their institutional span 
of control. This incremental approach reflects a recognition by policy makers and policy 
analysts that “[i]nformation infrastructure is politics” (Howard, Agarwal, & Hussain, 
2011, p. 9), but it is a difficult balancing act to maintain. 
The institutional requirements for controlling access are relatively low as little 
state intervention or bureaucratic investment is necessary. Until fairly recently, it was still 
possible for governments to forego Internet infrastructure altogether. The ruling junta in 
Myanmar, for instance, has long resisted private partnerships to upgrade their antiquated 
telecommunications infrastructure and expand Internet access,11 although there is evi-
dence this policy is finely shifting (The New York Times, 2000, Nov. 19; Open Technolo-
gy Fund, 2013).  In less extreme cases, states can control access by putting physical limits 
on the Internet infrastructure, often by constraining the number of servers, hosts, and 
Internet providers allowed domestically (McLaughlin, 2003).
 Many authoritarian regimes adopt a gateway model of Internet control, in which 
government agency serves as the de facto or de jure gateway to the Internet for the entire 
11 As of 2012, less than one percent of the population had access to the Internet (OpenNet Initiative, 2012a).
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country, allowing for a high degree of control over both access and activity. In such coun-
tries, there is little to no separation of duties between the government, Internet regulatory 
authorities, Internet service providers, and Internet hosts (Eko, 2012; Kalathil & Boas, 
2003).12 This approach does require a substantial bureaucracy—and possibly the creation 
of an entirely new agency—in addition to substantial investments in telecommunications 
hardware. The gateway approach may also empower and expand rent-seeking govern-
ment agencies. In the Middle East, for example, Internet licensing policies driven by 
neopatrimonialism and nepotism have accentuated the powers of the state, and enabled 
strategic government agencies to limit and control access (Warf & Vincent, 2007).13 Gate-
way countries may also feature a national language intranet that is isolated from the glob-
al Internet by firewalls, proxy servers, and filtering techniques (Eko, 2012; Warf; 2013).  
In advanced countries, access is universal and relatively affordable. As more 
people move online, a more complex, expensive, and cumbersome set of control mecha-
nisms are called for which primarily function to restrict user activity (as discussed ahead). 
Some have speculated that mobile phones—especially smartphones—may be better able 
to circumvent the censorship mechanisms described ahead in Activity. In China, for in-
stance, some websites are able to set up wireless application protocol (WAP) sites which 
can only be viewed on mobile phones to feature content that otherwise would be cen-
sored. However, a recent investigation into the risks and vulnerabilities of mobile phone 
services and apps in twelve countries with authoritarian governing regimes suggests the 
capability of repressive governments to monitor users of mobile phones and block access 
to Internet content is far beyond levels realized by users and presents significant risks for 
user privacy and safety (Callanan & Dries-Ziekenheiner, 2012).
Functionality. Functionality refers to the technical quality of Internet usage—spe-
12 This arrangement is in keeping with Linz’s observation of the “low specificity of political institutions” in 
authoritarian regimes (2000a, p. 160).
13 Even in cases where Middle East governments attempted deregulation to expand access and lower ser-
vice costs, such efforts ultimately benefited the state by placing more communication platforms and forums 
under government control (Salhi, 2009).
40
cifically, (2a) the physical quality of connections (bandwidth and speed); (2b) the quality 
of communications software (e.g. browsers, instant messaging programs, voice and video 
services); and finally (2c) the technical protocols of Internet communication (IP, TCP,  
BGP, UDP, etc.). Technical protocols provide the standardized methods of communica-
tion through which digital communication occurs, and is thus one of the most fundamen-
tal sources of power in Internet governance (Eriksson & Giacomello, 2009).14  
Governments may exert a degree of control on functionality through domestic 
regulation, licensing, and monitoring, but these measures are fairly marginal.15 Even 
when Internet infrastructure development is led by national governments, it is almost 
always in collaboration with international technology firms. In the 1990s, for example, 
Cisco helped the Chinese government develop that country’s Internet infrastructure, 
and remains a critical player along with several other US companies, including Nortel 
Networks, Sun Microsystems, and 3COM (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2012; OpenNet 
Initiative, 2005). The quality of connections and software is thus largely controlled by the 
market, as private firms are generally responsible for applications, hardware (including 
architecture), bandwidth, and the speed and stability of Internet connections.16 Author-
itarian governments, however, may occasionally interfere with the quality of Internet 
connections for political purposes. In the wake of the Arab Spring authorities in Bahrain 
14 Lessig’s influential book Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999)  explained how these protocols 
(and other examples of Internet code) regulated online conduct in much the same way that legal code 
regulated “real world” conduct. Because very few legal enforcement mechanisms were embedded in early 
Internet designs, regulating illegal actions such the sharing of copyrighted works was all but impossible. 
But, just as Lessig predicted, elements of the code architecture of the Internet have been adjusted to favor 
regulation instead of circumvent it, and regulating online activity has become considerably easier. 
15  The effect is larger when governments tightly regulate the telecommunications industry or even own 
major telecommunication firms. State monopolies in the industry are not uncommon, even in democracies. 
In Ireland, for example, some critics argue that state ownership of the telephone network infrastructure 
through the company Eircom explains the country’s very weak broadband indicators, especially vis-à-vis 
its economic development peer group. McDonnell (2013), however, argues that Ireland’s relatively poor 
broadband performance should be understood as the outcome of a number of interrelating factors, including 
a dispersed and low-density population and different market considerations.
16 Even to the extent that any government can be said to control this aspect of functionality, that level of 
control does not—at least to my understanding—reflect a policy objective of controlling the production, 
dissemination, and consumption of digital content.
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slowed down Internet access speeds to hamper the real-time uploading and circulation 
of videos and photos taken during protests and crackdowns (Bahrain Center for Human 
Rights, 2011). 
Governments play a much larger role in developing and maintaining technical 
protocols, especially on the global scale. The main Internet governance bodies—Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), World Summit on the Informa-
tion Society (WSIS), and the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)—repre-
sent a policy regime-building collaboration between governments and private actors. The 
United States and US domained-private actors tend to dominate these bodies, however of 
late Russia, China, and a number of Middle Eastern countries have been leading efforts to 
exert greater control in Internet governance through the UN’s International Telecommu-
nications Agency (Eriksson & Giacomello, 2009; Thomas, Waters, & Fontanella-Kahn, 
2012, August 27). In 2011 this loose coalition of authoritarian regimes proposed a UN 
General Assembly resolution proposing the creation of a global information security 
“code of conduct” and asserting that “policy authority for Internet-related public issues 
is the sovereign right of states” (Gross, 2012, May). Although the resolution failed, the 
possibility of further action and initiatives on the issue has alarmed many Internet policy 
observers. 
Because most governments play only a marginal role in controlling functional-
ity, the institutional requirements for control are less applicable. To the extent that gov-
ernments can be said to interfere with the quality of Internet connections, this is likely 
accomplished through the same gateway institutions that control access. Larger gov-
ernments more active in global Internet governance may create executive and advisory 
bodies for that purpose.  
Measurements of functionality focus on speed, which is the single most import-
ant metric of interest in characterizing the “quality” of Internet connections, especially 
broadband service. Perceptions about broadband quality inform regulatory policy, end-us-
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er behavior (e.g., broadband subscriptions), investments in complementary assets (e.g., 
content and applications), as well as the traffic management and provisioning decisions of 
network operators (Bauer, Clark, & Lehr, 2010, p. 2). The speedtest offered by the private 
web services company Ookla is the best available data source for assessing the speed of 
ISP’s broadband access service.
Activity. Activity online refers to how the Internet is used by individuals, organi-
zations, and government agencies. Eriksson and Giacomello (2009) argue that control of 
online activity can take different forms: (3b) filtering and blocking of websites or pro-
grams; (3c) surveillance of online activity, and finally (3d) attempts to manipulate and 
control social and political discourse through various means of information, propaganda, 
and entertainment. However, the authors omit (3a) enforcement at the source and inter-
mediary liability, i.e. direct state action against the producers, consumers and hosts of 
prohibited digital content. As the lettering suggests, I address this form of Internet activ-
ity control first as it is generally the first enforcement option. When states cannot control 
activity at the source, they move to other control techniques.
Specific government policies and laws are used to create a legal justification for 
government intervention into cyberspace in any and all of the forms noted above. As 
outlined the Regulatory discussion, the Internet has always existed within a regulated 
environment, although the extent and applicability of this regulation has expanded con-
siderably over the past two decades. National-security and communication laws—in-
cluding slander, libel, and copyright-infringement—are the most basic legal tools at a 
government’s disposal to create a regulatory oversight of cyberspace. Although new laws 
may be created to reinforce this framework, in some cases obscure or rarely enforced reg-
ulations may be cited ex post facto to justify acts of censorship or surveillance.17 Deibert 
and Rohozinski (2010b: 25-26) note that while such interventions may have once been 
17 Deibert and Rohozinski (2010b) note that Pakistan cited an old blasphemy law to block access to Face-
book after the social media platform hosted a group called “Everybody Draw Muhammad Day.” Pakistan 
lifted the block after Facebook prevented access to the page within Pakistan.
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considered “exceptional and misguided,” they are becoming increasingly standard.  These 
laws not only grant government writ to act, they also create a climate of fear and intimi-
dation that eventually (and intentionally) produces self-censorship. Wand (2012) argues 
that a regime’s legal and policy framework for Internet control is “as much about percep-
tion of risk and coercion as about detailed laws” and that “lack of clarity over boundaries 
of allowable information can, in fact, be a key policy tool” (pp. 55-56).
Enforcement at the source. Zittrain (2003) and Goldsmith and Wu (2006) docu-
ment how early state-led attempts to regulate prohibited content targeted the endpoints of 
the network—the sources and recipients of objectionable material—and to some extent 
the intermediaries (especially ISPs) who host users’ content. Today, Internet policy leg-
islation continues to locate specific action at the citizen or service provider level.  Under 
authoritarian governing regimes, this targeting often comes in the form of coercive ac-
tions against individuals, including intimidation, arrest, torture, execution (or the implied 
or overt threat of such actions), while in democratic regimes targeting is generally in the 
form of civil suits against individual users and litigation and threat of property seizure 
against domestic ISPs and assorted tech companies with holdings within the state’s terri-
torial boundaries (Wand, 2012, pp. 55-56).18 
At the individual level, regime regulations and the punitive consequences for their 
violation rest on user identification. Legal actions taken by private companies and their 
trade associations for audio, video, and software piracy are a clear example of this. The 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), for example, initiated civil lawsuits 
through US courts against US citizens in June 2003 (and onward) for illegally download-
ed copyrighted material.19 The organization targeted university students in particular, as 
peer-to-peer file sharing was and is rife on university campuses. Record labels pursued 
similar legal action in national courts across the globe. Some countries have even denied 
18 One of the best and earliest examples of this approach is LICRA v. Yahoo case discussed on page 106..
19 The RIAA was able to do this by identifying the users’ respective individual ISP addresses.
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Internet access to individuals who repeatedly download copyrighted music and films 
(Wand, 2012; Gelsthorpe, 2010, pp. 393-394). 
Repressive authoritarian governments may also target individual reporters and 
bloggers for violations of media or security laws, which are often fully applicable to In-
ternet content. Reporters Without Borders maintains a repository of such incidents, which 
are all too common under authoritarian and even hybrid governance. In China alone, 
seventy-eight activists are currently imprisoned for online activity, including Nobel Peace 
Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, who was sentenced on eleven years in prison in 2009 on a 
charge of “subverting state authority” for posting outspoken articles online and for help-
ing to draft Charter 08, a call for democratic reform (Reporters Without Borders, 2012b).
The institutional requirements for enforcement at the source vary significantly.  
As noted, effective enforcement requires user identification. Governments with relatively 
low Internet penetration levels have been able to achieve such identification by funneling 
users into government-operated Internet cafés, thus combining access mechanisms with 
activity mechanisms. In Tunisia under Ben Ali, for example, the regime maintained 240 
privately owned, government subsidized cafés (called “publinets”) across the country, all 
of which operated under the authority of the Ministry of Communications. The regime 
was thus able to regulate usage through its control—pursuant to a December 1998 de-
cree—of these important points of access.  Publinets were required to maintain a database 
of their customers and to post a clearly visible poster notifying users of their responsi-
bility to use the Internet in a legal and lawful manner. Similar Internet café policies have 
been documented throughout Pacific Asia and the Middle East (Wand, 2012; Freedom 
House, 2011; Zarwan, 2005). 
Governments with higher levels of Internet penetration contend with a greater 
number of home and mobile users, and thus depend more upon intermediary rather than 
user liability. Deibert (2012) uses the term intermediary liability to refer specifically to 
government regulation of and government coordination with Internet service providers 
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(ISPs) that provide access to the Internet and online service providers (OSPs)—both do-
mestic and international—that provide services through the Internet. OSPs like Facebook, 
Twitter, LiveJournal, and Blogger provide web hosting, publishing services, and complex 
community interactions to millions of users, most of whom would lack the means and 
skill necessary to create and maintain such content on their own. While these services 
have been a net boon for online free speech, they also consolidate a great deal of digital 
content onto the servers of private companies.20 
Both domestic and international companies can and do cooperate with govern-
ments to act as censors, removing content deemed unacceptable under the justification of 
legal compliance. Companies that fail to comply with these requirements may risk fines, 
the loss of their business license, or prosecution (Zuckerman, 2010; Calingaert, 2010).21 
Some countries have circumvented the necessity of this approach by creating homegrown 
(and state run) versions of social media and online publishing services and hosting them 
on government-controlled servers. But many other authoritarian-minded countries lack 
the capacity to create attractive alternatives, and thus face the problem of either blocking 
these sites entirely or allowing access to an unregulated sphere of the web.2223
20 Some sources lump ISPs and OSPs together as simply “ISPs.” I have largely retained authors’ respective 
usage choices in this paper when quoting or paraphrasing their arguments and observations. 
21 Even Twitter, the much ballyhooed microblogging service forever associated with the Arab Spring and 
earlier protests in Iran and Eastern Europe, has agreed to restrict “certain types of content” in countries that 
have “different ideas about the contours of freedom of expression,” such as France or Germany, which ban 
pro-Nazi content (Clark Estes, 2012, Oct 12; Twitter, 2012, Jan. 26).
22 Filtering only “problematic” content on a site like Facebook is difficult for several reasons. Most notably, 
while an individual page about Falun Gong (for instance) might have a unique address (e.g. https://www.
facebook.com/pages/Falun-Gong/112176658799482?fref=ts) that could be blocked, content from this page 
could still be visible to any user via “shares” and updates visible on a user’s newsfeed, which does not have 
a unique address (always https://www.facebook.com/).
23 South Korea implemented a law in 2007 requiring websites with more than 100,000 visitors per day to 
use resident registration numbers to track what South Koreans posted online. Although the “real name” 
verification policy was primarily directed at domestically hosted web sites, it also applied to international 
companies. Google’s YouTube division responded by disabling commenting and video uploads from the 
country, thus forcing Korean users into noncompliance by making them post anonymously using accounts 
registered outside of the country.  The law was overturned in 2012—along with an equally controversial 
law forbidding South Koreans from disclosing support or opposition of a political party or a candidate 
on the Web—but ongoing filtering policies and online speech restrictions led Reporters Without Borders 
(2012a) to label South Korea as a country “under surveillance” in its annual “Enemies of the Internet” 
report, putting it in the same company as Russia and Egypt.
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While intermediary liability is functionally similar to some of the filtering meth-
ods described below—such as the installation of filtering software on email servers—in-
termediary liability should be considered distinct in that (a) it is a policy geared towards 
private (often foreign) or partially privatized companies, and (b) content removal is 
usually carried out through human operators or internal screening procedures, not gov-
ernment-issued filtering software.24 Because intermediary liability transfers some of the 
regulatory burden from the state to the ISPs and OSPs, it reduces the state’s institutional 
requirements for control. But government agencies will still be charged with identifying 
prohibited material, and passing on formal requests to filter or remove said content to 
ISPs and OSPs or the gateway providers through which ISPs lease their bandwidth. 
In Thailand, for example, a “Cyber Inspector” unit working within the Ministry 
of Information and Communication Technology identifies prohibited content related to 
pornography, gambling, terrorism, separatist movements, and especially the monarchy 
(OpenNet Initiative, 2012d). Other case studies suggest human censors within an ISP 
or OSP are often tasked with monitoring and manually removing or shutting down blog 
posts, discussion forums and message boards that address verboten topics or criticize 
prominent political figures (Calingaert, 2010). 
Measuring enforcement at the source and intermediary liability is best accom-
plished by analyzing country profiles from Freedom Net, OpenNet Initiative, and Report-
ers Without Borders and identifying instances of arrests, prosecutions, or state-sanctioned 
repercussions for hosting, possessing, or distributing prohibited Internet content. Freedom 
House’s Freedom of the Net country profiles are especially useful, as their coding meth-
odology specifically looks for several categories of “violations of user rights,” including 
the presence of laws which call for criminal penalties or civil liability for online and ICT 
24 Such filtering is more likely to occur in joint ventures. Skype’s Chinese-language client, built in coop-
eration with China’s mobile Internet giant TOM Online, filters users’ messages based on a list of banned 
keywords, and stores conversations where specific keywords had been mentioned (Zuckerman, 2010; 
Villeneuve, 2008, Oct. 1).
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activities, and instances of individuals being detained, prosecuted, or sanctioned by law 
enforcement agencies for disseminating or accessing prohibited content.
Filtering. Filtering represents the first generation of technical Internet control 
techniques,25 and remains the most common technique governments use to restrict ac-
cess to content deemed objectionable for social, political, and security reasons. Network 
filtering of the Internet by national governments is documented in more than 30 countries 
worldwide, not all of them authoritarian.  Filtering is often implemented when physical 
control or direct jurisdiction over the targeted site is beyond the reach of authorities. Fil-
tering may be carried out through a firewall—a technological barrier designed to prevent 
unauthorized or unwanted communications between computer networks or hosts. When a 
firewall works effectively requests by targeted users to access restricted sites and content 
are consistently blocked or misdirected. In addition to government-implemented filtering, 
many privately operated websites—including those domained in the United States—filter 
their content by the geographic location of their users (Ziccardi, 2012; Deibert, 2010a; 
Faris & Villenveuve, 2008; ONI, 2013).26
 Governments may implement filtering mechanisms either directly or through 
intermediaries at any of the four main network nodes: the Internet infrastructure itself, 
Internet service providers (ISPs), institutional computer networks, and individual (home) 
computers. Applying filtering schemes and blocking technologies directly on the Internet 
infrastructure—or more specifically, the network service providers (NSPs) which provide 
Internet connections to ISPs and maintain the physical backbone of the Internet,27 and 
the Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) which keep domestic Internet traffic within the local 
infrastructure—is the most effective approach, as it allow regimes to condition Internet 
access throughout an entire country (Ziccardi, 2012).
25 The People’s Republic of China was one of the first states to adopt filtering systems at the backbone of 
the country’s internet, and this approach has become the standard model for Internet censorship ever since.
26 For example, streaming video provider Hulu blocks all users outside of the US from accessing its content 
(Ziccardi, 2012).
27 Including the high-speed fiber-optic links connecting high-capacity routers that direct network traffic.
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Moving down the infrastructure, the second node is that of Internet service pro-
viders (ISPs), the companies (or state owned enterprises) that provide users with access to 
the Internet, usually via a fixed or mobile access line such as dial-up, DSL, 3G, WiMAX, 
or fiber-optic cable. Government authorities may oblige ISPs to install filtering software 
or to adhere to specific surveillance schemes. At this infrastructure level, states may also 
target information exchange intermediaries, such as language translation sites, email 
providers, and proxy server sites (Ziccardi, 2012; Deibert et al, 2008; Fielder, 2012).28 
A third level is institutional networks, such as libraries, universities, Internet cafés, and 
even corporate computer networks. Increased control over specific types of institutions 
is common in many countries.29 The fourth—and lowest—level at which filtering may be 
implemented is on home computers on individual laptops, which may come with prein-
stalled filtering and monitoring software, or may be exposed to such software through 
malicious attacks and inadvertent downloads (Ziccardi 2012).30
The institutional requirements for filtering are moderate. Although filtering does 
not require a large bureaucracy—especially as much of the technical implementation of 
blocking requests can be carried out by intermediary providers—it does require expensive 
hardware and software, and personnel with the technical capabilities to install and opti-
mize both. Many regimes have to acquire filtering technology from Western providers. 
For example, Wagner (2012) notes that the Ben Ali regime was only able to build and de-
velop its censorship regime with the help of “international consultants, importing interna-
tional technology and access to international filtering systems” (p. 490). Indeed, corporate 
tech entities have emerged as critical actors in the Internet control supply chain. The most 
recent Reporters Without Borders Enemies of the Internet report (2013a) highlights the 
28 Although proxy server sites are also one of the primary ways users get around filters.
29 In the United States, twenty-four states have Internet filtering laws that apply to publicly funded schools 
or libraries. Some states also require publicly funded institutions to install filtering software on library 
terminals or school computers (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013).
30 The Chinese government issued a directive requiring the installation of a specific filtering software 
product, Green Dam, on all new personal computers sold in mainland China by 2009. But the directive was 
soon scaled back, and the project eventually lost funding.
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increasingly important role a small number of private-sector “digital mercenaries” play in 
providing authoritarian regimes with censorship and surveillance technology.31 
The best measurements of filtering come from the OpenNet Initiative. The organi-
zation runs filtering tests directly within countries (often at multiple locations, and during 
different times of day and week) using specifically designed software which checks con-
tent accessibility against a global list (constant for each country) and a local list (different 
for each country). The global list comprises a wide range of relevant and popular web-
sites mostly in the English language, including sites with content that is perceived to be 
provocative or objectionable. The local lists are designed individually for each country by 
regional experts, and include specific content believed to be blocked by existing filtering 
mechanisms. ONI classifies blocked content into four categories: political (e.g. regime 
opposition); social (e.g. religious and moral issues); conflict (e.g. secession movements); 
and access to specific communication tools (e.g. foreign-based social networks).
Surveillance. Roberts and Palfrey (2010) describe the Internet as a “surveil-
lance-ready” technology conducive to a wide variety of state-administered information 
monitoring techniques. It is important to emphasize that monitoring Internet activity is 
not necessarily that same as “controlling” Internet activity. The knowledge that author-
ities may be watching user activity may, of course, deter an individual from accessing, 
viewing, or posting prohibited digital data (or participating in online dialogues).32 But 
unlike filtering, the effect of monitoring is indirect, and the change in user behavior may 
be minimal depending on the perceived punishment.33 Furthermore, a large percentage of 
Internet activity occurs “out in the open”—i.e. on publicly accessible websites and social 
31 These companies include the U.K.’s Gamma Group, Germany’s Trovicor, Italy’s HackingTeam, Cal-
ifornia-based Blue Coat Systems, and France’s Amesys, which sold its EAGLE spyware to Libya while 
Muammar Gaddafi was still in power, and is now being sued in France by the International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH) for complicity in torture
32 Or lead them to Virtual Private Network (VPN) connections and other encrypted services such as TOR, a 
free software for enabling online anonymity.
33 Furthermore, the value of Internet monitoring for an authoritarian regime may be diminished when and 
if users are constantly self-censoring as the regime is unlikely to gather useful information—especially if 
dissidents simply avoid the platform altogether out of distrust.
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media platforms.34 The monitoring or gathering of this sort of information may be part of 
surveillance operations, but illicit or simply covert surveillance should be thought to refer 
to the monitoring of Internet activity—including emails, file transfers, and web browsing 
records—that a user believes to be private.
Authoritarian regimes use surveillance in order to track and control dissidents, 
spy on journalists and their sources, and generally head off potential destabilization. For 
instance, China—an industry leader in so many aspects of authoritarian Internet con-
trol—uses its human resource heavy “Golden Shield” program to carry out a massive 
domestic surveillance of ISPs and online chat rooms, scanning carefully for criticism of 
the Chinese Communist Party, praise of Falun Gong, and other comments and postings 
that might challenge regime leadership. A great number of liberal democracies have 
developed their own surveillance systems, including advanced systems for tracking all 
incoming and outgoing Internet traffic. Furthermore, private firms headquartered within 
those democratic states—including multinationals Google, Yahoo, and Facebook—have 
collected their own massive Big Data troves on users, including search queries and social 
maps, while the multitude of domestic Internet service providers continue to log the 
browsing behavior of subscribers. This information, in turn, may eventually be turned 
over to government authorities (Roberts & Palfrey, 2010; Reporters Without Borders, 
2013a).
 Effective surveillance requires moderate to high institutional requirements, as 
intelligence gathering is a largely human labor-intensive affair. China’s state media, for 
example, recently revealed that the Chinese government employs more than two mil-
lion people to monitor web activity—an absolutely staggering number that serves to 
underscore the extensiveness of the country’s surveillance state (BBC, 2013, Oct. 13). 
Some aspects of surveillance occur simultaneously with some of the control mechanisms 
34 Reams of information can be gathered about many individuals simply by typing their names into Google 
or skimming through their public Facebook and LinkedIn profiles.
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described above, especially through intermediary liability. ISPs in Asia, for example, are 
increasingly required to monitor users’ access and retain information about their web 
activity and other computer usage. This practice is most prominent in Myanmar, where 
Internet café owners are required to take screenshots of visited web sites. Some countries 
tie surveillance to individual user access, requiring Internet users to register with their 
real names before gaining access to Internet services. Even democratic South Korea brief-
ly implemented a policy that required users in forums and chat-rooms to register their real 
names before commenting (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2012, pp. 231-232). 
Other aspects of surveillance may occur outside of the normal Internet regulatory 
apparatus, and under the purview of law enforcement or state security agencies operat-
ing with or without Internet or telecommunications agency coordination.  The National 
Security Agency in the United States operates under the jurisdiction of the Department of 
Defense and reports to the Director of National Intelligence. Much of the NSA’s surveil-
lance operations occurred under the rubric of “signals intelligence” (often contracted 
to SIGINT), which refers to intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether 
between two or more people communicating electronically or from electronic emissions 
from military and civilian weapons and tracking systems. The NSA’s domestic eaves-
dropping program was originally designed to locate al-Qaeda terrorist cells suspected of 
still operating in the United States (Clark, 2007; Aid, 2010, pp 243-244).  Although the 
organization possesses only limited legal authority to spy on US citizens, it constructed 
a surveillance network with the capacity to reach around 75 percent of all US Internet 
communications (Gorman & Valentino-Devries, 2013, August 20). 
 Measuring surveillance is difficult since it is, by definition, covert and intention-
ally difficult to track, and the number of government agencies and personnel performing 
surveillance activities may not be well known or reported. Freedom House’s Freedom of 
the Net (2013d) coding methodology specifically looks for evidence of state surveillance 
of Internet and ICT activities, but the coding category includes the important—if ambigu-
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ous—caveat “without judicial or other independent oversight.” The coding questionnaire 
also considers the extent to which digital technology providers are required to aid the 
government in monitoring the communications of their users, but again this sort of infor-
mation is not always well known, as recent reporting about the NSA in the United States 
makes clear. 
National information-shaping strategies. National information-shaping strate-
gies represent a sophisticated and multidimensional approach to Internet control that has 
emerged most prominently in China and Russia. This technique focuses on successfully 
competing with potential threats through the proactive manipulation of web content, 
which renders it more challenging for regular users to distinguish between credible infor-
mation and government propaganda. Specific actions include employing ‘‘Internet Bri-
gades” to post propaganda and disinformation on blogs, participate in Internet polls with 
an intention to skew the results, disseminate false information about unfolding events, 
and harass bloggers and social media users supporting opposition candidates. Bahraini 
authorities, for example, have employed hundreds of Internet “trolls” to scour popular 
domestic and international websites, and—while posing as ordinary users—attack the 
credibility of those who post information that reflects poorly on the government. These 
same Internet brigades may also coordinate in denial-of-service attacks to temporarily or 
indefinitely interrupt or suspend services of a host connected to the Internet. During the 
2008 Russia-Georgia war, pro-government Russian hackers launched denial-of-service 
attacks against a wide range of Georgian ISPs and websites (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010: 
pp. 17, 129; Kelly, Cook, & Truong, 2012, p. 2). 
Like surveillance, institutional requirements for national information shaping 
strategies are fairly high. While China appears to be using these strategies in addition to 
existing control efforts, Deibert & Rohozinski (2010) suggest that Russia is using these 
sophisticated approaches to control instead of filtering and other blunt control tech-
niques because they are difficult to trace back to the government. The absence of overt 
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state-mandated Internet filtering in the country has actually led some observers to con-
clude that the Russian Internet represents an open and uncontested space, thus helping 
the country avoid the Internet pariah label. Another possible—and related—explanation 
is that these subtle techniques do not inadvertently disrupt Internet activity for “normal” 
users and business operations, thus making the country a more attractive destination for 
foreign direct investment. 
 National information shaping strategies are difficult to verify and thus difficult to 
measure without in-depth fieldwork. Freedom House’s Freedom of the Net (2013) coding 
methodology looks for instances of cyberattacks against opposition websites, but does not 
cover sophisticated propaganda techniques. 
Interests. Interests refer to policy stakeholders (the individuals, groups, organi-
zations, and institutions with a vested interest in a particular policy or its outcome) and 
the arrangement of stakeholder power in support of the policy, per Wilson (2000). In 
general policy terms, this arrangement may involve one or more powerful interest group, 
including governmental and nongovernmental actors, traditionally friendly or competitive 
groups, broad base coalitions, or well-endowed interests with narrow coalitions. The state 
may be a power broker (mediator) here, or a major actor itself.  Members of the domi-
nant political party or business class may also take a prominent role, and the state may be 
predisposed to favor these elite interests because of their positional advantages. In author-
itarian regimes, such policy coalitions often include key constituencies at the social core 
of the regime (Morlino, 2008).35 
Internet policy stakeholders may include Internet service providers, content devel-
opers, trademark holders, intergovernmental groups, policy experts, and end users. Pri-
35 Stakeholder analysis is a useful way to further break down regime power dynamics, and to specifically 
identify the critical policy actors. Power, in this analysis, can discerned through two dimensions: first, the 
power dynamic observable in the decision making process, by which (per Dahl) actor A can force actor B to 
do something B would not otherwise have done; and second—and more broadly—through the observable 
control of the agenda, especially the extent to which particular issues that might challenge the values or 
interests of particular actors are kept out of policy making processes (van der Bulck, 2013; Barzilai-Nahon, 
2008).
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vate actors may play critical policy advisory roles in emerging economies. Eldon (2005), 
for instance, documents how ICT companies have been influential in Kenya’s Internet 
policy working groups, and helped to guide the country’s telecommunications expansion 
and Internet development. In the late 1990s, Costa Rica’s proactive government part-
nered with private sector actors to attract ICT FDI (most notably Intel) and transform the 
country’s image from “banana republic” to “Silicon Valley South.” Israel, India, and other 
countries have adopted similar approaches to creating FDI-friendly tech hubs (Drori, 
2004, pp. 443-444).
As discussed earlier in the paper, Internet policy may fork off into distinct Internet 
regulatory regimes and Internet control regimes when there are competing economic and 
political interests. Zheng (2008, pp. 49-50) identifies just such a dynamic in China, where 
policy makers face the “difficult double tasks” of promoting information technology de-
velopment for economic reasons while simultaneously controlling information access and 
communication channels for political reasons. Although the control regime seems able to 
maintain the upper hand through its strategic use of coercive measures, there is recent ev-
idence that China’s Firewall may be hurting the tech industry by slowing Internet traffic 
and hindering the use of cloud-computing services (Economist, 2013a; Mozur & Tejada, 
2013, Feb. 13; Schuman, 2011, Oct. 26). This architectural flaw will eventually reduce 
China’s global competitiveness in e-commerce, which could cause a shift in the dynamic 
between the two regimes. Such factional policy cleavages in China and other authoritari-
an regimes hold special ramifications for democratization efforts, especially when and if 
this schism roughly parallels the split between regime “soft-liners” and “hard-liners.”36 
36  O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) famously argued that that “there is no transition [to democracy] whose 
beginning is not the consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian 
regime itself” (p. 19). Case studies suggest that Internet policy might be a bellwether of such schisms to 
the extent that it introduces a Dictator’s Dilemma—a variation of Huntington’s famous King’s Dilemma—
wherein economic development gains and subsequent increases in governing regime legitimacy come at 
ever increasing costs (and decreasing successes) for information control efforts (Wand, 2012). More specif-
ically, new technologies and subsequent institutional changes may erode political advantages and economic 
rents for entrenched elites, while empowering new political actors and competing interest groups (Fredman, 
2012; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 15).
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A broad coalition stakeholder approach to policy making has been most evident at 
the global Internet governance level. The main Internet governance bodies—Internet Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), World Summit on the Information 
Society (WSIS), and the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)—represent a 
policy regime-building collaboration between governments and private actors. The extent 
of these bodies’ influence on national Internet control policies is detailed in the Interna-
tional factors section ahead. 
International Factors. Internet policy is inherently global since it applies to a 
global information infrastructure, a network of networks. When a Chinese Internet pol-
icy results in the removal of a blog post critical of the CCP, that policy affects Internet 
users around the globe trying to access that content. Likewise, content available to the 
rest of the world may not be available to Chinese users because of that country’s exten-
sive firewall. The Internet is thus a global technology experienced under local conditions 
(Braman, 2011, p. 150).
The most important global Internet administrative body is the Internet Corpora-
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is responsible for the coordi-
nation of the global Internet’s system of unique identifiers and, in particular, ensuring 
its stable and secure operation.37  The United States government originally controlled 
the Domain Name System of the Internet directly. But as the Internet expanded globally 
and commercially, total US control became untenable. Instead of turning administrative 
authority over to an international body such as the UN’s International Telecommunica-
tion Union (ITU), in 1998 the Clinton Administration created ICANN as a not-for-profit 
organization incorporated under California law, effectively privatizing domain name 
37 More specifically, ICANN’s critical tasks include (1) coordinating the allocation and assignment of the 
three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet, which are (a) domain names (forming a system referred to as 
“DNS”); (b) Internet protocol (“IP”) addresses and autonomous system (“AS”) numbers; and (c)  protocol 
port and parameter numbers; (2) coordinating the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server 
system; and (3) coordinating policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these technical 
functions (ICANN, 2011). 
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governance in order to keep that critical aspect of Internet governance out of the hands of 
world governments and UN bureaucrats (Brito, 2011, March 5).
Government representatives from around the world sit on ICANN’s Governmen-
tal Advisory Committee, but as the name implies, their role is only advisory and policy 
decisions are ultimately made by the ICANN board. Governments unsatisfied with their 
limited influence over this critical aspect of Internet governance have traditionally gone 
to the ITU to air their grievances.38 Until recently that organization’s policy influence 
was marginal. However, during a renegotiation of the telecommunication treaty in 2012, 
a number of countries, including Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, proposed overarching 
reforms for the ITU that would have created significant Internet policy obligations for 
member states (Brito, 2011, March 4; Dourado, 2013, Sept. 8). While representatives of 
democratic member states fought to keep the worst provisions out of the final treaty, it 
still contained objectionable provisions, and was bundled with a resolution giving the 
ITU greater agency in crafting Internet policy. The United States and 54 other countries 
refused to sign, and in September 2013, two senior US officials—FCC Commissioner 
Ajit Pai and Republican Rep. Greg Walden—suggested the United States should pull 
funding from the ITU if the body persisted in its attempts to regulate the Internet (Doura-
do, 2013).
Several international organizations contribute directly and indirectly to Internet 
policy. Treaties are the basis of these activities, whether multilateral, plurilateral, or bilat-
eral. Braman (2011) explains how the formation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 
was necessitated by the transition to a global information economy. While the General 
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade had largely focused on goods, the WTO was designed to 
38 Dutton and Peltu (2010) note that the ITU’s World Summits on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 
and 2005 were a significant and controversial recognition of the technology’s growing global importance, 
and that a key WSIS characteristic was its commitment to multi-stakeholder global Internet policy-mak-
ing. Many works have analyzed the significance of the WSIS—the UN’s International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) body more broadly—for national Internet policy making (See Dutton & Peltu, 2010; Mathia-
son, 2008; Shahin, 2007). 
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accommodate information processing and related services (via the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services), and to treat more systematically the trade dimensions of intellectual 
property rights (via the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement). 
Liberalizing telecommunications agreements under the WTO framework may affect the 
cost of network access to the Internet, and trade agreements covering trade in computing 
and networking equipment may affect the cost of equipment used to use the Internet.39  
Multilateral treaties cover a broad purview, and effectively create an additional 
layer of legal infrastructure between the international and state levels. The most com-
prehensive of such regional legal entities is, of course, the European Commission. Other 
regional entities created by multilateral treaties with such features include those of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(Braman, 2011, pp. 151-152). 
Incidents. Wilson (2000) notes that the first stage of policy regime change in-
volves external factors (“incidents” here for alliterative purposes) that effectively weaken 
the policy regime, create conditions favorable to change, or act as a catalyst for change. 
Other policy literature refers to such factors as “trigger events.”40 As the term suggests, 
external factors emerge—often unexpectedly—from outside of the set of circumstanc-
es and conditions that shaped the existing policy regime. These observable occurrences 
can be divided into stressors, which impose pressure on the regime, or enablers, which 
facilitate change.41 Stressor and enabler factors may emerge suddenly or incrementally, 
but in either case they can be identified and analytically isolated as the cause of a partic-
39 China’s World Trade Organization accession came only after substantial deregulatory policy compli-
ances. The concessions  resulted in a massive foreign investments in Chinese telecoms and an expansion 
in domestic access and usage. Foreign investors were authorized to form joint ventures, investing up to 
50% in Internet services in the whole country, and up to 49% in the mobile sector in major Chinese cities 
(Daniel, 2005, p. 30). Although the governing regime has maintained tight content controls on the Internet, 
trade law analysts have speculated that China’s website blocking policies are not consistent with its GATS 
commitments, and could produce a WTO ruling against the country should a case be brought up (Harley, 
2010, Jan. 26; Zimmerman, 2013). 
40 Wilson (2000) cites Cobb and Elder (1983) as an example of this usage.
41 The effect of the phenomena or phenomenon is observable—or measurable—even if the factor itself is 
not (e.g. a heat wave).
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ular effect or series of effects42—including a disruption of the institutional arrangement 
executing the policy, an identification of anomalies in the prevailing policy paradigm, a 
reassessment of the legitimacy of the policy itself, or a challenge to the power dynamic in 
support of the policy.
One particular type of stressor, the “spillover effect,” would seem to be of special 
relevance to authoritarian Internet policy regimes and media policy regimes more broad-
ly. Spillover effects occur when changes in the governing regime initiate policy level 
regime shifts. Authoritarian regimes, of course, implement many policy level regimes 
explicitly for the purpose of preventing such changes and assuring regime stability. Thus 
a shift in governing-level regime—especially from authoritarian to (or towards) demo-
cratic—would seem to augur equally dramatic shifts in media and Internet policy.43  
Methodology Summary
The wide range of Internet control regimes can best be classified using a typo-
logical approach. The typology outlined in this paper identifies and categorizes the most 
common and most prominent control regime types. The typology identifies groupings 
of countries exhibiting densely linked shared characteristics and presents them as “mod-
els”—effectively ideal types, and more specifically constructed types to the extent that 
they are analogous to a measure of central tendency. The typology is decidedly descrip-
tive in that it identifies the compounds of conceptual attributes (the policy regime dimen-
sions) that comprise particular types (Internet control regime models). 
 The typology draws from and refines Eko’s (2001; 2008) Internet regulatory ty-
42 The relationship between cause and effect, in turn, can be explained through a causal mechanism. Wilson 
(2000) does not articulate this level of causal analysis in presenting his framework, but his case study ex-
amples adequately demonstrate this relationship.  
43 Although the Arab Spring and similar uprisings provide anecdotal evidence that ICT-emboldened ac-
tivists can continue to catch authoritarian regimes off guard, a wealth of evidence suggests authoritarian 
regimes have utilized ICT to create sophisticated surveillance systems that can enhance and optimize their 
repressive capabilities. There is evidence that regimes learn from the experience of other countries and 
act preemptively against particular forms of ICT to stem off civil unrest—for example, in the wake of the 
“Twitter revolution” in Iran, the service was blocked across mainland China in the days preceding the 20th 
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown (Aday et al 2010). 
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pology which is largely based on a single (albeit multifaceted) dimension of governmen-
tality. The six policy regimes dimensions used in this typology are derived from policy 
regime, public policy, and Internet policy literature. The dimensions are: ideas, Internet 
penetration, institutional arrangement, interests, international factors, and incidents. The 
typology categories are identified in Table 3.1, and discussed in further detail in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 3.1: Typology of Internet Control Policy Regimes  
 Cuban Model Chinese Model Russian Model
Includes Cuba, North Korea, 
Myanmar
China, Saudi Arabia, Iran Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan
Ideas Authoritarian governing 
regimes willing to deviate 
from global ICT trends in 
order to maintain political 
control.
Authoritarian governing 
regimes actively promoting 
ICT development while 
maintaining tight Internet 
control. 
Authoritarian or semi-au-
thoritarian regimes pro-
moting ICT development 
and using more subtle 
means of Internet control.
Internet 
Penetration
Very low 
(0 to 30 percent)
Moderate 
(30 to 60 percent)
Moderate
(30 to 60 percent)
Institutional 
Arrangement
A “gateway” governmental 
agency controls — either 
directly or indirectly — the 
country’s Internet architec-
ture. Access is limited to a 
small elite portion of the 
population, while activity 
is closely monitored and 
controlled.
A “gateway” governmental 
agency controls — either 
directly or indirectly — the 
country’s Internet architec-
ture. High levels of insti-
tutional capacity allow for 
control focus on activity, 
not access.
A “gateway” governmental 
agency controls — largely 
indirectly — the coun-
try’s Internet architecture. 
Open access to the Internet 
and very little  filtering, 
Government competes in 
informational space with 
competitors.
Interests Limited political pluralism; 
small political and business 
elite.
Limited political pluralism; 
core political elite; growing 
business class; internation-
al investors and companies.
Limited political pluralism; 
core political elite; growing 
business class; internation-
al investors and companies.
International 
Factors
Hermit countries largely 
cut off from global e-com-
merce market. 
WTO agreements produce 
liberalized telecom sectors.
Members of the Common-
wealth of Independent 
States (CIS); vocal in global 
Internet governance issues.
Incidents Arab Spring and similar 
incidents reinforced neces-
sity of tight controls.
WTO accession and simi-
lar economic agreements; 
Foreign direct investment
Color revolutions induced 
governments to increase 
Internet control capacity.
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Developmental Model United States Model European Model
Includes Botswana, Costa Rica, 
India, Malaysia 
US only France, Germany, Italy, Swit-
zerland, Norway
Ideas Developing countries 
with democratic or 
hybrid governing re-
gimes and liberalizing 
economies leveraging 
ICT as a tool for social 
and economic growth.
Democratic govern-
ment with a self-reg-
ulatory approach to 
tech sector. Concep-
tion of the Internet 
as a marketplace 
of ideas. National 
security backdrop to 
surveillance efforts.
Democratic governments with 
co-regulatory approach to tech 
sector. Policy makers’ views on 
privacy and speech contrast 
with US.
Internet Penetration Low to Moderate 
(0 to 60 percent)
Very high
(80 to 90 percent)
Very high
(80 to 90 percent)
Institutional Arrange-
ment
Varying levels and ar-
rangements of Internet 
control, but filtering 
and surveillance are 
generally less pro-
nounced than in gate-
way model countries 
due, in part, to lower 
levels of institutional 
capacity and higher 
levels of democracy.
FCC has jurisdiction 
over some issues, 
but no single agency 
regulates the Internet. 
NSA provides the US 
with unprecedented 
surveillance capaci-
ty. NTIA and NIST 
also exert a degree of 
control over func-
tional aspects of the 
technology.
While EU Directives produce 
policy harmonization on Single 
Market-related telecommu-
nication, e-commerce, and 
data privacy issues, a number 
of important Internet control 
policies remains firmly in the 
ambit of national governments.
Interests Limited to full political 
pluralism;  growing 
business class;  inter-
national investors and 
companies.
Multinational tech 
corporations that 
shape Internet devel-
opment and main-
tain giant troves of 
personal and business 
data for users across 
the globe.
The region’s tech sector is not 
especially strong. Data privacy 
and “information liberation” 
have become political issues 
with young voters.
International Factors WTO agreements 
produce liberalized 
telecommunications 
sectors. Strong ties 
with multinational 
corporations.
US policy makers 
have been proactive 
in intellectual proper-
ty right protection at 
international level.
Countries have succeeded in 
applying speech and data laws 
extraterritorially through a 
combination of market power 
and threat of asset seizure. 
Incidents Varies, but IMF-led 
stabilization and simi-
lar transitions towards 
market economies 
common.
Post 9-11 national 
security initiatives 
compel ISPs to share 
users’ private Internet 
communications with 
government agencies.
Data Retention Directive was 
adopted by the European 
Union after 9-11, but has gen-
erated resistance by member 
states.
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Chapter Three
Typology Categories
Cuban, Chinese, and Russian models 
Eko identified and defined the gateway model of Internet regulation in a 2001 
Communication Law and Policy article, and expanded upon the concept in several sub-
sequent works (2008; 2012).1 The most salient feature of the gateway model is its institu-
tional arrangement, which reflects a command-and-control regulatory posture. Under this 
model, a governmental agency in control of the country’s Internet exchange points (IXPs) 
or Internet backbone either serves as operator by providing Internet connections to users 
directly, or as direct regulator by leasing bandwidth to private or partially privatized In-
ternet service providers (ISPs). Through control of the IXPs and ISPs, governments may 
install hardware and software necessary to filter and monitor web communication. This 
allows governments to (a) create firewalls that prevent access to portions of the Internet, 
which are blocked in the name of national security, culture, morality, or some other stated 
interest, and to (b) monitor Internet communication (including email and other private 
messages) coming in and out of the country and circulating domestically. By bundling 
all relevant Internet control mechanisms in one (or a few) Internet agencies, authoritarian 
governments can create a centralized control structure that is able to make and implement 
far-reaching policy decisions about the Internet effectively and extremely rapidly. Wagner 
(2012) refers to this arrangement as “push button autocracy” in an analysis of Tunisia’s 
Internet control policy regime.
Eko (2008) notes that this model is most evident in countries with authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian governing regimes. Authoritarian governing regimes are characterized 
by—among other factors—limited political pluralism, which is usually broadly defined 
1 ISPs and IXPs had already been identified as critical mechanisms of control for authoritarian governments 
(Shapiro, 1999, p. 65; Human Rights Watch, 1999, p. 463), but Eko expanded on this observation by detail-
ing the specific manner in which control of the Internet architecture allowed governments to strategically 
limit both Internet access and Internet activity. 
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as interest-group competition within a democratic structure. More specifically, we can say 
that political pluralism, per Eisenberg's definition (2010, p. 18), comprises two inter-
twined themes: the distribution of power among groups, and the ability of any one group 
to direct individual development. The degree of limited pluralism varies among differ-
ent subtypes of authoritarian regimes, including so-called hybrid regimes,2 but it can be 
assumed that under any such regime, participation in political power is likely controlled 
through certain social forces and channeled through different organizational structures, 
including mass media and Internet policies. 
A survey of case studies of Internet policy under different authoritarian regimes—
especially those compiled by the OpenNet Initiative and Freedom House3—reinforces the 
applicability of Eko’s gateway model: 
● In Myanmar, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
retains control over the country’s international connection to the Internet through 
two main Internet service providers, the state-owned Myanmar Post Telecommu-
nication and the military-linked Yatanarpon Teleport.
● In Saudi Arabia, the Communications and Information Technology Commission's 
Internet Services Unit is responsible for overseeing Internet services through 25 
licensed ISPs and implementing filtering directives. 
● In China, access to the Internet is provided by eight state-licensed ISPs, while 
Internet usage is tightly regulated by the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), which oversees the country’s Great Firewall filtering system 
which blocks foreign content, and its Golden Shield domestic Internet monitoring 
system. 
● In Russia, a substantial portion of the telecom market—including broadband 
Internet providers—remains under state control, while all ICT is regulated by the 
2 See Gilbert and Mohseni (2011).
3All country Internet information ahead is sourced to these profiles, unless otherwise noted. 
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Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technolo-
gies, and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor), which possesses the authority 
to determine if a website should be blocked based on whether or not the site con-
tains material that is restricted by the law. 
● In Ben Ali-era Tunisia, all Internet traffic was routed through the Tunisian Internet 
Agency (Agence Tunisienne d’Internet, ATI), which provided the regime with a 
well-staffed institution to directly carry out existing Internet regulatory policy, and 
to develop and attain additional Internet control mechanisms. 
However, beyond the centrality of a government “gateway” agency and the presence of 
an authoritarian governing regime—the distinguishing characteristics of the model—
gateway countries exhibit a great diversity in Internet control mechanisms employed, fil-
tering and censorship (more generally) criteria, and other identified typology dimensions. 
Three groupings emerge, which I have categorized with titles reflecting the most exem-
plary cases of the traits described: the Cuban model, Chinese model, and Russian model. 
These three models are distinct enough along multiple dimensions that I treat them as 
discrete categories, rather than subsets of a single “gateway” category.
 Cuban model.  Countries within this grouping feature very low Internet penetra-
tion rates (0 to 30 percent), and governments willing to deviate from global ICT trends 
in order to maintain maximum political control. Cuban model governments may neglect 
to invest in Internet-related telecommunications infrastructure and technologies, refuse 
to change the legal and administrative investment climates in ways that would attract the 
kind of capital needed to generate significant Internet growth, or only allow incremental 
Internet expansion that never exceeds their limited institutional control capacity (Franda, 
2002). The Internet can be crudely but effectively controlled under this model because us-
ers are reliant upon the government to provide not only Internet service, but also Internet 
points of access. However, this approach is decidedly not conducive to economic growth. 
Many authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes—especially within Central Asia—ini-
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tially implemented many of the policies and control mechanisms described ahead, but 
eventually changed tact when the necessity of the Internet for foreign direct investment 
and domestic business growth became evident. 
Cuban model regimes can neutralize the Internet as a perceived political and 
social stability threat by confining Internet access to a small elite portion of the popula-
tion—usually military, scientific, and administrative-intelligence circles—while severely 
controlling the circumstances under which the bulk of the population is able to gain and 
use the technology. This can be achieved by (a) developing a sanitized national intranet as 
a substitute for the global Internet, (b) maintaining a weak Internet infrastructure with a 
limited number of ISPs, and (c) routing individual Internet users into government con-
trolled Internet cafés where access and activity can be carefully monitored. Cuban model 
regimes may also use filtering technology and enforcement at the source actions to limit 
Internet activity for any and all users. 
National intranets were attractive Internet alternatives for authoritarian govern-
ments in the late 1990s and early 2000s, since users were limited to a screened network 
of content that offered little to no political threat to the regime. The global Internet was 
either cut off entirely in such an arrangement, or extremely filtered. Although Intranets 
functioned as a short-term solution, their shortcomings were substantial, especially for 
governments trying to attract foreign direct investment and keep domestic businesses 
competitive. Hence, in China, plans for a national intranet were eventually overtaken by 
events—first, a tipping point in global Internet adoption, and second, the liberalization of 
the Chinese telecommunications sector as part of the country’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization—which made the idea much less feasible (Wingfield & Macavinta, 1997, 
Jan. 15; Kalathil & Boas, 2003, p. 141). Today, only Cuba and North Korea maintain 
such systems, although even in these countries there is evidence that citizens are gaining 
Internet access through other means and otherwise circumventing the intranet arrange-
ment. 
66
 Maintaining an underdeveloped Internet infrastructure is a similarly flawed strat-
egy. Even Myanmar—where Internet penetration rates remain in single digits due its an-
tiquated Internet infrastructure—is finely shifting policy and seeking outside investment 
to make the necessary upgrades in its telecommunications sector. Internet cafés, however, 
are a popular feature even in high Internet penetration countries, but they are especially 
critical points of access in low penetration countries where home computers are rare. In-
ternet cafés allow authoritarian regimes to tie Internet activity to individual Internet users, 
thereby combining two dimensions of control (access and activity). 
Cuban model countries do employ a number of strictly activity controls, although 
these are mostly limited to enforcement at the source actions, limited surveillance, and 
filtering. Enforcement at the source refers to attempts to regulate prohibited content at the 
endpoints of the network—i.e. the sources and recipients of objectionable material—and 
to some extent the intermediaries who host users’ digital content. In authoritarian coun-
tries, this targeting often comes in the form of coercive actions—including intimidation, 
arrest, torture, and execution—against reporters, bloggers, activists, and everyday Inter-
net users for violations of media or security laws. Such actions may also occur outside of 
a formal legal or political framework entirely. Four journalists were slain in Guatemala in 
2013, for example, and most observers were rightly skeptical of interior minister Mauri-
cio López Bonilla’s claim that the killings were unrelated to their professions (Reporters 
Without Borders, 2013b). 
Surveillance efforts include tracking the Internet activity of dissidents, spying on 
journalists and their sources, and scanning and filtering private emails. These efforts are 
generally less sophisticated than in Chinese model countries because of a lack of techni-
cal resources. Cuban model countries may simply opt to block a website or service—es-
pecially those domained elsewhere—if they lack the capacity to adequately monitor user 
activity. Filtering is actually fairly effective in countries where Internet access for a rela-
tively small amount of users is limited to a few government operated or closely regulated 
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ISPs, as the filtering software and hardware can generally handle that amount of traffic. 
But filtering on a larger scale can be an expensive undertaking. 
In addition to initial installation costs, filtering software and hardware must be 
periodically updated to maintain effectiveness, which requires further (and ongoing) in-
vestment. Many regimes have to acquire filtering technology from Western providers, and 
private-sector “digital mercenaries” have emerged as critical actors in the Internet control 
supply chain. In addition to technology costs, the agencies implementing the filtering 
must also build a list of sites and pages to block. This can be an arduous, human resource 
heavy task if the content to be blocked is a type of content, such as pornography, rather 
than a specific site, such as an opposition political party or human rights organization 
(Murdoch & Anderson, 2008).
As personal computer and smartphone ownership rates increase, however, Cuban 
model regimes must develop a more complex and cumbersome set of control mechanisms 
that require a great deal more institutional capacity to effectively execute. Some govern-
ments will forgo this option—either by choice or necessity—and instead pursue a devel-
opment model whereby direct government control is largely relinquished in favor of eco-
nomic development and market liberalization. Other governments will simply increase 
their institutional control capacity, and double down on control efforts. Authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian governments transitioning from low to moderate Internet penetration 
thus face a critical policy junction. In some cases, particular International factors or Inci-
dents might have a strong influence in that policy decision. The Arab Spring, for instance, 
caused some Middle Eastern governments to double down on Internet control measures, 
while others (especially Tunisia) have transitioned to the developmental model. 
Chinese model. Countries within the Chinese model grouping feature moderate 
Internet penetration levels (30 to 60 percent), government-led ICT promotion and devel-
opment, and a high institutional capacity which allows them to effectively manage and 
control digital information within their jurisdiction. 
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Examples of this high institutional capacity: 
● China’s “Great Firewall” global Internet filtering system is optimized for cen-
tralized and region-level management. The system is estimated to have cost the 
government $160 million dollars when it was developed in the late 1990s. In ad-
dition, Internet commentators are paid to post online comments in line with CCP 
interests, and the government employs more than two million people to monitor 
web activity.
● Iran employs a sophisticated centralized filtering system that augments the fil-
tering conducted at the Internet service provider level, and can effectively block 
a website within a few hours across the entire network in Iran. These filtering 
efforts are carried out using domestically produced technology for identifying and 
blocking objectionable web sites, which reduces the country’s reliance on Western 
filtering technologies. The state also counters critical content and online organiz-
ing efforts through online regime-funded propaganda, including 400 news web-
sites either directly or indirectly supported by the state. 
● Saudi Arabia filters all web traffic through country-level proxy servers which con-
tain massive databases of banned sites. This means that the Internet content that 
users in Saudi Arabia see is not the original page on a server outside the country, 
but a copy on the computer servers in Riyadh and Jeddah. Through this system, 
the government blocks any content that it deems harmful to society or challenging 
to the royal family or other Gulf Arab States.
Because of such high levels of institutional capacity, Chinese model countries primar-
ily focus on controlling Internet activity, not Internet access. Activity refers to how the 
Internet is used by individuals, organizations, and government agencies. Control of the 
online activity can take different forms: (a) enforcement at the source—i.e. direct state 
action against the producers, consumers and hosts of prohibited digital content—which 
is generally a regime’s first enforcement option for controlling prohibited content and on-
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line activity, (b) filtering and blocking of websites or programs; (c) surveillance of online 
activity, and finally (d) attempts to manipulate and control social and political discourse 
through various means of information, propaganda, and entertainment (Eriksson & Gia-
comello, 2009). Many of these mechanisms are also present in Cuban model countries, 
but because of their high institutional capacity Chinese model states are able to execute 
them with a greater degree of technical sophistication and generally handle a much larger 
amount of Internet traffic. 
Enforcement at the source efforts in Chinese model countries are increasingly 
directed through intermediary liability, which refers to government regulation of and 
coordination with Internet service providers (ISPs) that provide access to the Internet and 
online service providers (OSPs) that provide services through the Internet. Some OSPs 
like Facebook operate as “walled gardens” where access is controlled by a single compa-
ny, and posted content largely exists outside of the searchable parameters of the normal 
Internet and outside of the screening capacity of most filtering programs. These sites 
are thus very difficult for authoritarian governments to control unless they (a) block the 
service entirely, or (b) reach an agreement with the OSP to remove prohibited content as 
necessary. OSPs can and do cooperate with governments to act as censors, removing con-
tent deemed unacceptable under the justification of legal compliance. However, such an 
arrangement is much easier when the OSP is domestically hosted, and China, Russia, and 
numerous Middle Eastern governments have encouraged the creation of national alterna-
tives to Twitter and Facebook that are easier for the government to monitor and regulate. 
The example of Weibo is illustrative of this trend.  After the July 2009 riots in 
Ürümqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Chinese gov-
ernment shutdown many social media services, domestic and international alike. Wei-
bo, a hybrid of Twitter and Facebook, was launched in the wake of this crackdown as 
a Beijing-approved alternative to existing services, as the parent company Sina had a 
strong record of keeping content the government deemed sensitive off its 20 million blogs 
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(Epstein, 2011 March 3; Ramzy, 2011, April 21). Today the service has more than 500 
million registered users (Ong, 2013, Feb. 21). In cooperation with the government, Sina 
sets strict controls over the posts on its services and is proactive in removing prohibited 
content.  Nearly 30 percent of the total deletions occur within five to thirty minutes of 
posting, and nearly 90 percent of the deletions happen within the first 24 hours (Zhu, 
Phipps, Pridgen, Crandall, & Wallach, 2013). 
As noted above, filtering and surveillance efforts in Chinese model countries are 
considerably more sophisticated than in Cuban model countries, owing in large part to 
greater investment in filtering hardware and software. Although China developed and 
implemented its Great Firewall relatively early in the Internet development process, for 
most countries advances in filtering technology are gradual and incremental. Wagner 
(2012) details how the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) under Ben Ali was able to expand 
its Internet control over several stages as it acquired new hardware and software, and 
added new tactics to address emerging threats. The first stage began in 1997 when the 
ATI implemented a web-blocking proxy filtering program. Because all fixed-line Inter-
net traffic passed through infrastructure controlled by the ATI, the regime was able to 
load the filtering software onto its servers and filter content consistently across Tunisia’s 
ISPs. The second stage, which lasted from 2003 to 2007, began with the implementation 
of email-inspection and filtering, which augmented the existing web-blocking filtering 
program, and added a greater element of surveillance to the control operation. In the third 
stage, from 2007 to 2010, the ATI added deep packet inspection technology to its filter-
ing and surveillance efforts. The government also initiated national information shaping 
tactics during this period to proactively shape public opinion online through seemingly 
organic blogs, videos, and social media posts designed to insult dissident bloggers or 
praise the government. A fourth and final stage began near the end of 2010, when the 
regime employed hacking attacks and website defacement efforts to stem the tide of the 
revolution.
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Even the most sophisticated filtering and surveillance technology cannot catch 
every prohibited communication, in part because the technology advances so quickly. Be-
fore the Arab Spring, ATI authorities were aware that the existing filtering system lacked 
the technical capability to filter or intercept social media posts and messages while still 
allowing access to the sites themselves.  Tunisia did not have the capabilities to develop 
its own censorship hardware and software, and was negotiating with a European tech 
supplier to add monitoring of social networks to its existing monitoring capabilities when 
the events of the Jasmine revolution overtook the country (Wagner, 2012; Silver, 2011, 
Dec. 21). 
 Furthermore, extensive filtering and surveillance efforts eventually become detri-
mental to economic growth.  This is especially the case in China, where the government 
is trying to avoid the middle-income trap by steering the economy up the value chain into 
high-tech industries. High-speed Internet is critical to this economic development plan, 
but lag-inducing filtering negates any infrastructure gains. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
the Internet slows down to a near halt in the country when a sensitive event is taking 
place. Limiting the free flow of information hampers the development of homegrown, in-
novative businesses tapped into the global tech scene. Finally, filtering interrupts normal 
business operations by making the web unreliable, while surveillance makes companies 
wary of sending classified business information into and out of the country. All of this is a 
detriment to foreign direct investment in the country's tech industry, and puts its domestic 
businesses at a distinct disadvantage (Schuman, 2011; Mozur & Tejada, 2013).
As detailed in Chapter One, Zheng (2008) argues that the inherent contradictions 
in the Chinese government's approach to the Internet have produced two distinct Internet 
policy regimes: an Internet regulatory regime which seeks to promote the technology’s 
development, and an Internet control regime which seems to limit any destabilizing ef-
fects. Such policy cleavages—in China and elsewhere—would seem to hold special ram-
ifications for democratization efforts, especially when and if this schism roughly parallels 
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the split between regime “soft-liners" and "hard-liners.” O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) 
famously argued that “there is no transition [to democracy] whose beginning is not the 
consequence—direct or indirect—of important divisions within the authoritarian regime 
itself” (p. 19).
 Russian model. Countries within the Russian model grouping are all members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),4 feature moderate Internet penetration 
levels (30 to 60 percent), government-led ICT promotion and development, and moderate 
to high institutional capacity. The distinguishing characteristics of Russian model coun-
tries are (a) relatively open access to the Internet, (b) relatively low or nearly non-existent 
levels of filtering, (c) strategic removal of content (rather than filtering) through state 
coordination with ISPs and OSPs and functional domain name controls, and (d) sophisti-
cated information-shaping strategies whereby the government competes in informational 
space with potential adversaries and competitors. 
As this paper has detailed, authoritarian governing regimes are closely linked with 
repressive Internet control regimes. Thus we would expect the countries of the former So-
viet Union—Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—to follow suit, 
especially as many of their respective political trajectories have bent back towards au-
thoritarianism after briefs periods of political opening. Only two CIS countries, Ukraine 
and Moldova, rank as partly free in Freedom House's most recent (2013) Freedom in the 
World report. The rest are all decidedly not free.  Yet a 2010 report from the OpenNet Ini-
tiative, “Control and Subversion in Russian Cyberspace” (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010), 
notes that although “creeping authoritarianism” is evident throughout the CIS in nearly 
every facet of social and political life—and especially in the media, where independent 
press outlets are stifled and journalists regularly intimidated—the Internet remains ac-
cessible and relatively free from censorship. ONI’s frequent filtering tests throughout the 
4 Turkmenistan—with it single digit penetration levels and tight government controls over access—is a 
clear regional exception, and fits cleanly within the Cuban model. 
73
region identified significant filtering in only Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For the rest of 
the region, web content was as freely available as in Western Europe or the United States. 
This is not because the governments lack the means to implement greater con-
trol—although these countries feature a more liberalized telecommunications market than 
other authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, all of the countries within this grouping 
feature gateway institutional arrangements whereby a government ministry or agency 
tightly regulates the country’s Internet service providers (ISPs), and generally controls the 
Internet backbone. In Russia, for example, all of the major ISPs are either state owned or 
include significant state participation (either directly or through a state-controlled entity),5 
and most of the country’s existing country-wide cable lines are held by a small number of 
large operators, including the state-controlled Rostelecom and TransTeleCom—a subsid-
iary of government-owned Russian Railways—which operates and services the largest fi-
ber-optic communication network in the country. Roskomnadzor—a Russian abbreviation 
for the Federal Service in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies, and Mass 
Communications, which is located in the Ministry of Communications and Mass Commu-
nications—is the key government mass media agency. Its functions include licensing of 
broadcasters, registration of mass media outlets, and issuances of warnings for failure to 
comply with the mass media statute.  Roskomnadzor possesses the authority to determine 
if a website should be blocked based on whether or not the site contains material that 
is restricted by the law. (OpenNet Initiative, 2010a; Freedom House, 2013a; Reporters 
Without Borders, 2012c). 
 Given the ample control mechanisms outlined above, why is there not pervasive 
filtering in Russia or elsewhere in the CIS? Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) argue that in 
CIS countries, control strategies are designed to shape and affect when and how infor-
mation is received by users, rather than denying access outright. This is accomplished 
5 This arrangement in other CIS countries in similar, with former state monopoly telecom providers (e.g. 
KazakhTelecom, KyrgyzTelecom, Tajiktelecom, etc.) dominating private providers in the market. 
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through the use of what the authors label second generation controls, which enable state 
actors to strategically block access to online content through intermediary liability and 
subtle and covert mechanisms which can be difficult to trace back to the government, and 
third generation controls, which enable to state to compete with perceived adversaries 
through counterinformation campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize oppo-
nents. 
According to Deibert and Rohozinski (2010), second generation controls have an 
overt and a covert track: the former aims to normalize and legalize content controls by 
specifying the conditions under which access to particular content can be denied (or said 
content can be remove from servers), while the latter establishes procedures and technical 
capabilities that allow content controls to be applied immediately and effectively before 
and during critical moments (e.g. elections or public demonstrations), and to be applied in 
ways that assure plausible deniability.
 Second generation controls identified by Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) include: 
● Compelling Internet sites to register with authorities, and using noncompliance as 
justification for removing ‘‘illegal’’ content.
● Strict criteria pertaining to what is ‘‘acceptable’’ within the national media space, 
and the strategic de-registration of sites that do not comply from the national 
domain.6 
● Expanded use of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ laws to deter bloggers and 
independent media outlets from posting material critical of the government or 
specific government officials.
6 In Russia, for example, recent rules promulgated by Nic.ru—the largest Russian domain name-registra-
tion company—and reflecting official regulations allow the organization to cancel domain names (and thus 
access) for websites that incite violence or “extremist” activity, advocate the overthrow of the government, 
or feature activity in conflict with human dignity or religious beliefs. In addition, all domain name-registra-
tion companies within the country are authorized to suspend domain names upon written notification from 
“agencies conducting an investigation”—a provision would potentially authorize prosecutors, the Federal 
Security Service (FSB), the police, or the drug enforcement agency (FSKN) to order such a move (Report-
ers Without Borders, 2012c) .
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● Evoking national security concerns—especially at times of civic unrest—as the 
legal justification for blocking or removing specific Internet content and services. 
● Formal and informal requests to ISPs and OSPs to remove material, backed by the 
threat of serious sanctions. 
● Computer network attacks, especially the use of distributed denial-of-service 
attacks, to overwhelm ISPs and selected sites. Such attacks are difficult to trace 
back to the government. 
Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) provide numerous examples of all of the above. It should 
be noted that the use of these particular controls—as detailed in both the authors’ account 
and the most recent Freedom on the Net report—varies considerably across the CIS 
region. Evidence from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan suggests those countries are 
more likely to have content blocked or removed, or even cut Internet and mobile phone 
service altogether when their respective regimes feel threatened by protests and would-
be Color Revolutions. Russia—the model’s namesake—largely uses enforcement at the 
source in the form of offline threats and attacks against bloggers and journalists critical of 
local officials and powerful business interests,7 coordinated DDoS attacks, and the sort of 
third generation control mechanisms described ahead. But in all of these countries, there 
is very little permanent technical filtering.
Deibert and Rohozinski (2010, p. 27) label  “third generation” controls as (a) 
mechanisms for enhancing state control over national cyberspace, and (b) sophisticated 
techniques for competing in informational space with potential adversaries and competi-
tors. The examples the authors provide of the former do not seem substantially different 
from second or even first generation controls, although the focus seems to be on increas-
ing surveillance capacity rather than content removal capacity. For instance, the authors 
note that Russian ISPs are now obliged by law to purchase and install equipment that 
7 Numerous examples are detailed in Russia’s Reporters Without Borders profile (2012c), and in Alex-
anyan, Barash, Etling, Faris, Gasser, Kelly, Palfrey, and Roberts (2012). 
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would permit local authorities to monitor the Internet activity of specific users. More 
recent accounts suggest that ISPs are now required to temporarily store all Internet traf-
fic—including IP addresses, telephone numbers, and usernames—and make it available 
to the Federal Security Service (FSB), the internal affairs agency that replaced the KGB 
(European Digital Rights, 2013, Nov. 6).
Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) have a stronger claim about the second variation 
of third generation controls—which the authors refers to as “information shaping strate-
gies”—where the focus is less on denying access (either to the Internet itself or to particu-
lar online content) than successfully competing with potential threats through data min-
ing, surveillance, and effective counter-information campaigns. The ultimate source of 
such campaigns is difficult to attribute since they are “designed to render opaque the role 
of state actors” (p. 28).  These techniques include using paid “Internet Brigades” to post 
prepackaged propaganda and disinformation in online discussions, skew Internet polls, 
and harass other users in particular forums.8 The authors provide numerous examples of 
such information shaping strategies, and similar examples are also well documented in 
recent Reporters Without Borders country profiles of Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakh-
stan. This technique saw a marked increase in the run-up to parliamentary and presiden-
tial polls in Russia at the end of 2011. Several thousand Russian Twitter accounts were 
hacked in order to flood social media with pro-government messages, while a series of 
distributed denial-of-service attacks paralyzed sites critical of the government before and 
during the vote. The most recent Freedom House Freedom of the Net report (2013e) notes 
that the phenomenon of paid pro-government commentators has spread over the past two 
years, and now appears in 22 of the 60 countries surveyed, including China, Bahrain, 
Malaysia, and Ecuador.
8 However, Alexanyan, Barash, Etling, Faris, Gasser, Kelly, Palfrey, and Roberts’ (2012) comprehensive 
survey of the Internet's impact on Russian politics, media, and society finds that efforts by the government 
to push propaganda online through blog supporters—paid or otherwise—have not been very successful, as 
the mere presence of pro-Kremlin voices does not necessarily translate into influence.
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Deibert and Rohozinski (2010) speculate that one explanation for sophisticated 
second and third generation controls throughout the CIS region is the respective govern-
ments’ extensive prior experiences in dealing with opposition groups. Well before the 
Arab Spring, for instance, swells of young protesters used the Internet, mobile phones 
and text messages to launch protests in Ukraine in 2004, Belarus in 2006, and Moldova in 
2009 (Barry, 2009, April 7).9 In part, this was because the Internet was a relatively liber-
alized sector of the information sphere in the early aughts throughout many of the former 
Soviet republics. The Internet and social media, then, were external factors that disrupted 
the existing policy sphere and created pressure on regime actors to adjust policies. In the 
wake of the Twitter fueled protests, all three countries developed much more robust on-
line surveillance capacities (Kransnoboka & Semetko, 2004; Manaev, Manaeva, & Yuran, 
2012; Deibert et al 2008, p. 181). 
Developmental Model
Eko’s (2001, 2008) typology of Internet regulatory regimes includes a “devel-
opmentalist” model in which national Internet policy is (a) geared towards using the 
technology as a catalyst for rapid economic and social development, and (b) reflective 
of Internet and ICT development blueprints laid out by the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, United Nations special agencies, bilateral aid organizations, and diverse 
international non-governmental organizations. This policy model is an extension of older 
UNESCO-led “development communication” policies which instrumentalized mass com-
munication mediums in third world countries as tools for disseminating critical informa-
tion about agricultural production, health services, education opportunities, and similar 
social and economic resources.10 Eko argues that the Internet developmentalist model 
9 Ukraine and Moldova are better described as “flawed democracies” than authoritarian or even hybrid 
regimes. Neither country is included on Gilbert and Mosheni's (2011) list of hybrid regimes, and both coun-
tries are labeled “partly-free” by Freedom House. But the “flawed” qualifier does suggest real civil liberties 
concerns. 
10 See Schramm (1964) for a full treatment on the role of information in developing countries during the 
Cold War.
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was first articulated in a 1995 World Bank report which encouraged the international aid 
community to help developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa become connected to the 
Internet. The report emphasized that "the information revolution offers Africa a dramatic 
opportunity to leapfrog into the future, breaking out of decades of stagnation or decline" 
(Baranshamaje, Boostrom, Brajovic, Cader, Clement-Jones, Hawkins, Knight, Schware, 
& Sloan, 1995; quoted in Eko, 2001, pp.478-479).11 
While this international policy backdrop is important, the “developmentalist” 
label is problematic for several reasons. First, it is unclear if Eko intends this model to be 
broadly applicable to all developing countries or only those receiving substantial policy 
guidance from international organizations and donor agencies. The term “developing 
country” is something of a catch-all term—although it generally refers to countries that 
have not achieved a significant degree of industrialization relative to their populations, 
specific criteria for both “developing” and “developed” status vary from organization 
to organization. For instance, Eastern European countries with transition economies are 
sometimes grouped with developing countries based on their low or middle levels of per 
capita income, and sometimes with developed countries based on their high industrial-
ization. The IMF uses a flexible classification system that considers (a) per capita income 
level, (b) export diversification, and (c) degree of integration into the global financial sys-
tem. The World Bank classifies countries into four income groups (IMF, 2013; Soubboti-
na, 2004). 
Second, not all developing countries have waited for the explicit prompting of 
international organizations and donor agencies to launch proactive Internet development 
policies, while others lacked (and continue to lack) the Internet infrastructure and other 
vital telecommunications resources necessary to initiate such policies in the first place. 
Furthermore, there is considerable national Internet policy variation even within the 
11 The USAID commissioned Leland Initiative—also known as the African Global Information Infrastruc-
ture—was among the first comprehensive development efforts to build IT infrastructure in Africa as a step 
toward African economic and social growth (Wheeler, 2011, p. 199).  
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Sub-Saharan African region Eko analyzes.  Nigeria—a regional Internet leader with more 
than 45 million users and 26 percent penetration—features very few significant controls 
and no laws restricting online content. Other Sub-Saharan countries fit cleanly within the 
Cuba or Chinese model, with all service controlled by a state-owned or operated provid-
er—such as the Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation or Zimbabwe's TelOne—and 
all access and usage strictly regulated by a government agency. Some landlocked African 
countries with extremely low penetration levels (0 to 10 percent) effectively lack a func-
tional regulatory framework at all.12 
The term developmentalism also has some distinctly negative connotations related 
to its Cold War-era origins:  Ting and Feng (1996) define developmentalism as a "set of 
ideas which emphasize the political primacy of economic development as dynamics of 
institutions and policies and as the fundamental means of political legitimacy" (p. 21). 
The authors note that in the case of both Latin America and parts of East Asia, the end 
product of developmentalism was embedded authoritarian (or semi-authoritarian) govern-
ing regimes, as economic success granted legitimate leadership status to political figures 
with dubious democratic credentials. 
 I use the label “developmental model” to avoid that connotational baggage and to 
cast a wider comparative net. The developmental model is observable in developing-level 
countries with proactive Internet development policies that leverage the technology as 
a tool for social and economic growth, and serve as an extension of ICT-driven devel-
opment goals more broadly. The latter may include attracting foreign direct investment, 
increasingly the value-added output of domestic businesses, and creating technology 
hubs which facilitate both goals. Developmental model countries have Internet penetra-
tions levels ranging from low (0 to 30 percent) to moderate (30 to 60 percent), and fea-
ture democratic governing regimes or even semi-authoritarian governing regimes, to the 
extent that the latter are willing to allow Internet development to proceed beyond their 
12 Although the few controls that exist place them in the Cuban model by default. 
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institutional span of activity control. Authoritarian regimes at this level of development 
(and Internet penetration) operate almost exclusively under the Cuba or Chinese model 
category even when the telecommunications market is partially liberalized, as political 
stability takes precedence over economic development.13 
Developmental countries feature varying levels of Internet control, and may even 
maintain gateway model institutional arrangements through which a government ministry 
maintains substantial regulatory authority over otherwise private ISPs. However, filter-
ing and surveillance in developmental model countries is simply less pronounced than 
in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries, and the democratic system provides a 
public check on Internet policy issues. That said, some countries clearly straddle the line 
between gateway-variation and developmental models. 
ICT and Development. It is widely recognized that ICT can act as a catalyst for 
development and enable change across all economic sectors, especially in combination 
with other growth-promoting policies. Hanna  (2003) identifies three different ICT policy 
goals that occur across economic levels, but are especially pronounced at the develop-
mental stage.  First, countries may develop and promote their national ICT infrastructure 
and industry (both hardware and software) to attract both market seeking and efficiency 
seeking foreign direct investment (FDI).14 Second, countries may utilize ICT as a general 
purpose, value-added technology that can increase the productivity and competitive-
ness of the local economy—particularly among ICT-intensive industries and services.15 
Third and finally, countries may use ICT development as a part of larger policy strategy 
for social and community development, often in coordination with nongovernmental 
organizations and other civil society actors working to increase education opportunities 
13 Political control and economic growth are not mutually exclusive, of course, but as the earlier discus-
sion of China’s Internet policy makes clear, substantial Internet control mechanisms tend to be a drag on 
economic growth over the long term.  
14 Market seeking FDI is especially attractive in developing countries favoring import substitution strate-
gies.
15 The impact of investment in ICT infrastructure may span beyond targeted industries into all types of 
information-based and business-support services.
81
and economic agency. This latter goal is important as a policy backdrop that encourages 
governments to expand Internet access, but is ultimately of only marginal importance in 
the larger Internet control regime framework.16
ICT is of particular importance to landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), 
which tend to perform poorly as hosts for FDI. A UN report on FDI in landlocked coun-
tries highlights the global service and knowledge economy as a practical development al-
ternative to manufacturing and other export sectors with potential high transaction costs, 
as geographic distance from ports and other hubs of commerce becomes largely irrele-
vant.  The low-cost labor of some LLDCs is a significant advantage here, but the report 
notes that LDCs need to be proactive in generating worker skill sets that would attract 
such investment and enhance local technological capabilities (UNCTAD, 2003). 
While Eko (2001, 2008) focuses almost exclusively on Africa—the region where 
World Bank influence on national Internet / ICT policy is arguably the strongest—the 
developmental model has been most pronounced (or at least effective) in Latin America 
and East Asia.
● Colombia has the second highest Internet penetration rate in Latin Ameri-
ca (after Uruguay), due in large part to government-led ICT development 
efforts. Strong government support and tax breaks for foreign investors 
have accelerated Bogotá’s position as a major South American tech hub (Mumford, 2013.)
● Proactive government initiatives in Argentina have increased penetration 
levels to 60 percent, while the country’s investment friendly climate has 
attracted large, global high-tech corporations such as Motorola, Microsoft, 
Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Sony, and Google (Essinger, 2012).
● The Malaysian government has prioritized the development of broadband 
16 Cuban model countries, for instance, are unlikely to relax particular controls solely for the purpose of 
making online education or health care resources more accessible. 
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Internet infrastructure, and household penetration recently surpassed 60 
percent. Tech companies receive ample tax incentives to relocate their 
operations to MSC Malaysia, the country's designated Special Economic 
Zone for tech. Startups receive assistance from government grants and 
private venture capitalists (Do, 2013).
● Internet penetration has increased to 36 percent in the Philippines, and 
users enjoy nearly unrestricted access to the Internet.  The government's 
five year Philippine Digital Strategy plan include ambitious ICT infra-
structure expansion. Like Ireland in Europe, the Philippines is especially 
attractive to tech investors because its citizens speak English. Tech compa-
nies are also able to piggyback on service linkages created by the thriving 
business-process outsourcing (BPO) sector (Freedom House, 2013b; Do, 
2013).
Despite significant gains in Internet and mobile phone penetration across Africa—partic-
ularly Sub-Saharan Africa—the region does not have a strong record of success in estab-
lishing major tech hubs or generally utilizing the Internet and ICT to create value-added 
economic sectors, although recent evidence suggests this development gap may finally be 
closing. Kenya has been an especially prominent target for tech investment as its fiber-op-
tic cables tie the country (and much of East Africa) to Europe and the Middle East, spark-
ing hopes of an information-technology boom. The government hopes to create 120,000 
BPO jobs by 2020 through the development of tech hubs and giant call centers built 
around economies of scale. Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, and other African nations hope 
to compete with outsourcing companies in India for the lower end of the BPO market 
(The Economist, 2010). Botswana’s ICT development efforts are particularly interesting, 
as the government of the landlocked country has identified ICT as a critical component 
of economic diversification efforts. The country’s ample diamond revenues are funding 
the construction of a colossal science and tech park that has been designed to place start-
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ups, global corporations, and research and health organizations in a sprawling 57-hectare 
facility in the capital city of Gaborone (LaBarre 2011).
Control Mechanisms. Policymakers within developmental model countries 
implicitly or explicitly recognize that the long term benefits of ICT and Internet driven 
economic development outweigh any short term political or social instability that may 
result from largely unfettered access, and have thus relinquished a command-and-control 
regulatory approach, liberalized their telecommunications systems, and privatized state-
owned telecommunications operators. In Malaysia, for instance, a government pledge to 
refrain from censorship of the Internet reflected a financial calculation to attract foreign 
investment, and was statutorily enshrined in the Communications and Multimedia Act of 
1998, which regulates the country’s telecommunications industry. The pledge was repeat-
ed in a bill of IT development guarantees to reassure foreign investors (OpenNet Initia-
tive, 2012c). The regulatory backdrop in developmental countries is usually a mixture of 
self-regulation and co-regulation, especially with regard to infrastructure expansion and 
other telecommunications issues. Formal government regulatory intervention into Internet 
activity and content usually reflects familiar public interest concerns—namely, pornogra-
phy and other obscene material, fraud and identity theft, and hate speech. 
Latin American and African developmental countries feature very low levels of 
systematic technical filtering for political or security-related content. Prohibited con-
tent—especially child pornography—is usually removed or blocked through collabora-
tion with ISPs. Colombia, for example, passed legislation in 2001 to prevent the online 
circulation of child pornography and to eliminate online content related to child prostitu-
tion. The law prohibits ISPs from hosting child pornography and requires them to provide 
customers with software to block all forms of pornography (OpenNet Initiative, 2013a). 
Asian developmental countries tend to feature much higher level of filtering, and 
may even grant filtering authority to a government agency with regulatory authority over 
private ISPs in a similar fashion to gateway model countries. In India, for instance, the 
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Information Technology Act criminalizes the online publication of obscene information 
and grants the central government power to issue filtering directives through the Depart-
ment of Information Technology.  Indonesia grants similar authority to the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology, which carries out filtering through hard-
ware and software installed by ISPs. Recent testing from the OpenNet Initiative (2012b; 
2012c) in both countries revealed filtering on political, social, and security content, 
including some content with clear public interest. However, both countries’ preferred 
censorship approach has been intermediary liability through content removal requests, 
including directives to social media platforms to remove content that could offend re-
ligious sensibilities, and select enforcement at the source mechanisms, especially for 
pornographic material  (Freedom House, 2012). Despite the presence of these Chinese 
model-style control mechanisms, both India and Indonesia are democracies, and these 
control policies have emerged from parliamentary bodies accountable to the public.  
Nevertheless, such filtering and concentrated government control underscores the extent 
to which developmental model countries with high institutional capacity may retain a 
relatively effective span of control over their own Internet infrastructure. 
Other developmental countries, however, suffer from a lack of effective control 
mechanisms due in large part to minimal institutional capacity. This regulatory gap is 
especially evident in Nigeria where domestic-based advance-fee fraud solicitations and 
similar scams have earned the country a negative reputation. Although such activities 
are explicitly illegal, the government simply lacks the resources to crack down on the 
practice (Eko, 2008).  In Mexico and other Latin American countries, drug trade-based 
violence has extended onto social media platforms, creating a climate of self-censorship 
and highlighting the necessity of privacy protections (Freedom House, 2012b; Goodman, 
2011). In addition, copyright protection is generally weak in developmental countries 
across the globe, even when international agreements such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
have been ratified. 
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The United States Model
Eko’s (2001; 2008) typology of Internet regulatory regimes includes a “neo-mer-
cantilist” model framed around libertarian economic principles. The neo-mercantilist 
model emerged in the United States, which adopted a hands-off regulatory posture after 
the technology was privatized and its commercial prospects became evident. This ap-
proach was encapsulated in the Clinton-Gore administration’s 1997 document “Frame-
work for Global Electronic Commerce," which conceptualized the Internet as a competi-
tive marketplace of ideas, goods, services, and cultural content and advanced a vision and 
framework for expansion and governance of the Internet that emphasized e-commerce. 
The document was intended to be a policy blueprint for not only US regulation, but also 
an appeal to governments around the world to assume a similarly minimalist regulatory 
posture in order to best facilitate a global e-commerce network (Eko, 2012, pp. 228-229). 
While the neo-mercantilist model is reflective of the United States’ regulatory 
policy backdrop, the term’s free-market connotations do not adequately reflect several 
critical and interrelated aspects of control unique to the United States. First, although 
the Internet regulatory backdrop in the US is largely self-regulatory, some important 
co-regulatory mechanisms do exist. Second, the presence of so many important Internet 
giants in Silicon Valley and elsewhere within the US gives the government regulatory 
authority over not only its own national corner of the Internet, but also the multinational 
tech corporations that shape Internet development and maintain giant troves of personal 
and business data for users across the globe. Third, the United States arguably has greater 
functional control of the Internet than any other country through its indirect control of the 
Domain Name System management body and global data encryption standards. Fourth 
and finally, recent revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance oper-
ations and cooperation and coordination with Google, Yahoo, and other tech companies 
suggest a unique convergence of the three control aspects identified above, and raise 
serious concerns about violations of user rights. 
86
I use the term “United States model” here to avoid the connotational baggage 
of the term “neo-mercantilist” and to highlight the extent to which the model’s control 
mechanisms are only found within the United States. While other countries do feature 
relatively laissez faire approaches to content and commerce regulation, the US model 
is narrowly applicable to its namesake due to the presence of the unique control mech-
anisms described above. The US’s default position at the top of the Internet national 
regulatory hierarchy may shift, however, if the Internet continues to organically balkanize 
into culture and language-defined walled gardens anchored around national and regional 
online services providers and mobile apps less dependent upon global telecommunication 
standards. 
Regulatory backdrop.  No single agency regulates the Internet in the United 
States. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an independent agency of the 
executive branch, has claimed jurisdiction over some Internet-related issues as an ex-
tension of interstate communication, although it does not directly regulate the Internet 
or Internet service providers (ISPs). Other government agencies, such as the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), play advisory or executive 
roles with respect to telecommunications, economic, and technological policies and regu-
lations. The US Congress is the most important Internet policy maker, as the body creates 
important national Internet laws and delegates regulatory authority. Government agencies 
such as the FCC and the NTIA must act within the bounds of congressional legislation 
(Freedom House, 2013c). 
As discussed ahead, government departments and agencies outside of the normal 
regulatory structure also exert a degree of control—both directly and indirectly—on the 
Internet and Internet companies. These include (a) the National Security Agency (NSA), 
which operates under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, and has coordinated 
with Silicon Valley-based tech giants to create a massive surveillance network, (b) the 
Department of Commerce and the National Telecommunications and Information Admin-
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istration (NTIA),  which together maintain unilateral oversight over ICANN operations 
and exercise the ultimate authority over the DNS root zone of the Internet, and (c) the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a non-regulatory agency of the 
Department of Commerce which developed an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
capable of protecting sensitive communications which was widely employed by the US 
government, the private sector, and users around the globe.
Regulation of the Internet in the United States largely serves to facilitate and 
reinforce e-commerce and to ensure wide user access to the technology generally. For 
instance, in order to achieve uniformity to state electronic signature laws—which are 
critical to e-commerce transactions—the US government enacted the Electronic Sig-
natures in Global and National Commerce, or E-Sign, Act of 2000, which preempted 
all existing state law and insured the security, reliability, privacy, and authentication of 
online transactions (Eko, 2001; Blythe, 2005). Although the United States has been an 
influential model for such regulation at the national and international level, policy makers 
within developed economies have been remarkably consistent in their efforts to promote 
and facilitate e-commerce, as the technology is widely perceived to reduce information 
asymmetries, lower transaction costs within national markets, and provide opportunities 
for business and consumers to access previously inaccessible markets (Deffains & Winn, 
2012, p. 347).17 
 While the United States is one of the most connected countries in the world with 
penetration rates above 80 percent, the US has fallen behind countries like Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, and South Korea in terms of Internet speed, cost, and broad-
band availability. The Universal Service Fund was established as part of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, and was designed to provide telephone service to underserved 
areas of the country. The fund uses fees applied to telephone bills to subsidize telecom 
17 National law reforms based on the UN’s Model Law on Electronic Commerce appear to have satisfied 
business demands to remove legal obstacles to the use of e-commerce technologies, and future legal or 
political challenges are unlikely (Eko 2008).
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providers that operate in underserved areas and would not survive in the marketplace 
without such support (Warf, 2013; Freedom House, 2013).
Approximately 4,000 ISPs operate in the United States, although fifteen of them 
control nearly 80 percent of the market, and four—AT&T, Comcast, Time Warner, and 
Verizon—control around 50 percent and own the majority of network cables and other 
infrastructure. The most important regulatory issue for ISPs over the last decade has been 
the principle of “network neutrality,” according to which network providers must treat all 
data on the Internet equally, not discriminating or charging differentially by user, content, 
site, platform, application, or modes of communication. Supporters of the principle argue 
that without it, ISPs would be able to block (or change more for) Internet applications 
such as Netflix that require greater bandwidth usage, thereby imposing a tiered service 
model that would remove competition and create a segmented Internet not unlike cable 
television.  In December 2010, the FCC issued a compromise ruling on the issue that 
instructs fixed-line service providers not to block access to, or unreasonably discriminate 
against, lawful websites, applications, devices, or services. The rules for wireless broad-
band providers are much more limited, however, and would not keep ISPs from charging 
more for faster access (Freedom House, 2013c; Lessig & McChesney, 2006, June 6).
US policy makers’ conception of the Internet as a marketplace of ideas is im-
portant as it suggests a normative standard that—except in very limited circumstances 
explored ahead—the government may not regulate online “speech” on the basis of its 
subject matter or viewpoint.  Litigation in the US concerning governmental efforts to 
regulate speech on the Internet has established that online communications including 
emails, shared files, and published content are to be accorded the full measure of First 
Amendment protection.18 This high standard of free speech continues to distinguish the 
United States Internet control regime from other national models in the West. Internet 
18 That said, regulation of speech is uncontroversially constitutional with respect to threats, bribery, defama-
tory statements, fighting words, fraud, copyright violation, plagiarism, and other forms of speech that courts 
have decided the First Amendment, properly understood, does not protect (Levmore & Nussbaum, 2010).
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regulation based on the ambiguous notion of public interest is used to block or shut down 
sites for hate speech in France and Germany and blasphemous content in Italy (Levmore 
& Nussbaum, 2010; Warf, 2013, p. 65).19 Although there have been pushes for tighter 
content controls in the United States, legislative attempts at creating a mandatory filtering 
or screening system have failed to produce a comprehensive solution (OpenNet Initiative, 
2010b). 
Eko (2001) and Frydman, Hennebel, and Lewkowicz (2012) clarify that Internet 
regulation in the United States is not exclusively self-regulatory, as some co-regulatory 
mechanisms exist in three important areas: minors’ protection and the fight against child 
pornography, security issues related to the fight against terrorism, and the protection of 
copyrighted materials.  In these areas, the authors argue that various legal patterns illus-
trate an “invisible handshake” (Birnhack & Elkin, 2003) between the state and private ac-
tors, especially ISPs, which are enlisted in the implementation of the law.20 Nevertheless, 
the authors emphasize that these co-regulation mechanisms are issue-specific exceptions 
against a broader self-regulatory policy backdrop, whereas in Europe co-regulation is the 
general and leading model of regulation of Internet content.
The US approach to online child pornography is fairly standard. Sexual content 
involving children is illegal in most jurisdictions, and international cooperation in creat-
ing a global legislative framework to prosecute individuals involved in its production and 
dissemination reflects a willingness by policy making actors to separate the regulation of 
this particular type of content from broader censorship issues (Taylor & Quayle, 2003).21 
19 For further details on the Italian authorities’ crackdown on anti-Catholic websites domained in the United 
States, see Associated Press (2002). 
20 "Invisible handshake" is a term coined by Okun (1980) to refer to implicit contracts between employers 
and employees characterized by a mutual expectation of longevity. These agreements are enforceable only 
through the threat that if one party reneges, he or she will lose the benefit of the trust on which the relation-
ship was founded.
21 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides the legal basis for the suppression 
of child pornography on the Internet. In this convention, member countries of the United Nations agreed to 
undertake the necessary actions to protect children from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1989; Eko 2001).
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US policy related to the issue is co-regulatory to the extent that it shares the burden of 
regulation with private actors. The 1998 Protection of Children from Sexual Predators 
Act and 2000 Children’s Internet Protection Act compel ISPs and other Internet players to 
act as law enforcement intermediaries by providing user information to the government 
or by restricting access to controversial material (Frydman, Hennebel, & Lewkowicz, 
2012). 
National security initiatives in the United States compel ISPs and OSPs to share 
users’ private Internet communications with government agencies in particular cir-
cumstances. According to the Patriot Act—amended by the 2002 Cyber Security En-
hancement Act (CSEA)—law enforcement authorities may urge ISPs to disclose user 
communications relating to emergency security matters (Frydman, Hennebel, & Lewko-
wicz, 2012).  Moreover, the CSEA (a) permits the voluntary disclosures of content and 
information on customer records to a law enforcement agency if the ISP “believes that 
an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires 
disclosure without delay of communications relating to the emergency,” and  (b) allows 
any government employee to conduct surveillance at the invitation of the ISP (Birnhack 
& Elkin-Koren 2003: 103-105).
 Leaked documents from former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor 
Edward Snowden reveal that the agency has been compelling at least nine large US 
companies, including Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple, to disclose content and 
metadata relating to e-mails, web chats, videos, images, and documents in order to collect 
“foreign intelligence information.” Although the PRISM program under which such data 
collection occurs is targeted at persons abroad, the NSA is able to retain and use infor-
mation “incidentally” collected about US persons (Freedom House, 2013c). Companies 
are legally required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to hand over whatever 
information the government asks for under the law. But, as revealed in reporting from 
the New York Times, they are not required to make it easier for the government to get that 
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information—which is why Twitter declined to make as much information available as 
did Google, Facebook, and others (Miller, 2013, June 7). 
Finally, US policy makers—acting at the behest of key stakeholders—have been 
relatively proactive in attempting to ensure online intellectual property right protection, in 
part through holding ISPs liable for illegal downloads and enlisting them in enforcement 
efforts. Like child pornography enforcement, national policy on the issue reflects inter-
national efforts at policy harmonization.  The World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, has led a multilateral approach to 
intellectual property through a series of treaties which made international copyright law 
applicable to the Internet  (Delta & Matsuura, 2008).  Intellectual property may refer to 
copyrights, patents or trademarks, as well as author’s rights and moral rights (Eko, 2012, 
p. 280). According to the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), an ISP that is 
unaware that it is hosting infringing material and does not take advantage of the infring-
ing activity cannot be held liable. However, when a copyright owner notifies the provider 
about the infringement, the ISP must remove or disable access to the material within ten 
days to avoid liability for damages (Frydman, Hennebel, & Lewkowicz, 2012). 
Key interests. Many of the largest and most important Internet and information 
technology companies in the world are headquartered in the United States. This includes 
Silicon Valley-based Google, Facebook, Apple, Twitter, eBay, Yahoo, HP, Intel, and 
Oracle, and Washington-based Microsoft and Amazon. The relationship between the 
tech sector and the US government is a complicated one, but each side has ample incen-
tives to maintain a mutually beneficial “partnership,” however uneasy. The tech sector 
is a critical component of the US economy. US tech companies—especially Apple and 
Google—routinely dominate global rankings of corporate brand leaders, and function as 
soft power intermediaries by winning over the “hearts and minds” of middle class con-
sumers in emerging markets. The "brand gap" between these companies and their global 
competitors reflects positively on the US's entrepreneurial culture and business-friendly 
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regulatory environment. Apple—a brand associated with forward thinking products and 
a minimalist approach to design—is in many ways a symbol of the US's dynamism and 
strength in innovation, technology, and marketing (Interbrand, 2013; Chin & Collazo, 
2012, Nov. 3). 
The US government, in turn, has been an important—if underrecognized—bene-
factor to many tech companies. During the Cold War, the Department of Defense poured 
money into developing technologies at America’s elite engineering schools, including 
Stanford, which used the money to fund the research and business ventures that created 
Silicon Valley.22 While it is well known that the US Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency bankrolled the Internet, fewer people are aware of the extent to which CIA and 
military funded research facilitated the growth of GPS technology (which has critical to 
the success of smartphones), or that Apple and Intel’s success came after both compa-
nies received early financing from the US Small Business Investment Company program 
created by Congress (Kim, 2013, Aug. 1; Mazzucato, 2013). In addition, the US govern-
ment has backed US tech companies in important domestic and international court cases. 
A recent US International Trade Commission order, upheld by President Barack Obama’s 
administration, blocks Samsung from importing or selling certain hardware found to 
infringe on Apple patents, while the US government, together with Google and Facebook, 
have undertaken a lobbying offensive against proposed EU data privacy laws (Decker, 
2013, Oct. 8; Der Spiegel, 2012, Oct. 7).
Recent revelations stemming from former National Security Agency (NSA) con-
tractor Edward Snowden suggest that the relationship between the government and these 
tech companies has been both more cooperative and more contentious than previously 
disclosed. The PRISM program operated by the NSA allows the government to scour 
the Internet usage of foreign nationals overseas who use any of nine US-based service 
22 The “Silicon Valley” description stems from the silicon chips used by Fairchild, Intel and other local 
semi-conductor manufacturers. 
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providers, including Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, Google, Yahoo, YouTube, Skype, AOL 
and the lesser known company PalTalk, which hosted a lot of traffic during the Arab 
Spring and the ongoing Syrian civil war. While these companies are legally required by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to hand over whatever information the govern-
ment asks for under the law, they are not required to make it easier for the government 
to get that information. Although Twitter declined to comply with government requests 
for greater access to user information, other companies were more compliant and worked 
with government officials to develop better methods for efficiently and securely sharing 
the personal data of foreign users in response to lawful government requests (Miller, 
2013, June 7).
Functionality control. Eriksson and Giacomello (2009) describe functionality 
as the technical quality of Internet usage, the most pertinent features of which—for the 
purposes of national and international-level control—are the technical protocols of Inter-
net communication, including the Domain Name System (DNS), and the data encryption 
algorithms necessary for secure digital communication and data protection.23  Because the 
United States government was involved in the early development of the Internet, many 
parts of the Domain Name System were originally performed by either US government 
agencies or pursuant to contracts by US government agencies. But as the Internet ex-
panded globally and commercially, total US control became untenable. Instead of turning 
administrative authority over to an international body such as the UN’s International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), in 1998 the Clinton Administration created the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) as a not-for-profit organization 
incorporated under California law, effectively privatizing several critical administrative 
functions—including DNS management, IP address space allocations, protocol parameter 
assignment, and root server system management functions—in order to keep that critical 
23 Eriksson and Giacomello (2009) do not specifically identify encryption as a functional control, but in-
cluding it here is a reasonable inference given its centrality in digital communication. 
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aspect of Internet governance out of the hands of world governments and UN bureau-
crats. The Department of Commerce and the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration (NTIA) oversee ICANN, and exercise the ultimate authority over the 
DNS root zone of the Internet (Feld, 2003; Brito, 2011, March 5).24
ICANN is not the Internet’s sole administrative body. Two other groups— the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)—de-
velop the standards for how information is shared and displayed through the Internet and 
on the web. The groups have substantial consultative and technical power but very little 
national oversight—in no small part because their efforts rarely if ever pose a threat to 
national interests. And while the Internet couldn’t work without regional IP registries, 
they are effectively nodes in the system carrying out functions dictated by ICANN.25 The 
US has reaffirmed its delegation of the DNS management to ICANN while insisting it 
could intervene in case of an emergency. A 2009 “Affirmation of Commitments” be-
tween the US government and ICANN permitted the corporation more independence, but 
preserved the government’s power to take over the root server in an emergency (Kravets, 
2013, Oct. 14; Meyer, 2013, Oct. 16).
Governments like China, India, and Russia have long distrusted ICANN, and 
lobbied for DNS management to be turned over to an organization such as the ITU. But 
criticism of the United States’ role in the system became more pervasive in the wake of 
the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA). The House and Senate 
proposals, respectively, were introduced in 2011 to stop the theft of intellectual property 
through foreign-based websites. Both bills were variants of strategies introduces in the 
2010 Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA), which was directed 
primarily at domestic websites. Both SOPA and PIPA would have required ISPs to stop 
24 The extent to which ICANN can be said to “control” the Internet is often overstated. Penenberg (2005) 
notes that while ICANN’s function is important, most online traffic exists outside the traditional do-
main-name system in peer-to-peer file sharing and instant messaging.
25 ICANN assigns not only top-level domains—the dot-suffixes like .com and .edu—but also country codes 
like China's .cn and the United Kingdom’s .uk.
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referring requests for websites hosting infringing content to their assigned IP addresses, 
and would have required search engines to stop linking to these sites as well. 
Critics raised numerous concerns about both bills, not least of which that they 
would undermine the integrity of the Domain Name System and the development of Do-
main Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), a set of security protocols that fix 
fundamental vulnerabilities in the DNS. Provisions related to DNS redirection were 
eventually pulled from SOPA, and both bills were eventually tabled after intense voter 
pressure and online activism (Herman, 2013; Masnick, 2011, Dec. 9). In 2012, however, 
the US government admitted to seizing at least 750 dot-com domains registered outside of 
the US for allegedly breaching federal copyright and trademark laws. This was followed 
by the Snowden leaks in 2013, which revealed the extent of the NSA’s global surveillance 
machine and further undermined trust and confidence in the US government’s ability to 
objectively administer technical features of Internet governance, even indirectly (Kravets, 
2012, March 6; Kravets, 2013, Oct. 13; Meyer, 2013). 
Encryption standardization is another critical aspect of both functionality (as the 
code through which digital information is securely transmitted) and activity (as the ends 
to which encryption is a means). While some countries—usually authoritarian—set their 
own national encryption standards to better control the information environment,26 most 
countries rely upon standards endorsed by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO), an international standards body composed of representatives from standards 
organizations from several countries. The National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), a non-regulatory agency of the Department of Commerce, is charged with rec-
ommending cybersecurity standards in the United States, and is a key player in the ISO.  
A recent New York Times report revealed that the NSA used its influence as the world’s 
most experienced code maker to covertly introduce a “back door” into a 2006 standard 
26 In Tunisia under Ben Ali, for instance, ISPs were prohibited from transmitting encrypted information 
approval. 
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adopted by NIST and later by the International Organization for Standardization, which 
counts 163 countries as members (Perlroth, Larson,  & Shane, 2013, Sept. 5). 
While the compromised portion of the algorithm was relatively simple to replace, 
NIST publicly discouraged tech companies from using that cryptographic approach. 
Other revelations suggest the compromise was part of a broader, multi-pronged effort by 
the NSA to break widely used Internet encryption technologies. According to the Times, 
cryptographers "have long had mixed feelings about [NIST's] close relationship with the 
[NSA]," but the back door revelations "confirmed their worst fears and eroded their confi-
dence in [NIST] standards entirely” (Perlroth, 2013, Sept. 10).
 Surveillance. Government-led Internet surveillance in the United States and other 
countries will generally occur outside of the normal Internet regulatory apparatus, and 
often under the purview of law enforcement or state security agencies. The NSA operates 
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and reports to the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence. Much of the NSA's surveillance operations occurred under the rubric 
of "signals intelligence" (often contracted to SIGINT). The NSA's domestic eavesdrop-
ping program was originally designed to locate al-Qaeda terrorist cells suspected of still 
operating in the United States, and the organization possesses only limited legal authority 
to spy on US citizens. Nevertheless, it has constructed a surveillance network with the 
capacity to reach around 75 percent of all US Internet communications (Gorman & Val-
entino-Devries, 2013, August 20). 
 Such a large number clearly constitutes a substantial degree of “control” over the 
Internet in terms of both activity and functionality. However, the extent to which such 
control is legal or necessary is difficult to ascertain.  In December 2013, two federal 
judges reached polar opposite conclusions about the legality of the NSA's data collection 
programs. Judge William H. Pauley III in New York endorsed arguments made by senior 
government officials that such data collection was a necessary tool for effective counter-
terrorism efforts, and ruled that bulk data collection was lawful. Two weeks prior, Judge 
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Richard J. Leon in Washington ruled that the government had failed to make the case that 
the program was necessary, and further data collection was probably unconstitutional 
(Liptak & Schmidt, 2013, Dec. 28, p. A1).  Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net coding 
system for surveillance includes the important—if ambiguous—caveat "without judicial 
or other independent oversight,” and although the organization details concerns about 
the NSA’s efforts in its most recent report on the United States (2013c), it still ranks the 
country as Free.  
 The FBI has followed the NSA’s lead in expanding its wiretapping capabilities. 
The 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) forces tele-
phone companies to provide backdoors to government so that law enforcement agencies 
can spy on users after obtaining court approval. CALEA was expanded in 2006 to reach 
Internet technologies like peer-to-peer voice-over-Internet protocol services. A recent 
proposal by the FBI would allow law enforcement agencies to listen in on any conversa-
tion online, regardless of the technology used, by mandating engineers build "backdoors" 
into communications software. Companies would be ordered to comply, and judges could 
impose fines if they did not (Savage, 2013, May 7).
European Model 
Eko’s (2001; 2008) typology of Internet regulatory regimes includes a “Eu-
ro-Communitarian” model reflective of a “Euro-governmentality” and the hierarchical 
relationship between the European Union and member states. This regulatory model 
represents a market-based system of governance characterized by the formulation and 
transfer of directives, in specific issue areas of Internet communication, from the Europe-
an Union to its member states for purposes of policy harmonization.27 However, it should 
be emphasized that while such directives have binding force in relation to the result to be 
achieved for each member state, they do not explicitly dictate the forms and methods for 
27 The EU uses directives to bring different national laws into line with each other, and they are particularly 
common in matters affecting the operation of the single market (e.g. product safety standards).
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achieving that result. Directives can thus be distinguished from EU regulations, which 
are self-executing and do not require any implementing measures. Directives may oblige 
national legislatures to amend national law only to the extent necessary for the function-
ing of the Single Market. 
Important aspects of Internet control policy—including the definition and des-
ignation of “illegal” online content and specific telecommunication data retention poli-
cies—vary between EU member states, and enforcement on these issues will continue to 
reflect each country’s institutional capacity. Furthermore, the EU does not have its own 
intelligence or surveillance agency. Each member state maintains its own security and 
intelligence agencies, which vary considerably in their surveillance and data gathering 
capabilities. Freedom House, the OpenNet Initiative, and Reporters Without Borders all 
analyze EU member states’ Internet policies individually, and that approach is unlikely to 
change in the years ahead. Moreover, Switzerland, Norway, and several smaller countries 
are not part of the EU, but their co-regulatory approach to the Internet is quite similar. As 
such, I use the category label “European model” to reflect the regional and hierarchical 
aspects of this model without giving EU directed policy harmonization undue descriptive 
weight. 
Europe is the region with the highest Internet penetration rate in the world (75 
percent), but the continent features a wide spectrum of Internet penetration levels ranging 
from exceptionally high (Iceland at 96 percent) to relatively low (Moldova at 43 per-
cent). In 2013, the average penetration rate across the continent (including Russia) was 
75 percent. However, rates of usage vary widely, and are typically much higher in North-
ern and Western Europe than in Eastern and Southern parts. This digital divide reflects 
long-standing socio-economic differentials (Warf, 2012, p. 27; ITU, 2013).
Regional Policy. European Commission policy papers from the early 1990s echo 
many of the same themes as the United States’ preferred Internet development approach: 
business leadership balanced with government efforts to expand accessibility. The Com-
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mission’s 1994 "Europe and the Global Information Society" report—which came to be 
known as the “Bangemann Report” after the German Commission chair—touted the abil-
ity of a liberalized and Europe-wide market to deliver the benefits of an “information so-
ciety” in terms of economic growth, new services, and employment opportunities. At that 
time, most European governments were still in direct control of their national telecom-
munications sector and remained wedded to traditional interventionist policies in regard 
to industrial and technological affairs. The report set the tone for a series of liberalizing 
directives issued in the area of telecommunication terminals, services, and infrastructure  
(Ducatel, Webster, & Herrmann, 2000; Savin, 2013, pp. 25-26).28
Two focal points of EU intervention in the field of Internet regulation began to 
crystallize: one centered around the Single Market and the other around consumers, 
citizens, and public interest concerns (Savin, 2013, pp 3-4). The Electronic Commerce 
Directive (ECD), adopted in 2000, reflected the former and harmonized rules on issues 
such as the transparency and information requirements for online service providers, com-
mercial communications, electronic contracts, and limitations of liability of intermediary 
service providers. Furthermore, the proper functioning of the Internal Market in electron-
ic commerce was ensured by the Internal Market clause, which meant that information 
society services were (and are), in principle, subject to the law of the member state in 
which the service provider is established. In turn, the member state in which the informa-
tion society service is received cannot restrict incoming services (European Commission, 
2000). 
The EU adopted a new regulatory framework in 2002 meant to (a) cover the 
Single Market and competition issues, and to (b) improve the development of new infra-
structures and technologies. The framework reflects the convergence between fixed and 
28 On the heels of the report, a series of national-level information society strategies were produced. These 
included the French Information Autoroutes Report in 1994, the UK Information Society Initiative and 
German Path to the Information Society in 1996, the Irish Information Society Steering Committee in 1997, 
and the Danish Information Society in 2000 (Ducatel, Webster, & Herrmann, 2000).
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mobile telecommunications and between broadcasting, telecommunications, and infor-
mation technology more broadly, and effectively puts all telecommunication services 
under a single regulatory framework (Savin, 2013, pp. 25-26). The European Union has 
also adopted a series of telecommunication policies designed to promote Internet access, 
particularly the diffusion of broadband. In 2005, the European Commission launched 
i2010, an information society initiative intended to enhance Internet access across the 
continent. This goal was explicitly articulated in the Lisbon Strategy of 2010, which was 
implemented with the broader aim of accelerating the continent's shift into a competitive, 
knowledge driven economy (Warf, 2013, p. 28).
Other directives from the Commission reflected a recognition that the impact of 
the Internet extended beyond e-commerce into the everyday activities of private citizens. 
In October 1996, the Commission produced a report titled “Illegal and Harmful Content 
on the Internet” and a Green Paper on “The Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in 
Audiovisual Services” in response. Based on these documents, “a common framework for 
self-regulation (of the Internet) at the European level” was drafted, which culminated in 
an Action Plan on Promoting Safe Use of the Internet, which was adopted in 1999 (Open-
Net Initiative, 2007b). The Action Plan emphasized the need to take steps in five broad 
areas in order to curb illegal and harmful content on the Internet:
1. Promoting voluntary industry self-regulation and content monitoring schemes, 
including the use of hotlines for the public to report illegal or harmful content; 
2. Encouraging Internet service providers to provide filtering tools and rating sys-
tems that enable parents or teachers to regulate the access of Internet content by 
children in their care, while allowing adults access to legal content;  
3. Raising awareness about services offered by ICT firms to allow users to control 
access to content; 
4. Exploring the legal implications of promoting the safer use of the Internet; and 
5. Encouraging international cooperation in the area of regulation.
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Although originally planned as a three-year program, the Action Plan was extended in 
2002, and its objectives were widened to cover new and emerging communication tech-
nologies. While the 2002 Action Plan largely left implementation to individual states, 
the 2005 Safer Internet Program aimed to give the EU broader powers and new tools to 
achieve these goals itself (Deibert, 2010, pp. 279-281).29
Both the Action Plan and the Electronic Commerce Directive established the EU’s 
preferred co-regulatory approach to Internet content regulation. The term “co-regulatory” 
gives a sense of the joint responsibilities of market actors and the state. Frydman, Hen-
nebel, & Lewkowicz (2012) note that the text of the ECD provides a “regime of liability 
limitations” less favorable to ISPs than the immunity clause in the United States' Com-
munications Decency Act. The language also allows for a degree of state intervention—a 
position, the authors note, consistent with the European view that “freedom of speech 
should be subject to certain restrictions, liabilities, and penalties that justify the interven-
tion of public authorities” (pp 138-140).
Although the adjectives "illegal" and “harmful" are often grouped together in 
reference to online content, there is a critical distinction between them, as the former 
refers to content criminalized by national laws, while the latter refers to content consid-
ered offensive or inappropriate by some people. Harmful content includes legal content 
which may offend some Internet users or content which may be thought to harm some 
but not all users, such as pornography that is accessible by children (Akdeniz, 2001, p. 
304). Under the Safer Internet Program, the exact definition and categorization of illegal 
content is intended to vary between member states, especially with regard to hate speech 
and sexually explicit content. Nazi memorabilia, for example, remains illegal in France 
and Germany but not in Italy. There is no explicit obligation at the EU-level mandating 
either governments or ICT firms to filter or remove any particular form of online content 
29 Among other things, the 2005 program included EU-level funding for hotlines for citizens to report of-
fending content, sponsored education efforts on consumer and data protection, and authorized new studies 
into filtering technology for illegal content (Deibert, 2010).
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(Deibert, 2010). Child pornography, however, was and is illegal across all jurisdictions in 
Europe, and such content matter remains one of the primary impetuses for policy inter-
vention at both the EU and national level.30 
Commission directives have aimed to not only target particular kinds of content, 
but to protect user privacy as well. The right to privacy is a highly developed area of law 
in Europe. All the member states of the European Union (EU) are also signatories of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 8 of the ECHR provides a right 
to respect for one's "private and family life, his home and his correspondence," subject 
to certain restrictions, and the European Court of Human Rights has given this article a 
very broad interpretation in its jurisprudence (Sauter, 2011, p. 294). As a result, the EU 
features some of the world’s broadest and most stringent data privacy laws. The EU Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) implemented in 1998 regulates any "data controller"—that is, 
anyone who "processes" data they collect. The Directive imposes three relatively strin-
gent requirements on such individuals or companies: First, they must tell consumers why 
they are collecting personal data and receive consent "unambiguously" before proceed-
ing; second, data must be used only for the purposes stated during collection and not redi-
rected to other purposes; third and finally, the data collected must have a reasonable rela-
tionship to the purposes for which it is collected. In addition to these basic requirements, 
the Directive adds extra protection for "special categories," namely, "data revealing racial 
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union mem-
bership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life” (EU Directive, 1995; 
Goldsmith & Wu, 2006, pp. 174-175).31 
30 The early results of the Action Plan initiated hotline system—known as the International Association 
of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE)—were promising: between March 2003 and February 2004, the hotlines 
processed more than 250,000 reports, more than one third of which were related to child pornography, child 
trafficking, and sex tourism (INHOPE, 2004). The program subsequently expanded to 38 countries world-
wide, including some outside of the EU. In 2012, INHOPE’s 150 analysts processed 1,059,758 reports of 
illegal content. 96 percent of identified illegal content was reported to law enforcement within a day, and 88 
percent of it was removed from the Internet within a week (INHOPE, 2012).
31 The 2002 Electronic Communications Sector Directive (the “E-Privacy Directive”) and its 2009 amend-
ment further clarify this protection by requiring anyone who places cookies—small pieces of data that web 
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 Goldsmith and Wu (2006) note that what makes the DPD particularly controver-
sial is its aggressive geographic score. Article 4 of the Directive applies not only to com-
panies established in Europe but also to any company that makes use of data processing 
"equipment" or "means" in Europe, and to any company that may be reached “by virtue 
of international public law.” This means that EU countries can directly apply their nation-
al data protection legislations to non-EU based websites whenever they would make use 
of equipment located on the territory of the said countries (although not when the equip-
ment is used "solely for the transit purposes"), and this language has been interpreted by 
European officials to reach nearly any company that collects information from European 
citizens (EU Directive, 1995; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006, pp. 175-177). 
In July of 2002, the EU Internet Task Force began an investigation of Microsoft's 
Passport system—the predecessor to Windows Live ID, which was intended to function 
as a single sign-on service for all web commerce—to see if it complied with the 1998 
DPD. As issue was whether Microsoft was collecting more data than it needed for the 
purposes of its program. The EU had considerable leverage in its challenge of the Amer-
ican-based software giant as the European market accounted for about a third of Micro-
soft's sales. Capitulation was a foregone conclusion, and by January 2003 Microsoft and 
the EU had an agreement. Microsoft would “substantially modify" its Passport service 
to conform to EU privacy laws, including granting more user control over how data is 
shared (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006, pp. 175-177; Bennett, 2008, pp. 158-159). 
In 2012, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Cit-
izenship, announced a sweeping new “right to be forgotten” privacy proposal which 
would require companies like Facebook and Google to remove (a) content that a user 
posts about themselves and later regrets or simply wishes to see removed, even if said 
servers pass to a user's web browser while the user is browsing that website— to provide a “clear and pre-
cise” statement of what information was placed on the “terminal equipment.” The Directive also requires 
data controllers to ensure that the method for informing subjects must be “user-friendly.,” and that  users 
are provided with meaningful opportunities to refuse those files from being mechanically stored (Tsesis, 
2013).
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content (especially photos or comments revealing personal information) have already 
been widely distributed, and (b) content that another users posts about someone else that 
the second party finds objectionable. The onus would then falls on the original user to 
prove that the said content falls within the exception for journalistic, artistic, or literary 
content. Under the language of the proposal, Facebook and Google could be held liable 
for up to two percent of their global income if they fail to remove content when request-
ed. The right was designed to address a real problem familiar enough to anyone with a 
digital footprint on social media networks, but its approach is so broad that New Republic 
editor Jeffrey Rosen (2012) referred to it as “the biggest threat to Internet free speech in 
the coming decade," and warned that unless the right was scaled back and more precisely 
defined, it could "transform Google, Yahoo, and other hosts of third party content into 
censors-in-chief for the European Union, rather than neutral platforms.” 
The "right to be forgotten" has been rebranded as the “right to erasure” in the 
imminent EU Data Protection reform. Article 17 of this new EU General Data Protection 
Regulation represents a lesser obligation for content hosts than the original proposal, but 
still gives data subjects the right to request that data controllers delete any personal data 
relating to them, and ensure there is no further dissemination of such data (Baker, 2013, 
Oct. 21). The reform is also intended to establish a single, pan-European law for data pro-
tection, replacing the current inconsistent patchwork of national laws, and thus creating a 
single supervisory authority instead of a far-more-cumbersome twenty-eight. But the pro-
posed reform suffered a major setback in December 2013, after the European Council's 
legal service chief questioned whether this "one-stop shop" measure was lawful, opining 
that it might breach European citizens' human rights (Fiveash, 2013, Dec. 9).
Goldsmith and Wu (2006, p. 176) note that the combination of Europe's enormous 
market power, its concern for its citizens privacy, and the impracticality of tech compa-
nies implementing privacy policy changes in one region only has effectively transformed 
European Union directives into global law. This is due to a simple economy-of-scale 
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assessment. The California emissions standards is an illustrative example of this effect: 
when California sets new emission standards for cars, it is more cost effective for auto-
motive manufacturers to build cars to the California standard for the entire United States 
rather than producing two sets of the same vehicles. This is known as the “California 
Effect,” and the influence of European Union directives on tech policy issues is evidence 
of a similar  “EU effect” operating on a larger scale.   
National policy. While EU Directives produce policy harmonization on Single 
Market-related telecommunication, e-commerce, data privacy issues, a number of import-
ant Internet control policies remains firmly in the ambit of national governments. Perhaps 
most critically, national policy makers dictate the definition and designation of “illegal” 
and “harmful” online content and decide what measures should be taken to filter or other-
wise censor it. National courts have also pushed back against the 2006 EU Data Retention 
Directive (DRD), thus staking out a degree of policy autonomy in this controversial area. 
Finally, EU member states maintain their own state security and intelligence agencies, 
which vary considerably in their surveillance and data gathering capabilities. 
While European countries generally maintain relatively liberal free speech pol-
icies, several governments do attempt to restrict certain types of online content. These 
efforts stand in sharp contrast to the American conception of free expression. Most of 
these restrictions relate to intellectual property and certain types of pornography—espe-
cially child pornography, but also sexual content labeled as “extreme”—rather than overt 
attempts to stifle political dissent. More controversially, however, some European nations 
have in place laws prohibiting incitement to racial hatred, the espousal of neo-Nazi views 
and ideologies, Holocaust-denial, and the display, possession, or sale of neo-Nazi mem-
orabilia. The source of the proscribed content is generally irrelevant; the laws apply as 
long as said content is made available to citizens of the respective European country.32 
32 French criminal law, for example, applies where criminal offences are committed on the territory of the 
French Republic (Article 113-2 of the Penal Code) and where a primary offence committed in another 
country is aided and abetted in France (Article 113-5). 
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This, of course, means that European courts can attempt to impose their restrictive speech 
laws on US-domained websites that are acting within their rights under the laws of the 
United States. Understandably, this leads to complicated and controversial disputes, 
including one of the most well-known and widely cited challenges to the conception of an 
unregulable Internet: LICRA vs. Yahoo (Paulson, 2003).
 In 2000, a French judge ruled that US-based Yahoo! Inc. had to prevent French 
users from accessing a Yahoo hosted site auctioning Nazi memorabilia or pay a hefty fine. 
Yahoo CEO Jerry Yang defiantly stated that the company would not “change the content 
of our sites in the United States just because someone in France is asking us to do so,” 
and the company’s lawyers appealed on the grounds that such geographic based filtering 
was technically impossible (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006, pp. 5-7). Several American and Eu-
ropean experts, however, testified that IP-identification technology could effectively filter 
the content for 90 percent of French users, and the judge upheld the decision. Yahoo final-
ly removed the Nazi-related content from the French version of its portal, although only 
after the French court threatened to seize the company’s French assets, including income 
from a sizeable subsidiary (Breindl, 2013). Goldsmith and Wu (2006), and others have 
noted that the Yahoo! decision seemed to undermine the illusion of a borderless Internet. 
In the French conception, the Internet must honor national borders and national laws. The 
decision represented “a direct attempt by a foreign nation to apply its law extraterritori-
ally to restrict the expression of US-based online speakers who are protected by the First 
Amendment” (Corn-Revere, 2003, p. 223).
Several incidents in the early aughts exemplified the friction between European 
speech restrictions and the relatively unrestricted online content streaming from websites 
domained in the United States and elsewhere outside of Europe. In 2002, Italian police 
closed down five US-based websites featuring blasphemous content, which remains ille-
gal not only in Italy but in several countries across Europe, including Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Malta and Poland. The websites in question were created in Italy and hosted by 
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Internet providers in Washington, D.C., and California. Police used the suspects’ com-
puter to remove the offense material from the US-domained websites and replace it with 
crest of the special police unit involved in the case. The crackdown followed a Vatican 
position paper calling for restrictions on the Internet's "radical libertarianism ” (Associat-
ed Press, 2002, July 10; Corn-Revere, 2003, p. 224). 
 In 2001, Der Spiegel reported that the German Interior Minister Otto Schily was 
contemplating perpetrating denial-of-service attacks to disable neo-Nazi websites do-
mained in the United States. Such attacks would be legal, according to Schily, because 
they represent "the defense of our system of laws against illegal attacks by those who 
consciously exploit the international medium of the Internet." Schily later backed off 
that idea, and instead pressed US Attorney General John Ashcroft to exert pressure on an 
American Internet service provider to remove the offending content (Kettmann, 2002, 
Jan. 10; Greene, 2001, April 9; Patalong, 2001). In 2002, a German district government 
obliged 56 ISPs to restrict access to four websites domained in the United States which 
contained right-wing extremist material.33 Furthermore, according to a study published by 
the Berkman Center for Internet and Society in 2002, a number of websites with neo-Na-
zi and other objectionable material were completely or partly excluded by the German 
version of the search engine Google. YouTube has also removed content to comply with 
the demands of German law (Deibert, 2010c; Zittrain  & Edelman, 2002).
While European governments have attempted to impose speech restrictions 
universally, European national courts have emerged as an important defender of user 
privacy domestically. The EU Data Retention Directive (DRD) was proposed following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th attacks as part of a flurry of anti-terror measures in 
the EU. The Directive obliges all ISPs and telecommunications service providers operat-
ing in Europe to collect and retain a subscriber's incoming and outgoing phone numbers, 
33 Because of the federal structure of Germany’s political system, Internet content removal and filter-ing can be initiated at the regional level.
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IP addresses, location data, and other key telecom and Internet traffic data for a period 
of six months to two years for later access by law enforcement. Many EU member state 
transposed the Directive into national legislation, including Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Norway, and the United Kingdom. Countries outside the Eu-
ropean Union such as Serbia and Iceland have also adopted data retention laws (Ermert, 
2013, July 05; EFF, ND).
But the DRD was met with considerable resistance in several member states. 
While mass protests did not kill the legislation, national Constitutional Courts have issued 
decisions striking down national data retention laws for violating human rights. Nations 
contesting the Directive include Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, and Roma-
nia. The DRD was adopted in Romania, but declared unconstitutional in 2009. In Febru-
ary 2011, Cyprus declared their national data retention law unconstitutional. The Courts 
in Bulgaria declared mandatory data retention laws unconstitutional and the German law 
adopting the Directive was declared unconstitutional in March 2010 (Ermert, 2013, July 
05; EFF, ND). In December 2013, the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice 
opined that the directive is incompatible with Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The case combined challenges from Austria and Ireland that wanted proof that 
massive data collection is proportionate, necessary, and efficient. While the opinion is 
not binding on the European Court of Justice, in the majority of cases advocate general 
opinions are followed  (Robinson, 2013, Dec. 12; Ermert, 2013, Dec. 13).
Surveillance. The European Union has never established a EU-level intelligence 
agency, although there have been recent calls to create one as a  "counterweight" to the 
US’s National Security Agency (Whittaker, 2013, Nov. 5). However, the EU does pos-
sess some intelligence assets. The European Police Office, or Europol, is essentially an 
analytical intelligence agency, while the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) is 
a small foreign intelligence analytical unit that reports to the External Action Service, 
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the EU’s embryonic diplomatic corps.  Both agencies handle data categorized as signals 
intelligence—including Internet communication—however, neither Europol nor INTCEN 
maintain their own intelligence collection facilities (Jeffreys-Jones, 2013, pp. 222-223; 
Jeffreys-Jones, 2013, March 19). INTCEN's staff is very small—a mere 70 people, 
including temporary agents—and the agency depends upon the security and intelligence 
services of member states (European Parliament, 2012). The European Union Agency 
for Network and Information Security (ENISA) works to prevent and address network 
security and information security problems, and releases an annual “Threat Landscape” 
report that identifies the top cyber-threats. Its operations are, however, better categorized 
as information analysis than intelligence gathering. 
Many of the national intelligence services are quite sophisticated. Recent report-
ing from The Guardian (Borger, 2013, Nov. 2; MacAskill, Borger, Hopkins, Davies, Ball, 
2013, June 22)—largely drawn from Britain intelligence agency documents leaked by 
former NSA contractor Edward Snowden—suggests that the German, French, Spanish, 
and Swedish intelligence services have all developed methods of mass surveillance of In-
ternet and phone traffic over the past five years in close partnership with Britain's GCHQ 
signals intelligence agency, which has also collaborated with the NSA. Like much of the 
NSA’s eavesdropping, this bulk monitoring is carried out through direct taps into fiber 
optic cables and through covert relationships with telecommunications companies. The 
communications GCHQ has been able to capture include phone call recordings, email 
messages, Facebook posts, and users’ Internet browsing history for both targeted suspects 
and entirely innocent people. All of GCHQ’s communication surveillance activities have 
been deemed legal, even though the warrant system was supposed to limit interception to 
a specified range of targets.
The Guardian’s analysis of the Snowden documents emphasizes that “GCHQ has  
become Europe's intelligence hub in the [I]nternet age, and not just because of its success 
in creating a legally permissive environment for its operations. Britain's location as the 
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European gateway for many transatlantic cables, and its privileged relationship with the 
NSA has made GCHQ an essential partner for European agencies” (Borger, 2013, Nov. 2, 
p. 1). The leaked documents suggest that the French and Spanish agencies had compara-
ble capabilities, largely owing to their relationships with unidentified telecommunications 
providers. Swedish and Dutch agencies appeared to have more limited capabilities, owing 
in part to legal restrictions, although the GCHQ has provided legislative guidance to both 
countries.
A recent joint study by the German think tank Neue Verantwortung and the US-
based New America Foundation found that the legal foundations, focus, and government 
oversight of the NSA, GCHQ, and Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany’s  intelli-
gence service, are all quite similar. The report finds that the underlying laws supporting 
the programs have the same structure, although the “interpretation of how these laws are 
applied may diverge (Heumann & Scott, 2013, p. 2).
The authors criticize the weakness of legal controls for intelligence services, 
which they argue are far too limited:
In all three countries the intelligence agencies enjoy great discretion and indepen-
dence when it comes to the collection of foreign intelligence. Legal restrictions 
and oversight mechanisms are only concerned with the protection of the rights of 
each country’s own citizens. And, in most cases, these restrictions come into place 
mainly after the interception and collection of telecommunications traffic has 
already occurred (Heumann & Scott, 2013, p. 2).
All three countries, they conclude, lack robust systems for judicial review to protect citi-
zens from undue surveillance.  The authors note that of the three countries, Great Britain 
has the weakest oversight mechanisms as it lacks institutionalized review of surveillance 
programs from both the legislative and judicial branches of government (Heumann & 
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Scott, 2013; Biermann, 2013, Oct. 4).
Key Interests. The presence of large Internet and ICT companies within a coun-
try should confer a greater degree of Internet control to the extent that said companies are 
regulated by domestic laws and cooperate with government intelligence agencies.34 But 
while Europe features enormous market power that it has leveraged into substantial influ-
ence in tech privacy policies, the region’s tech sector is not especially strong—especially 
when compared to the United States. Only four European companies—SAP (Germany), 
Accenture (Ireland), Atos (France), and Ericsson (Sweden)—are included in Booze & 
Company's most recent ranking of the world’s top 20 ICT companies (Acker, Geerdes, 
Frone, & Schroder, 2013). And none of the world’s top 10 dot-com Internet companies on 
the Forbes Global 2000 list are European (DeCarlo, S. (2013). 
The tech sector gap between Europe and the United States is becoming more 
pronounced for several reasons. First, Silicon Valley is uniquely appealing to Euro-born 
tech entrepreneurs because of it deep talent, linkages with nearby tech players, and ample 
venture capital funding. Second, Europe features strict labor laws which are acutely prob-
lematic in the tech sector, with features high job mobility and fast growing competitors. 
Third and finally, fewer European graduates are entering the job market with engineering, 
science, or technology degrees, and tech companies have had to look elsewhere for top 
talent (Palmer, 2011, June 8; Alderman, 2014, Jan. 3). 
This imbalance is unfortunate given the World Wide Web’s European roots. While 
the modern Internet is generally perceived as an American invention, British computer 
scientist Tim Berners-Lee invented the Web’s hyperlink system while working for the Eu-
ropean Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva. Not only did Berners-Lee 
lay the foundations for the Web, he founded the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 
34 This is not true in all instances, of course. Many hedge funds are domained in the Cayman Islands, and 
few if any observers would argue that the national government there exude much influence over global 
finance. But states with even a moderate institutional capacity are generally able to leverage the presence of 
large tech companies into at least a degree of Internet control. 
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1994 to set standards and specifications for the Web's growth. France also contributed to 
the technology’s growth through Minitel, a popular and influential pre-World Wide Web 
online service developed at the behest of the French government in the late 1970s (Jones, 
2003; Schofield, 2013, June 27).35
One tech field Europe excels at is piracy. The Pirate Bay—one the largest and 
most notorious piracy sites (hence the name)—was founded in Sweden in 2003. The Pi-
rate Bay and other Swedish file sharing sites are part of a strong and influential anti-copy-
right movement in the country whose values are perhaps best expressed by the country’s 
"Pirate" political party. Pirate Parties have also emerged in Austria, France, and Great 
Britain (Miegel & Olsson, 2008; Putzier, 2013). 
 The 2004 EU Directive on the civil enforcement of intellectual property rights 
(known as the "(IPR) Enforcement Directive") required EU member states to apply ef-
fective remedies and penalties against those engaged in copyright infringement. But the 
directive was substantially changed due to widespread criticism of its seemingly draconi-
an approach, and the national laws that followed proved to be largely fangless (Whittaker, 
2013, April 15). An International Chamber of Commerce report claimed that Europeans 
downloaded €10 billion worth of pirated music, film, television shows and software from 
the Internet in 2008 (Tera Consultants, 2010). 
More recent national Internet control policies across Europe represent a crack-
down on illegal downloading. Perhaps most notable among these is HADOPI, a French 
anti-piracy law introduced during 2009 by the then president Nicolas Sarkozy that would 
have disconnected users suspected of copyright infringement from the Internet after 
multiple violations. France's highest court, the Constitutional Council, subsequently 
declared the main part of the bill unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the 1789 
35 Subscribers and terminal users could use the service to search the telephone directory, make train res-
ervations, check stock prices, and chat with one another well before America Online and other companies 
brought the World Wide Web to American homes. At one point, nine million Minitel sets were installed in 
households around the country, reaching an estimated 25 million users.
113
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The Council later approved a revised 
version of the law, but after public outrage HADOPI was finally revoked in July 2013 as 
the government conceded that the punitive penalties imposed on copyright infringers was 
disproportionate to the crime. The law was replaced with a system of automatic fines, and 
the government shifted its focus from individual users to “commercial piracy" and "sites 
that profit from pirated material" (Reporters Without Borders, 2012e; Datoo, 2013, July 
9).
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a multinational treaty for the 
purpose of establishing international standards for intellectual property rights enforce-
ment, would have allowed the EU and other global law enforcement agencies to impose 
new criminal sanctions on users who violate copyright and patent laws, but the agreement 
died in the European Parliament in 2012 following Parliament rapporteur David Martin’s 
statement that “[t]he intended benefits of this international agreement are far outweighed 
by the potential threats to civil liberties” (BBC, 2012, April 16).  
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Chapter Four
Conclusion
Research Summary 
The introduction to this paper detailed how the mechanisms through which gov-
ernments attempt to control the Internet may be developed and implemented by different 
institutions and agencies, or fall outside of a formal regulatory structure entirely. As such, 
the totality of the institutions and practices of national Internet control is better conceptu-
alized not as a regulatory regime, but as a control regime. This broader definition captures 
the different methodological and descriptive approaches used in prominent  “Internet 
Freedom” reports and in Internet policy literature more generally, and thus allows for a 
more effective comparative approach. This paper then sets out to answer the following 
research question: What are the different Internet control regimes at the national level 
and how are they different? I argue that the wide range of Internet control regimes can be 
best classified using a typological approach. 
The Internet control regime typology I construct in this paper is not intended 
to exhaustively capture and exclusively categorize every country's respective Internet 
control regime configuration. Rather, it classifies the most common and most prominent 
control regime types. The typology identifies groupings of countries exhibiting densely 
linked shared characteristics and presents them as "models"—effectively ideal types, or 
more specifically constructed types to the extent that they are analogous to a measure of 
central tendency. The typology should be considered a refinement of Eko’s (2001; 2008) 
typology of Internet regulatory regimes. While Eko’s work is a very useful starting point, 
his analysis is (a) focused on regulation, not control, and (b) largely centered on govern-
mentality, a concept that by itself does not adequately or consistently capture important 
policy regime variations. The six dimensions used in this typology are derived from 
public policy, Internet policy, and policy regime literature, and are intended to capture 
all of the relevant aspects of Internet control. In using a multidimensional, descriptive 
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approach, my proposed typology more accurately identifies the compounds of conceptual 
attributes that comprise particular types. 
By detailing the typology dimensions and explaining their applicability to In-
ternet control policy, the paper addresses several corollary questions raised by the main 
research question. The answers reinforce the notion that Internet control regime variables 
are densely linked. First, what does “control” of the Internet constitute and what are the 
technical mechanisms through which it can be achieved? Per Eriksson and Giacomello 
(2009), control of the Internet occurs across three dimensions: (1) access to the Internet, 
(2) functionality of the Internet, and (3) activity on the Internet. The mechanisms for 
control vary by dimension, but effective control across all three dimensions—especially 
activity—is contingent upon institutional ability. Second, what are the variations in the 
strategic and administrative aspects of Internet control? The strategic aspects generally 
reflect (a) governing regime type, especially as it reflects upon the degree of political 
pluralism allowed, and (b) particular normative factors related to policy makers’ concep-
tion of the “public interest.” Administrative aspects reflect policy goals and institution-
al ability, and are thus closely linked with the level of control. Third, why do different 
governments adopt particular control regimes? This typology does not purport to explain 
why governments choose different control regimes, but the analyzed country profiles 
suggest that the characteristics identified above—especially governing regime type, 
normative factors, and institutional ability—are key factors in that decision. Fourth and 
finally, what are the results, limitations, and unintended consequences of control efforts? 
All three factors vary considerably across model types and from country-to-country. But 
the friction Zheng (2007) identifies between China's contradictory Internet regulatory and 
control policies is evident in many cases—especially with regard to state surveillance, 
which often occurs outside of a regulatory framework. 
The typology identifies six main Internet control regimes: Cuban model, Chinese 
model, Russian model, developmental model, United States model, and European mod-
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el. The first three models capture authoritarian governing regimes which maintain tight 
"command-and-control" of their countries' respective Internet architectures through a cen-
tral "gateway" agency which regulates access. But these control models are very different 
beyond these few shared characteristics: Cuban model countries feature very low Internet 
penetration levels and focus their limited control resources on regulating Internet access 
through national intranets and closely monitored Internet cafés; Chinese model countries 
feature moderate levels of Internet penetration, and focus their ample control resources 
on regulating Internet activity through extensive filtering and surveillance systems; and 
Russian model countries feature relatively high levels of Internet penetration, and only 
indirectly control the Internet through sophisticated propaganda and strategically timed 
cyberattacks.
The developmental model applies to developing-level countries with proactive 
Internet policies that leverage the technology as a tool for social and economic growth. 
Developmental model countries feature democratic governing regimes or even semi-au-
thoritarian governing regimes with relatively few restrictions on Internet activity. These 
countries feature varying levels of Internet control, and may even maintain gateway 
model institutional arrangements through which a government ministry maintains sub-
stantial regulatory authority over otherwise private ISPs. Filtering and surveillance in 
developmental model countries is, however, less pronounced than in authoritarian coun-
tries, and democratic institutions provide a public check on Internet policy issues. Some 
developmental countries suffer from a lack of effective control mechanisms due to mini-
mal institutional capacity.
The United States model of Internet control narrowly applies to the United States 
only.  While at least a few other countries feature a relatively self-regulatory approach to 
Internet regulation, the US also features several unique functional control mechanisms 
through its indirect control of the Domain Name System management body and global 
data encryption standards. In addition, the presence of so many global Internet giants 
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within the US grants the government regulatory authority over not only its own nation-
al corner of the Internet, but also the multinational tech corporations that shape Internet 
development and maintain giant troves of personal and business data for users across the 
globe The NSA's collaboration with these companies has given the agency incomparable 
surveillance capabilities. 
The European model applies to many countries within the European continent, 
where co-regulation is the general and leading model of regulation. Although much re-
gional Internet content analysis focus on the role of the European Union in harmonizing 
member states’ respective Internet regulatory policies through directives, other important 
aspects of Internet control—including the definition and designation of “illegal” online 
content, telecommunication data retention policy, and the institutional capacity to carry 
out enforcement—vary significantly from member from member. Moreover, Switzerland, 
Norway, and several smaller European countries are not part of the EU, but their regu-
latory approach to the Internet is quite similar. EU member and non-member states all 
maintain their own security and intelligence agencies, which vary considerably in their 
surveillance and data gathering capabilities.
Research Significance, Limitations, and Analysis 
The Internet control policy regime concept allows for a more effective compara-
tive approach as particular mechanisms of control commonly identified in Internet policy 
country profiles from Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, the OpenNet Initia-
tive, and other organizations are clearly operating outside of a formal regulatory frame-
work. This is especially true of national information shaping strategies and enforcement 
at the source actions under authoritarian regimes, and surveillance efforts under both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes. In addition, important aspects of functionality are 
not always considered in comparative accounts. The significance of the US’s indirect 
control of ICANN, for instance, can be overstated, but the degree to which Russia, China, 
Iran, and other authoritarian countries have lobbied to put root authority under the fold of 
118
a UN body should underscore the continued importance of the Domain Name System. 
With the exception of the United States model, the identified control regime mod-
els capture clusters of countries sharing densely linked attributes. Some countries do not 
fit cleanly within the typology categories, however. These include Australia, New Zea-
land, Canada, and several Pacific Asian countries—especially South Korea and Taiwan—
which feature unique control arrangements that mix attributes from other models, yet are 
not similar enough to one another across dimensions to justify a separate model. Filtering 
efforts in South Korea, for example, target content related to conflict and security (partic-
ularly regarding North Korea), and should be considered within the context of particular 
geopolitical factors that would be represented in the International factors dimension. A 
proposed mandatory filtering system in Australia, on the other hand, would have targeted 
sexually explicit content—a reflection of the country’s socially conservative culture that 
would be captured in the Ideas dimension. In a sense, these outliers could be categorized 
as European model countries—minus, of course, the harmonizing influence of the Euro-
pean Union—as they all feature co-regulatory approaches to filtering and content regula-
tion. But, again, these countries vary significantly on other dimensions, and no one coun-
try represents a prominent enough model of control to justify another model category. 
The Internet control regime typology outlined in this paper reflects a policy 
dynamic that could shift rapidly in the years ahead.  ICANN board member Wolfgang 
Kleinwächter (2013, Dec. 21) anticipates a “worst case” scenario in the near future in 
which the Internet may become increasingly fragmented and nationalized. A number of 
governments already employing Chinese model control regimes are developing the legal 
and technical abilities to more rigorously regulate their national Internet segments, which 
could eventually be walled off from the “world wide” Internet entirely à la the Intranets 
still used by Cuban model countries. Browsing outside of national domains may require 
special passwords handed out by governmental authorities on an annual basis. This could 
produce a greater number of control regime categories, as national regimes could become 
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more distinct as they become more influential as gatekeepers.  
This scenario seems far-fetched, but a more organic balkanization is already oc-
curring on culturally defined corners of the Internet. Taneja and Wu (2013) identify a set 
of 37 “culturally defined markets”—collections of popular websites that seem to be vis-
ited predominantly by people who share languages or cultures. Language, while a pow-
erful factor in explaining this clustering, is not the sole factor: the fourth largest cluster 
is predominately French language sites, but also includes a substantial number of Arabic 
language websites domained in Northern Africa, suggesting a distinct Francophone cul-
tural corner of the web. Likewise, there is a clear cluster of Indian sites mostly in En-
glish, but distinct from the North American / UK / Australian cluster. An exception to the 
geo-linguistic clusters is football (soccer) sites, which appear to have a truly transnational 
audience. The authors’ findings suggest that culture is a more powerful force towards 
Internet balkanization than government regulation (Zuckerman, June 2). Such natural 
clusters, however, actually make it easier for governments to control the parts of the In-
ternet most significant to them: the Chinese language cluster, for instance, is of far greater 
concern to CCP authorities than any other segment of the Internet, and as more Chinese 
users gravitate to this cluster—especially via Beijing-approved apps such as Weibo—the 
government’s Internet surveillance efforts become that much easier. Likewise, Russian 
authorities are likely less concerned with scathing criticism of Putin published in promi-
nent English-language dailies than they are with the everyday communications occurring 
across "Runet," the Russian language portion of the Internet. 
Opportunities for Further Research  
Recent revelations about the extent of the NSA’s capabilities underscore the im-
portance of integrating state surveillance into Internet policy analysis. The impact of sur-
veillance on user behavior is generally indirect, and the change in user behavior may be 
minimal depending on the perceived punishment. But the ability to intercept email, read 
ostensibly private social media posts, and access user browsing records is clearly a form 
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of control, whether done with proper oversight within a well-defined legal framework or 
not.  A typology of state Internet surveillance regimes could explore distinctions between 
surveillance techniques, institutional arrangements, and legal frameworks (or the lack 
thereof) in more detail. Such a typology would be especially useful for democratization 
analysis. Although the Arab Spring and similar uprisings provide anecdotal evidence that 
ICT-emboldened activists can continue to catch regimes off guard, a wealth of evidence 
suggests authoritarian regimes have utilized ICT to create sophisticated surveillance sys-
tems that can enhance and optimize their repressive capabilities. 
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Appendix 
Freedom on the Net vs. Freedom in the World Scores
Freedom on the Net Freedom in the World 
Angola 34 5.5
Argentina 27 2
Armenia 29 4.5
Australia 18 1
Azerbaijan 52 5.5
Bahrain 72 6
Bangladesh 49 3.5
Belarus 67 6.5
Brazil 32 2
Burma 62 5.5
Cambodia 47 5.5
China 86 6.5
Cuba 86 6.5
Ecuador 37 3
Egypt 60 5
Estonia 9 1
Ethiopia 79 6
France 20 1
Georgia 26 3
Germany 17 1
Hungary 23 1.5
Iceland 6 1
India 47 2.5
Indonesia 41 2.5
Iran 91 6
Italy 23 1.5
Japan 22 1.5
Jordan 45 5.5
Kazakhstan 59 6.5
Kenya 28 4
Kyrgyzstan 35 5
Lebanon 45 4.5
Libya 45 4.5
Malawi 42 3.5
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Malaysia 44 4
Mexico 38 3
Morocco 42 4.5
Nigeria 31 4.5
Pakistan 67 4.5
Philippines 25 3
Russia 54 5.5
Rwanda 48 6
Saudi Arabia 70 7
South Africa 26 2
South Korea 32 1.5
Sri Lanka 58 4.5
Sudan 63 7
Syria 85 7
Thailand 60 4
Tunisia 41 3.5
Turkey 49 3.5
UAE 66 6
Uganda 34 4.5
Ukraine 28 3.5
United King-
dom 24 1
United States 17 1
Uzbekistan 78 7
Venezuela 53 5
Vietnam 75 6
Zimbabwe 54 6
Result Details & Calculation
X Values
∑ = 2723
Mean = 45.38
∑(X - Mx)
2 = SSx = 25726.18
 
Y Values
∑ = 245.5
Mean = 4.09
∑(Y - My)
2 = SSy = 216.75
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X and Y Combined
N = 60
∑(X - Mx)(Y - My) = 2002.39
 
R Calculation
r = ∑((X - My)(Y - Mx)) / √((SSx)(SSy))
 
r = 2002.39166666667 / √((25726.18)(216.75)) = 0.85
Meta Numerics (cross-check)
r = 0.85
Key
X: X Values
Y: Y Values
Mx: Mean of X Values
My: Mean of Y Values
X - Mx & Y - My: Deviation scores
(X - Mx)
2 & (Y - My)
2: Deviation Squared
(X - Mx)(Y - My): Product of Deviation Scores
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